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1. Introdnction 
Global climate change is the most serious threat currently facing humanity. 
Although the increase in the Earth's temperate is a natural occurring phenomenon, 
anthropogenic interference has being speeding up this process at an alarming rate. 
Eleven out of the twelve years from 1995-2006 are among the twelve warmest years in 
record.! Increases in sea level, decreases in snow and ice, alteration in rainfall patterns, 
changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme whether events are some observed 
causes linked to global warming. The causation between human activities and global 
warming is established by the increase in greenhouse gases ("GHG") emissions coming 
from growing energy demand, transport, industry, deforestation and agriculture sectors. 
Greenhouse gases are so called because while they allow sunlight to come through the 
atmosphere, they trap the heat produced thereof impeding it from being released back 
out of the Earth. 
In comparison with pre-industrial levels, concentration of carbon dioxide 
("C02") in the atmosphere increased from 280 parts per million ("ppm") to 379 ppm in 
2005.2 CO2 is the main anthropogenic greenhouse gas. Higher concentrations ofGHGs 
in the atmosphere have rise to a point that led the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change ("IPCC") to conclude that "[m]ost of the observed increase in global average 
temperatures since the mid_20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in 
anthropogenic GHG concentrations.,,3 In that sense, regulating human activities 
worldwide to address the threats due to global climate change is the major challenge 
facing the international regime launched by the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change ("UNFCCC") in 1992. 
Because over half of the anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions come from 
the energy, industrial and transportation sectors, international policy efforts have 
concentrated with more emphasis on diminishing fossil fuel consumption through 
1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), !PCC'S FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHES!S REPORT 30 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4 syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC Fourth Assessment Report]. 
2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC'S FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 37 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/svr/ar4 svr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC Fourth Assessment Report]. 
3 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC's FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 39 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/svr/ar4 svr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC Fourth Assessment Report]. 
( 
investment in alternative sources of renewable energy. In addition, recognizing that 
these sectors are the main drivers of industrialization - a process until very recently 
restricted to developed countries - the climate change regime focused throughout the 
90s on trying to impose quantified emission reductions and commitments upon those 
most industrialized nations. That was partially accomplished with the international 
community agreeing upon the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC in 1997 and, more 
importantly, with its entering into force in 2005. 
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However, the 90s also experienced alarming rates oftropical deforestation which 
is another major source of greenbouse gas. That drove international attention to a 
problem that went beyond the impairment of natural ecosystem services related to 
forests, including, but not limited to, maintaining biodiversity, regulating hydrological 
cycles and local climate patterns, protecting water and land resources, serving as 
recreational and spiritual refugees, alleviating poverty and improving air quality. 
Considering that the amount of carbon stored in forest biomass and soil currently 
outweighs the total amount of carbon in the atmosphere, growing rates of deforestation 
impose just a serious of a threat than the burning of fossil fuels.4 As a consequence, 
attempts of holding developed countries accountable for forestry practices domestically 
and jointly - with another developed andlor developing country - marked the climate 
change regime negotiation process. 
In addition, growing international consensus over developing countries' taking 
on quantified and concrete commitments of some sort in light of the rapid 
industrialization process some of them are currently undergoing (i.g. China and India) 
or due to increasing rates oftropical deforestation verified in others (Lg. Brazil and 
Indonesia) is contributing to expand the role forest and forestry practices are likely to 
play in a post-2012 climate agreement. 2012 is when the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol is set to end. Negotiations over a post-20l2 agreement are expected as 
the outcome of the forthcoming Conference ofthe Parties in its fifteenth session to be 
held in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. Moreover, growing private investments in the 
forestry sector has been indicative of the increasing perception of the importance of 
4 See Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAOJ, Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, Executive Summary, xvi, xvii (FAO Forestry Paper 147, 2006), 
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resource 
Assessment 2005] ("It is estimated that the world's forests store 283 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon in their 
biomass alone, and that the carbon stored in forest's biomass, dead wood, litter and soil together is more 
than the amount of carbon in the atmosphere."), 
• 
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promoting forest conservation and regeneration practices as an essential climate change 
mitigation strategy. 
Effective protective forest regulation has been traditionally a great challenge for 
various reasons. Up until when scientific knowledge effectively started to establish 
causation between unsustainable forestry practices and increasing global temperatures, 
forest resources and its related ecosystem services were dealt domestically as part of 
any country's rightto exploit its own natural resources. Because domestic legal 
frameworks traditionally have not recognized the value of a forest's ecosystem services 
beyond just those commercially tradable goods such as timber and the land itself, a 
perverse deforestation incentive prevailed over conservation and regeneration practices. 
That started to change in the early 90s with the release of alarming rates of deforestation 
and the tighter link with a global environmental problem: climate change. After the Rio 
Summit in 1992, the Parties had [mally realized that deforestation was no longer a 
problem of domestic significance, but rather, it was affecting negatively the entire 
world. 
Along with attempts to address global warming by expressly including the 
promotion of sustainable forestry practices in the 1992 UNFCCC, the Parties agreed 
upon the 1992 Conventions on Biological Diversity ("CDB") and to Combat 
Desertification ("CCD"); the non-legally binding forest principles of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED"); Chapter II of Agenda 21; 
and the conception of the United Nations Forum on Forests ("UNFF") in 2000. Those 
are all illustrative of the solidification of international consensus throughout the 90s that 
additional forest ecosystem services are a matter of common concern of humankind. 
They were also important in fostering domestic protective forest legal frameworks 
recognizing those priceless ecosystem services. Although the 2005 Global Forest 
Resource Assessment of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
("FAO") identified worldwide progress in slowing down deforestation for the period 
1990-2005, in developing countries deforestation rates are still high.5 Not surprisingly, 
Brazil itself accounts for 24% of the total net loss in the period.6 
5 See Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, Executive Summary, xiv, (FAO Forestry Paper 147,2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/ A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resource Assessment 
2005]. 
6 See Food and Agriculture Org. ofthe U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, Executive Summary, xiv, (FAO Forestry Paper 147,2006), available at 
( . 
( 
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In light of the failure ofthis non-binding set of international policies and even of 
the emergence of domestic forest protective legal frameworks, economic forest market 
incentives can offer an ultimate hope to save the remaining world's forest stocks while 
also promoting regeneration practices. Essentially, what the climate change regime and 
parallel voluntary initiatives are attempting is to market a forest's carbon sequestration 
potential and other ecosystem services by attributing them a price and putting into place 
a property right regime upon credits arising thereof. Unfortunately, though, more active 
international involvement and domestic action aimed at saving the forests worldwide 
came too late for one of the world's most important forested ecosystems: the Brazilian 
Atlantic Rainforest. 
Since the first wave of European explorers have discovered and settled on the 
region comprising the Atlantic Rainforest more than five hundred years ago, the biome 
underwent major transformation. From intense lumbering, natural resources' 
exploitation, unsustainable agriculture practices and, more recently, a growing industrial 
demand, very few preserved areas still remain. Consequently, on one of the most 
biodiverse biomes on Earth that is over twice the size of France, only 7.26% remains 
preserved 7 and upon which hope currently lies on a domestic command-and-control 
regime that has proven insufficient to curb deforestation practices. Socio-economic 
challenges such as demographical pressure and growing agriculture and industrial 
demands contribute even further for the failure of the command-and-control regime 
currently in place. 
It is against this ecological and socio-economic background that this study 
takes the Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest biome as a case study to analyze whether 
existing market-based economic incentives can assist on maximizing the forest's 
protective legal framework in place. But first, understanding forests in the global 
context is useful to differentiate and identifY the Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest's 
ecological and socio-economic particularities. An overall trend can influence the 
conceptual nature of different economic instruments. For areas that still preserve large 
stocks of primary forest, a market-based tool valuing ecosystem services in the format 
of crediting avoided deforestation practices is better suited. On the contrary, for 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/faoI008/A0400E/A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resource Assessment 
2005]. 
7 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Floresta;s da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005,74 (2008) available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site media! A TLAS%20MA TA %20A TLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORl02000-2005.pdf(last visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
forested areas under advance stages of degeneration and deforestation, market-based 
incentives that are not limited to valuing those remaining protected areas, but that also 
include crediting from regeneration, reforestation and afforestation activities is 
preferable. 
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Under the international climate change regime, a regulatory forestry market-
based economic incentive was introduced by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Of relevance to 
the case study of the Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest proposed by this study, the Parties 
agreed upon the Clean Development Mechanism ("CDM") which is a market-based 
incentive allowing developed countries to invest in greenhouse gas offsetting projects in 
developing countries. However, after a contentious negotiation process, the Parties 
decided to limit the scope of allowable forestry activities under the CDM to human-
induced afforestation/reforestation projects. Conflicting interests ranged from the fear 
that cheap forestry credits could undermine domestic action towards curbing greenhouse 
gases emissions to apprehension that conservation projects could bring about a new 
form of colonialism, the so-called eco-colonialism. One that would allow developed 
countries to buy forested areas in developing countries and thus interfere directly with 
their development goals. In addition, strict set of technical rules was put into place to 
assure that forests underlying issued carbon credits were not disturbed and did not lead 
to deforestation elsewhere undermining the credibility ofthe forest carbon market. As a 
result, in comparison with energy efficiency and renewable energy project-activities, 
forestry projects in the regulatory market are significantly underutilized and have not 
been proposed to a point that can positively impact the problem of global warming. 
One the flip side, another major consequence of an over bureaucratic set of rules 
and policies for forestry project under the regulatory CDM market, an increased number 
of voluntary initiatives started to rise. For different reasons, including merely 
philanthropy or promoting corporate environmental and social responsibility, private 
entrepreneurs started to invest voluntarily in parallel forest projects. Because under 
those voluntary initiatives no set of binding rules apply, projects ranged from an array 
of conservation, regeneration and reforestation/afforestation activities. Envisioning 
benefits beyond just climate change mitigation, important not-for-profit organizations 
started to develop standards for certification of additional ecosystem services. Albeit 
still limit in absolute numbers voluntary forestry projects are growing exponentially. 
This study examines these voluntary initiatives in light ofthe existing Atlantic forest's 
II 
legal framework to conclude that they can also assist on maximizing the efficacy of the 
current command-and-control regime. 
Along with the growing international pressure for some key developing 
countries to take on some sort of concrete binding commitments under the climate 
change regime, the increasing carbon forest market triggered attempts to expand the 
scope of current allowable forestry activities for the post-2012 period. Developing 
countries would be permitted to participate by hosting not only 
afforestation/reforestation projects, but would also by being accountable and 
participating with reducing emissions from forest degradation and deforestation 
("REDD"). The benefits are just as promising as the challenges facing the inclusion of 
REDD activities into the climate change legal regime. Depending on how the rules of 
REDD are negotiated, biomes with higher rates of primary forest, such as the 
Amazonian one, tends to take more advantage than the already degraded Atlantic 
Rainforest one. However, even if restricted to those last remaining areas of primary 
Atlantic forest or to those under advanced degree of degeneration, REDD activities can 
constitute an important maximization tool to the command-and-control regime currently 
in place. 
In sum, the problem this study aims at examining is whether the current 
Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest's legal framework is sufficient to promote conservation 
and regeneration practices. Because only 7.26% of the forest is preserved and 
deforestation is still happening, this study turns to analyzing whether existing forest 
market-based economic incentives can assist on maximizing mandatory and/or non-
legally binding conservation and regeneration practices. For that, this study takes into 
consideration: existing political and legal obstacles, technical methodological 
challenges and the Atlantic Rainforest's ecological and socio-economic hurdles. 
Finally, whether Brazil's forest legal framework is receptive of auxiliary market-based 
economic incentives and how it should be construed in light of the rules of the current 
available regulatory and voluntary carbon markets constitute the core problems 
examined by this work. 
In order to address each ofthe above stated problems, this study is dived into six 
main chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to situate forests in the global context and 
providing a detailed description of the Atlantic Rainforest's history, ecological features, 
geographical and demographical information and its potential contribution to emissions 
and removals of greenhouse gases. Considering the traditional trend of not valuing 
• 
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ecosystem services, this first chapter introduces the notion of economic incentives to 
promote forest conservation and regeneration policies highlighting existing market-
based approaches. The goal is twofold: first, to compare the Atlantic forest's reality and 
characteristics with a worldwide deforestation trend; second to provide an 
understanding of the nature of existing carbon forest market schemes and how they 
operate. 
Next, this study presents an overview of the evolution of the forest market-based 
approaches internationally. Since the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol is the dominant 
regulatory market influencing various trading schemes around the world, understanding 
how the international community overcame conflicting interests and technical obstacles 
to build consensus over such an economic incentive is crucial to identifYing its practical 
implementation challenges. Subsequently, chapter four builds upon the analysis ofthe 
previous chapter by laying down the evolution of the CDM's legal and institutional 
framework. Being able to visualize the legal and institutional framework is critical to 
understanding the operational and bureaucratic bottlenecks of a CDM forestry project 
implementation process. 
Having stressed down the Atlantic forest's main ecological and socio-economic 
features and constraints along with the implementation challenges of the dominant 
carbon forest market, the fifth chapter turns to examining current obstacles to, and 
impacts of, forestry activities specific to the Atlantic Rainforest biome. Then, this study 
provides a thorough analysis of the current command-and-control regime governing 
conservation and regeneration practices in the Atlantic forest. It examines the legal 
framework in light of the procedural rules of the regulatory market while assessing the 
maximization potentialities of both voluntary and regulatory carbon forest markets. 
Before a conclusion can be draw, the final chapter provides policy recommendations to 
overcome the identifiable obstacles to, and adverse impacts of, carbon forest markets in 
the Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest. 
2. Forests in the Global Context 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
("FAa"), out of the world's 3.5 billion hectares of forests, currently only 35% remains 
( 
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primary forests. 8 Primary forests are defined as "forests of native species, in which 
there are no clearly visible indications of human activity and ecological processes are 
not significantly disturbed.,,9 Almost half the world's primary forests are in South 
America. JO Brazil is by far the country with the largest stocks, accounting for 31 %.11 
The next ten countries in this list, account for almost 90% of the world's total areas of 
primary forests. 12 Albeit alarming, the worldwide and Brazilian averages of remaining 
primary forest are far higher than that of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest, 7.26%,13 which 
makes it one of the most threatened forests in the world. 14 The table and figure below 
borrowed from the 2005 FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment illustrate these data: 
8 See Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, 41 (FAO Forestry Paper 147, 2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resource Assessment 
2005]. 
9 See Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, Executive Summary, xv, (F AO Forestry Paper 147, 2006), CNailable at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/ A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resource Assessment 
2005]. 
10 Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, 41 (FAO Forestry Paper 147,2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resource Assessment 
2005]. 
11 Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, 41 (FAO Forestry Paper 147, 2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resource Assessment 
2005]. 
12 Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, 41 (FAO Forestry Paper 147,2006), available at 
ftn:llftp.fao.orgidocrep/fao/0081 A0400EI A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resource Assessment 
2005]. 
13 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005,74 (2008) available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site medial A TLAS%20MA TA %20ATLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORI02000-2005.pdf(last visisted Jun. 23, 2008) 
14 See Mirian Prochnow, Mata Atlantica [Atlantic Forest], in ALMANAQUEBRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL 144, 
144 (Beto Ricardo and Maura Campanili eds., 2008) (stating that after the Madagascar forests, the 
Atlantic Rainforest is the most endangered in the world). 
E-astem and Southern Africa 18 214589 94.7 12241 
Northern Africa 12 117193 89.4 13919 
Western and Central Afrka 17 99556 35.8 11510 
Total Africa 47 431347 67.9 37669 
East Asia 5 244862 100.0 21800 
South and Southeast Asia 17 283126 100.0 62900 
Western and Central Asia 23 43579 100.0 2810 
Total Asia 45 571 567 100.0 87526 
Total Europe 36 983907 98.3 263948 
caribbean 12 4090 68.5 60 
Central America 7 22 411 100.0 9139 
North America 4 677 464 100.0 302456 
Total North and Central America 23 703965 99.7 311 656 
Total Oceania 11 203455 98.6 35275 
Total South America 12 783 827 94.3 601 689 
Source: 2005 FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment 
FIGURE 33 
Ten countries with largest area of primary forest 2{)OS 
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Source: 2005 F AO Global Forest Resources Assessment 
Brazil 
RUS$ian FederatIon 
II Canada 
II United States 
iii Peru 
II Colombia 
II Indonesia 
jill£: Mexico 
• Bolivia 
B Papua New GuiMa 
Remainlng countrIes 
5.7 
11.9 
11.6 
8.7 
8.9 
22.2 
6.4 
15.3 
26.8 
1.5 
40.8 
44_6 
44.3 
n.s. 
76.8 
0-81 
0·20 
0-45 
O-Sl 
6-46 
1-100 
0-72 
0-72 
0-32 
6-59 
2-70 
34-53 
2-70 
n.s.~S9 
10-96 
31 
19 
12 
S 
5 
4 
4 
3 
2 
2 
11 
14 
The main cause of forest loss is deforestation due to growing agricultural 
demand. Although forested areas continue to disappear, the 2005 F AO Global Forest 
Resource Assessment reveals that the rate of net forest loss is slowing down. According 
to this report, the trend can be attributed to "forest planting, landscape restoration and 
( 
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natural expansion of forests".!5 Of importance to this study though the report does not 
mention whether the evolution of worldwide economic incentives as instruments of 
environmental policy are also underlying causes of decreasing deforestation rates. 
Within the South American context, deforestation rates do not accompany this 
worldwide trend. To the contrary, deforestation rates in the continent are increasing. 
South America is leader in forest loss accounting for 4.3 million hectares per year.!6 The 
figure below reveals the location of remaining forested areas worldwide. 
FIGURE 1 
The world's forests 
Forest 
Other wooded land 
Other land 
Water 
Source: 2005 FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment 
This overall panorama of forest loss around the world is crucial to raising 
policy-makers attention in light of different socio-economical and environmental 
15 Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, xii (FAO Forestry Paper 147, 2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resource Assessment 
2005]. 
16 Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, xii (FAO Forestry Paper 147,2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/A0400E/ A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resource Assessment 
2005]. 
• 
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services provided by forests. 17 Forests are not only essential to serving as carbon sinks 
and reservoirs of'carbon dioxide ("C02"). They also serve as sources of food, fiber and 
fuels, are essential to preserving watersheds, regulating hydrological cycles and local 
climate, along with their invaluable aesthetic and biodiversity attributes.!S Not to 
mention, economically measurable goods such as timber and products thereof. 
However, because those aforementioned ecosystem services attributed to forests 
were traditionally oflocal concern!9 and considering forests fall within national 
territories, losses of forests were essentially a domestic problem in a battle fought 
between conservationists and developers?O In the beginning of the 1900s, for instance, 
conservationists alerted that destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest was 
extending the dry season, increasing regional temperature extremes and reducing 
rainfall patterns?! International preoccupation was restricted to non-profit organizations 
with a worldwide reach but it was insufficient to launch action among sovereign nations 
towards agreeing upon a transnational forest legal regime. 
It was not until the second half ofthe 1900s that scientific knowledge evolved to 
understanding the link between deforestation and global wanning.22 Uncertainty ofthe 
potential consequences due to increasing global temperatures accomplished in the 
international arena what the growing loss of other ecosystem services due to 
deforestation failed to achieve. It launched international awareness to a problem that 
17 See Manuel Estrada POlTua and Andrea Garcia-Guerrero, A Latin American Perspective on Land Use, 
Land-Use Change, and Forestry Negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, in CLlMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS-EMERGING POLlCY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
209,211 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Although national circumstances vary widely, in most Latin American countries forests are valued 
highly for their environmental, social, cultural and economic benefits."). 
18 World Resources Institute [WRIJ. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Biodiversity Synthesis, III 
(2005). available at httn:/lv{Vv·w.millenniumassessment.org/enlSynthesis.aspx [hereinafter Biodiversity 
Synthesis]. 
19 See Manuel Estrada Ponua and Andrea Garcia-Guerrero, A Latin American Perspective on Land Use, 
Land-Use Change, and Forestry Negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
209,213 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
(noting that in Latin America, large human populations "are heavily dependent on forests for food, 
particularly in tropical South America. Changes to forests therefore affect people's quality of life and 
their social and cultural customs directly and sometimes dramatically."). 
zo A pioneer multilateral agreement dating back to 1979 recognizes deforestation and changes ofland use 
are a major cause ofincreasing concentrations of carbon dioxide ("COz" ) in the Atmosphere. See World 
Climate Conference, Geneva, Switz. Feb. 12-23, 1979, Declaration of the World Climate Conference, at 
2, U.N. Doc. IOC/SAB-IVIINF.3 [hereinafter Declaration of the World Climate]. 
21 WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- 'THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC 
FOREST 242 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995). 
2Z See World Climate Conference, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 12-23, 1979, Declaration of the World Climate 
Conference, at 2, U.N. DOC IOC/SAB-IV/INF.3 (constituting one of the first international agreements 
recognizing the scientific work linking deforestation practices and increasing global temperatures). 
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was no longer of local concern. Because forests could act both positively and negatively 
to mitigating or contributing to climate change, respectively, the international 
community started to pay closer attention to the problem. That eventually led to 
international action resulting in the inclusion of forests in different multilateral 
environmental agreements as a problem that had to constitute a common concern of 
humankind in spite of the sovereignty right principle upon this precious natural 
resource.23 The following section is dedicated to demonstrate how scientific knowledge 
evolved to linking forest and forestry practices to global climate change. 
a. The Science Linking Forest and Forestry Practices to Global 
Climate Change 
Of the six greenhouse gases regulated by the climate change legal regime, CO2 
is the most common one.24 Other gases and group of gases include: methane ("ClL,"), 
nitrous oxide ("N20"), hydrofluorocarbons ("HFCs"), perfluorocarbons ("PFCs") and 
sulphur hexafluoride ("SF6,,).25 All ofthese other gases are measured in CO2 equivalent 
according to their greenhouse potentials.26 Global warming potentials for each of the 
regulated gas and group of gases are defined by scientific work compiled by the 
23 Forests were featured, for instance, in the 1992 UNFCee, the 1992 Conventions on Biological 
Diversity ("CDB") and to Combat Desertification ("CeD"); in the non-legally binding forest principles of 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED"); in Chapter 11 of Agenda 
21; and in the conception of the United Nations Forum on Forests ("UNFF") in 2000. See Convention on 
Biological Diversity, UNEP, June 5,1992, pmbl., 31l.L.M. 818, 822 [hereinafter Convention on 
Biological Diversity] ("Affirming that the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of 
humankind. "), 
'4 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC'S FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REpORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REpORT 36 (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pd£.assessment-report/ar4/svr/ar4 syr. pdf [hereinafter IPee Fourth Assessment 
Report] ("Carbon dioxide (CO,) is the most important anthropogenic GHG [greenhouse house gas]."). 
25 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Annex A, Dec. 10, 
1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. . 
26 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), !PCe's FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REpORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REpORT 36 (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4 syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report] (,'COrequivalent emission is the amount of CO] emission that would cause the same time-
integrated radiative forcing, over a given time horizon, as an emitted amount of a long-lived GHG or a 
mixture of GHGs. The equivalente CO2 emission is obtained by multiplying the emission of a GHG by its 
Global Wanning Potential (GWP) for the given time horizon. For a mix ofOHOs it is obtained by 
summing the equivalent CO2 emissions of each gas. Equivalent CO2 emission is a standard and useful 
metric for comparing emissions of different GHGs but does not imply the same climate change 
responses. "). 
18 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPcc"i7 according to article 5.3 ofthe 
Kyoto Protocol.28 For example, one metric ton ofC~ equals 23 metric tons of CO2 
considering methane has a twenty-three times higher global warming potential than 
carbon dioxide?9 Thus, the relationship between forests and C02 in the atmosphere is 
characterized by forests' ability to absorb C~, store C02, and offset greenhouse gas 
emissions?O 
Growing forests and plants, through photosynthesis, have enormous carbon 
sequestration capabilities. Long established old-growth and mature forests can store 
significant amounts of carbon for long periods of time.31 Nonetheless, when disturbed 
forests no longer playa role in mitigating global warming; rather, they become part of 
the problem because they turn into a considerable source ofC02.32 According to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC"), a "source" is 
"any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a 
greenhouse gas into the atrnosphere.,,33 Forests will act as sources of CO2 when the 
27 See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") Official Homepage, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2009) (containing detailed information on the 
IPCC's mandate and role within the climate change regime); see RICARDO BAYON, AMANDA HAWN AND 
KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS - AN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO 
WHAT THEY ARE AND How THEY WORK 4 (Earthscan 2007) (2007) ("A group of scientists associated 
with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has determined the global warming 
potential (GWP) of each gas in terms of its equivalent in tons of carbon dioxide (i.e. tC02e over the 
course of 100 years,"); 
28 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 5(3), Dec. 10, 
1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
29 RICARDO BAYON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS - AN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEy ARE AND How THEY WORK 4 (Earthscan 2007) (2007). 
30 See Pedro Moura Costa & Charlie Wilson, An Equivalence Factor Between CO2 Avoided Emissions 
and Sequestration - Description and Applications in Forestry,S MITIGATION ADAPTATlONSTRATEGIES 
FORGLOBALCHANGE51, 51 (2000). 
31 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CUMATE CHANGE ("!PCC" ), IPCC SPECIAL REPORT: LAND USE, 
LAND·USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY ("LULUCF") - SUMMARY FORPOLICYMAKERS 4 (2000), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/srlulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter !PCC SPECIAL REpORT ON LULUCF] (" Newly planted 
or regenerating forests, in the absence of major disturbances, will continue to uptake carbon for 20 to 50 
years or more after establishment, depending on species and site conditions, though quantitative 
projections beyond a few decades are uncertain."); Hawk Jia, Old-Growth Forests are "Key Carbon 
Sinks" , SCIDEV.NET, Dec. 1,2006, http://www.scidev.netlcontentlnews/englold-growth-forests-are-kev-
carbon-sinks.cfm (citing a recent study showing that 400-years-old forest in southern China soaks up 
carbon significantly faster expected). 
32 See KENNETHL. ROSENBAUN ET AL, FOOD & AGRIGULTUREORGANlZATION OF THEU.N., CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND THE FOREST FACTORS: POSSIBLE NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONALLEGISLA TION 2 (2004), 
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/v5647e/y5647eOO.pdf(" Actively growing trees and other 
plants capture CO2 from the atmosphere, combine it with water through photosynthesis and create sugars 
and more stable carbonhydrates. They may store a significant part of the carbon absorbed for appreciable 
lengths oftirne, from years to millennia .... Eventually, when plants and animals die, CO2 returns to the 
atmosphere. When wood products and other organic materials burn or decompose, they also release 
CO2,''). 
33 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 1(9), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107 [hereinafter VNFCCC]. 
( 
ecosystem's capacity to uptake carbon is limited; when the rate of photosynthesis no 
longer rises with the concentration of CO2; or when anthropogenic or natural factors 
cause ecosystem degradation.34 
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In a reflection of this common scientific understanding, the UNFCCC embraced 
the role of forest conservation practices and called upon all parties to promote, and 
cooperate in the enhancement of sinks and reservoirs35 while respecting the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility.36 But since the UNFCCC, negotiations upon 
an international legal regime recognizing climate change mitigation potentials and 
threats due to forestry practices and disturbances was fueled by a variety a different 
conflicting interests examined in deeper details in chapters 3 and 4. In light of the 
sovereignty barrier facing any attempt upon building legally-binding forestry rules, the 
forest framework under the UNFCCC emerged from an agreement around the 
utilization of economic incentives in the format of market-based schemes aimed at 
promoting forestry practices. Notwithstanding, prior to analyzing the efficacy of this 
kind of regulatory approach as applied to the Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest, the 
following section is dedicated to examining the challenges intrinsic to regulating forests 
in general. 
h. Forest Regulation (Command-and-Control Regime and Economic' 
Policy Instruments) 
Traditionally, a forested area has been valued for the direct economic goods and 
services that could benefit an individual and/or the state. Additional social and 
environmental services were despised.37 In the past, that was due mainly to the lack of 
34 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC SPECIAL REPORT: LAND USE, 
LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY ("LULUCF") - SUMMARY FORPOLICYMAKERS 4 (2000), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/srlulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter IPCC SPECIAL REpORT ON LULUCFj. 
35 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4(1) (d), May 9,1992,1771 
U.N. T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
36 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3(1)., May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. See generally PmLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W 285-89 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing, in detail, the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility). 
37 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC 
FOREST 242 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (describing that with respect to the Atlantic Rainforest, 
"[n]earlyall of those scientists and public figures who adopted conservationist positions despaired of the 
average citizen's indifference or hostility toward the natural environment."). 
• 
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scientific certainty linking additional ecosystem services to human vital needs.38 
Consequently, a general legal system of public concessions and private property was 
sufficient. Thus, whenever a forest was seen as an insurmountable obstacle to 
development it was simply cleared or converted into agricultural use. Because forested 
areas were once abundant and population density rather low, upon exhaustion ofthe 
natural resource or land under exploitation, the area was simply abandoned and more 
forests were cleared. In many circumstances, this scenario reflects the history of the 
Atlantic Rainforest.39 
As scientific knowledge evolved to recognizing ecosystem services (social and 
enviromnental) inherited to forests, the need for state intervention through regulation 
emerged.40 And that was based on a fundamental premise: in the absence of a legal 
framework capable of recognizing social and environmental services by imposing 
restrictions upon forest exploitation, decisions are likely to prioritize exhaustion for 
rapid and maximum benefits.4 ! The logic is that without a price for ecosystem services, 
private landowners bear conservation and regeneration costs and society shares the 
benefits.42 
38 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC 
FOREST 243 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("Conservationist arguments were often based on nothing more 
than impressionistic observations, which pro-developmentalists confronted with impressionistic 
observations of their own."), 
39 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC 
FOREST 243 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("It was a major cause of the destruction of the Atlantic Forest 
that the government assigned no value to the land it so freely granted. Having consumed all the most 
promising primary forest in a given sesmaria, a grantee commonly sold it off for a trifle and asked for 
another, which he nonnally experienced no difficulty in obtaining."), 
40 See Rosimeiry Portela et aI., The Idea a/Market-Based Mechanisms/or Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
11,13 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby lanson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Whereas the private benefits afforest exploitation are valued through the market, social benefits are not 
valued in the market without some type of policy intervention. "), 
41 See PAULA. U. ALI & KANAKO YANO, Eco-FINANCE- THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULATION OF 
MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENTS 8 (Kluwer Law Int'12004) (2004) (stressing that "[aJ 
major impediment'to the adoption of sustainable forest management, particularly by forestry companies 
based or with forestry operations in developing countries, is the costs associated with the adopting such 
practices .... " Therefore, "the development ofaltemative sources of finance for forestry companies that 
have the potential to reduce sharply the funding costs of those companies is of considerable 
significance."). 
42 See Rosimeiry Portela et aI., The IdedofMarket-Based Mechanisms/or Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
11, 13 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("For many situations the market economy works well and provides the socially optimal level of goods 
and services. Yet for many other situations, such as the consumption of natural resources, market systems 
have led to excessive and unsustainable extraction. The reason many natural resources are not traded 
efficiently in market systems is that they do not meet wo crucial conditions necessary for a market 
outcome to be efficient: the good or service should be private rather than public, and there should be no 
difference between the private and social costs of producing the good or service. "). 
( 
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Mutatis mutandis, in a different scale, this premise is also valid for the 
relationship between countries with large forested areas and those with little or none.43 
Whereas the sovereignty principle in intemationallaw is equivalent to private property 
rights in domestic law systems,44 conservation and restoration policies in the priors 
benefit forestless nations or countries with little forest resources.45 But similarly to what 
happen on the national level, the costs of social and environmental services are 
distributed unevenly.46 
The solution to avoid what would be comparable to the "tragedy of the 
commons",41 but for forested areas, seems to be twofold: 1) a solely based command-
and-control regime with laws and regulations recognizing ecosystem services and 
imposing restrictions upon private proprietors and monitoring techniques for public 
43 See Kenneth Hanf, The Domestic Basis of international Environmental Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 1, 14 (Arild Underdal and Kenneth Hanf eds., 
2000) (explaining the difficulties in the implementation of international agreements because global 
environmental problems and the negotiations to address them tend "to penetrate societies in a more 
pervasive and direct way. They carry potentially high costs for important interests, such as producers 
and/or consumers of particular goods and services. "), 
44 See generally, Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 109, 151 (2009) ("Property rights are central to economic growth. It has been empirically 
demonstrated that the economies of nations which protect property rights grow more rapidly than those 
that do not. The international commons is no exception to this principle. Without some form of 
guaranteed property rights, development in the commons will be curtailed eve as technology 
meaningfully opens up the commons for the first time. "). 
45 See generally, STEPHEN J. DECANIO, ECONOMIC MODELS OF CLIMATE CHANGE- A CRlTIQUE 8 
(Paulgrave Macmillan 2003) (2003) (noting that "[tlhe distribution ofrights across generations, and 
within different groups of people presently alive (rich or poor in the United States, for example, or North 
or South in the world) is so important that prices, interest rates, incomes, and welfare all depend on the 
way the rights are allocated."). 
46 See STEPHEN J. DECANIO, ECONOMIC MODELS OF CLIMATE CHANGE-A CRlTIQUE 12 (Paulgrave 
Macmillan 2003) (2003) ("Today, the human impact on the climate (and the natural world more 
generally) has become massive and measurable. The consequences are severe, both in terms of likely 
future damages and in terms of the risk of catastrophic surprises .... If and when governments begin to 
address the consequences, and assign various kinds of environmental or climate rights to people 
(including future potential victims of climate change), the result will be a change in the allocation of 
wealth. This reallocation will significantly affect the outcome of market processes."). 
47 See generally Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28 STAN. 
ENVfL. L.J. 109, 118-119 (2009) ("The concept of a tragedy of the commons was first proposed in 1833 
by William Forster Lloyd, a fellow ofthe Royal Society, and was later popularized by Garrett Hardin. 
The theory suggests that unrestricted access to a resource ultimately dooms the resource to over-
exploitation. Hardin concluded that there was no foreseeable technical solution to increasing both human 
populations and standards of living on finite planet, stating, "Freedom is the recognition of necessity.' He 
suggested that 'freedom,' (i.e., the freedom to do as one pleases), is ultimately responsible for the tragedy 
of the commons. But overexploitation is not the only tragedy. Continued economic growth and resultant 
poverty alleviation requires new resources that may increasingly be found in the international commons. 
By recognizing resources as commons, and by agreeing that they require management, Hardin believes 
that we can preserve and nurture other more precious freedoms. Thus finding a solution to resource 
competition requires recognizing the necessity of preservation and responsible management through 
international cooperation to avoid both over- and under-exploitation. "). 
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forests.48 The downside is that such system only operates efficiently with strong 
institutions capable of promoting and putting in place compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms.49 Paraphrasing Tientenberg on this issue, "[0 )ne of the insights derived 
from the empirical literature is that traditional command-and-control regulatory 
measures, which depend upon govermnent agencies to define not only the goals but also 
the means for reaching them, are in many cases insufficiently protective of those 
resources or economically inefficient."so And 2) a command-and control regime mixed 
with economic policy instruments to balancing individual costs and collective social and 
environmental benefits. 51 A third approach would be taxing emissions regardless where 
they originate from (i.g. fossil fuel, land-use, forestry, etc).52 However, because at least 
presently this option is being left out from international and domestic policy initiatives, 
this study will focus in the prior two. 
Economic policy instruments of relevance to this study are those market-based.53 
They operate basically by pricing ecosystem services and thus creating a market for 
them. This is an approach that faces moral and ethical opposition.54 Although extreme 
valid concerns, these are considerations falling outside the scope of this study. Because 
48 See Kenneth Hanf, The Domestic Basis of International Environmental Agreements, in lNTERNA TIONAL 
ENVlRONMENTALAGREEMENTS AND DOMESTIC POLlTICS 1, 5 (Arild Underdal and Kenneth Hanfeds., 
2000) (noting that "[l]ike domestic society, international society in many areas is characterised by nOn-
hierarchical politics through which joint regulatory actions can be taken to deal with common problems. 
In such cases obligations do not emanate from a hierarchical norrn- and rule-setting process but from 
voluntary agreements to play by a set of rules which are binding in the sense that the create convergent 
expectations regarding acceptable govern behaviour." 
49 See PAUL A. U. ALI & KANAKO Y ANO, Eco-FINANCE- THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULATION OF 
MARKET·BASED ENVIRONMENTALINSTRUMENTS 8 (Kluwer Law Int'l2004) (2004) (comparing the 
downside of traditional command-and-control systems with market-based instruments, noting that solely-
based command-and-control policies "can lead to technology "freezes', since, once a company has 
achieved minimum compliance, the policies provide no incentive for that company to seek over-
compliance through the adoption of better pollution control technologies."). 
50 T. H. TlETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 1 (2006). 
51 See PAUL A. U. ALI & KANAKO YANO, ECO-FINANCE- THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULA nON OF 
MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENTS 7 (Kluwer Law Int'12004) (2004) ("Market-based 
instruments are seen as having two key advantages over traditional command-and-control policies: cost-
effectiveness; and technological innovation~ They give companies a strong economic incentive not only to 
adopt the most cost-effective means of achieving minimum compliance but also to exceed those 
minimum requirements .... "). 
52 G. CORNELIS VANKOOTEN, CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS 96 (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2004) 
(2004) (noting that "the least cost option appears to be that of taxing emissions when they occur, whether 
these are emissions from LULUCF activities or fossil fuel burning, and providing a subsidy of the same 
amount as the tax when carbon is sequestered through some sink activity."). 
53 See generally PAUL A. U. ALI & KANAKO Y ANO, Eco-FINANCE- THE LEGAL DESIGN AND 
REGULATION OF MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENTS g·9(Kluwer Law int'l2004) (2004) 
(listing the different fonnats economic market-based incentives can take). 
54 See generally JozefKeulartz, Kyoto and the Ethics of Flexibility, in READING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL-
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONVENTION ONCLlMATE CHANGE 117, 117-153 (Etienne Vermeersch ed., 
2005) (discussing the moral and ethical issues inherit to emissions trading). 
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economic instruments for forest conservation and regeneration are widely spread at the 
local, regional and international level, 55 the following sections concentrate on 
identifYing their specific format and peculiarities to focus on those market-based 
schemes available and applicable to the Atlantic Rainforest biome. 
i. Economic Incentives as Instrument of Forest Conservation 
and Regeneration Policies 
A variety of economic policy instruments for forest conservation and 
preservation exist.56 They can take the direct or indirect economic incentive format 
through the payment for conservation easements and regeneration efforts, or through tax 
abatement and subsidies, respectively. 57 Ecosystem compensation is another tool upon 
which some sort of development rights in any given place are tradable for compensation 
or regeneration efforts elsewhere.58 Or else, economic policy instruments can take the 
shape of a market, whereas ecosystem services are valued and, therefore, tradable in 
temporal and geographic scaJesjust like any other commodity. 59 Ecosystem markets, in 
tum, are widely spread around the globe in different types and modalities.60 According 
55 See generally Rosimeiry Portela et al., The Jdea a/Market-Based Mechanisms/or Forest Conservation 
and Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET 
OPPORTIJNITIES II, 21 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky 
eds., 2008) (providing a table illustrating existing carbon forest markets at the local, regional and 
intemationallevel). 
56 Note that the origin of economic market incentives as instruments of environmental policy dates back 
to the early 1970s, when "a group of experts from the academic community familiar with emerging 
literature on poperty rights suggested that it might be possible to improve upon this system by allowing 
firms to trade control responsibility among themselves by means of emissions trading. 'In this way, finns 
that could control relatively cheaply would voluntarily control more, selling the excess control to those 
that, for economic reasons, wanted to control less." See T. H. DETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 5 (2006). 
57 See PAUL A. U. ALI & KANAKO Y ANO, Eco-FINANCE- THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULA nON OF 
MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENTS 8 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2004) (2004) ("Environmental 
financing instruments - these include the levying of fees for the provision of environmental services and 
other instruments for the raising of funds for pollution mitigation or environmental conservation .... "). 
58 See Jose Marcos Domingues, Environmental Fees and CompensatOlY Tax in Brazil, 13 L. & BuS. REV. 
AM. 279, 297-298 (2007) (describing environmental compensation under the Brazilian National System 
of Conservation Units' Act according to which developers that cause forest degradation can compensate it 
by promoting forest conservation and regeneration in a different area). 
59 See J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, in 
PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE LA W AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, 22 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 157, 161-162 (2007) (describing the market and payment for ecosystem services). 
60 According to lB. Ruh! et ai, "[over 280 cases of payments have been documented for forest ecosystem 
services from around the world, not to mention mitigation markets, subsidy schemes, government 
competitive payments, etc." See J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of 
Ecosystem Services, in PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE LA 'w AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157, 162 (2007). 
to a compilation prepared by Rosimeiry Portela et ai., they include, market 
enhancement, creation and tradable permits.6 ! 
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Market enhancement refers to an array of different environmentally friendly 
initiatives, voluntarily in nature, aimed at getting financial support for those ecosystem 
services. These types of initiatives include certification or eco-labeling, marketing for 
nontimber forest products, sustainable timber management, bioprospecting permits and 
eco-turism.62 One main feature of market enhancement initiatives is that they are 
designed for conservation purposes and therefore presupposes existing forest stocks. 
One initiative worth of noticing within the Atlantic Rainforest is the conception 
in the mid-1990s by the Ministry of Environment of the National Biodiversity Program 
(PRONABIO). It refers to a market enhancement type of economic incentive related to 
the principles of the Convention on Biological Diversity. The PRONABIO is based on 
financial incentives with the objective of fostering conservation practices. This program 
has already identified key areas for conservation in the Atlantic Rainforest and is 
serving as an example of policy economic instrument towards the enhancement of the 
existing command-and-control regime.63 
Market creation, on the other hand, is based on a system that compensates 
landowners for conservation and reforestation practices.64 It is often linked to a trading 
scheme on which emission allowances are distributed among a close set of participants. 
By the end ofa predefined compliance period of time, each individual's overall 
emissions shall equal to the amount of allowances distributed upon the beginning of the 
61 See Rosimeiry Portela et at., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
11,16-19 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
(listing the different formats of economic forest incentives), 
62 See Rosimeiry Portela et aI., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
11, 16-17 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008). 
63 See Jose Carlos Carvalho, Policy Initiatives/or the Conservation afthe Brazilian Atlantic Forest, in 
THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 133, 134 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara 
eds., 2003) (,'Since the mid-1990s the Ministry of Environment has been carrying Qut the National 
Biodiversity Program (PRONABIO), Brazil's first government program with objectives directly related to 
the principles set forth in the Convention on Biological Diversity and Agenda 21. The work of 
PRONABIO starts from the premise that the effective protection, recovery, and sustainable use of 
Brazilian biological diversity must necessarily-depend on measures taken by public organizations and 
institutions, working both in situ and ex situ as well as on private property. Its mission statement caBs for 
the gathering, systematic compilation, and dissemination of information on biological diversity; the 
definition and application of instruments for the economic measurement of biological diversity; the 
implementation of conservation measures both in situ and ex situ; and the promotion use biological 
resources."). 
64 See Rosimeiry Portela et aI., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
11, 17 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008). 
( 
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program.65 Whenever an emission target is set low and participants are not able to reach 
it within a tradable permitting system, investment on avoided deforestation or 
afforestation/reforestation projects can be authorized in exchange for credits that can be 
used to meeting that emission target in the closed trading scheme.66 
That is the idea behind a carbon market, which translates into "the buying and 
selling of emissions permits that have been either distributed by a regulatory body or 
generated by GHG [Greenhouse Gas 1 emission reductions projects.,,67 Thus, a carbon 
forest market refers to the same idea, but with tradable permits and carbon credits 
deriving from conservation and reforestation targets and projects, respectively. Like any 
other economic policy instrument, it is a type of emissions-trading scheme designed to 
assist a command-and-control regime based on laws and regulations aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gases emissions and/or valuing other ecosystem services.68 
The differences within market creation are conceptual. A trading scheme can 
either take the format of a cap-and-trade program69 and a project-based market the 
format of a baseline-credit system.70 They both can be utilized for ecosystem 
conservation and restoration, contrary to market enhancement which is driven by 
conservation activities. Understanding the distinction between the two is crucial for the 
examination of whether carbon forest markets can be effective auxiliary incentives for 
successful conservation and regeneration policies for the Atlantic Rainforest. 
ii. Cap-and-trade and Baseline-Credit Schemes 
65 See PAULA. U. ALI &KANAKOYANO, Eco-FINANCE- THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULATION OF 
MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTALINSTRUMENTS 12-13 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2004) (2004) (presenting the 
characteristics shared by closed emissions trading markets), 
66 See Dennis Hirsch et aI., Emissions Trading - Practical Aspects, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
U.S. LAW 627,630-631 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) (explaining how project-based activities can be 
allowed in a closed market scheme), 
67 RICARDO BAYON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS - AN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEy ARE AND How THEY WORK 4 (Earthscan 2007) (2007). 
68 See T. H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE I (2006) (noting that emissions 
trading provides a cost-effective alternative additional to command-and-control regimes and that, "this 
general approach have spread not only to many different types of pollution in many different countries 
but are also being used to ration access to many other resources, including fisheries, forests, water, and 
land use control, among others."). 
69 See PAULA. U. ALI & KANAKO Y ANO, Eco-FINANCE- THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULATION OF 
MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTALINSTRUMENTS 14 (Kluwer Law Int'I 2004) (2004) (explaining how a 
cap-and-trade system functions). 
70 See PAUL A. U. ALI & KANAKO Y ANO, ECO-FINANCE- THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULATION OF 
MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENTS 15 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2004) (2004) (explaining how a 
baseline-credit system functions). 
/ 
26 
A cap-and-trade program is based on the regulatory work of an institution with 
powers to impose caps over different polluters within specific or various sectors of the 
economy. This regulatory institution can be international, domestic, or even a private 
organization. Private systems constitute voluntary programs with respect to adhesion, 
but are contractually binding with respect to compliance.71 In close systems, 
corporations meet their reduction commitments at the end of any given compliance 
period usually through investing in cleaner technologies, or buying available emission 
allowances from different facilities participating in the program.72 
Because all the players involved in such cap-and-trade programs enjoy reduction 
commitments, the system becomes self-regulated. The rationale is quite simple: if a 
regulated entity oversells its emissions allowances, by the end of the given commitment 
period it will lack the necessary amount of allowances to meet its own reduction 
commitments. All in all, the economic attractiveness of overselling emission allowances 
is undermined by the contractually based penalties inherent to non-compliance.73 
Such a market-based incentive can also operate for avoided deforestation efforts. 
An allowance-based program (cap-and-trade) for forest conservation is based on 
allocation of carbon stocks credits according to a country's amounts of carbon pools 
accumulated in tropical forests at a defined moment in time. Then, "[aJ certain 
percentage ofthese credits would have to be held constant within the country, and forest 
areas would be placed under protection. A quota of the credits would be available for 
trading among countries to allow for deforestation.,,74 This is viewed as the most 
71 Private regulated cap-and-trade programs are also called "hybrid systems." See Dennis Hirsch et aI., 
Emissions Trading - Practical Aspects"in GLOBALCLlMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 627,630 (Michael 
B. Gerrard ed., 2007) ("Hybrid systems share features of both closed and open-market programs. One 
form of hybrid system allows entities to 'Dpt in' to a closed cap-and-trade scheme. Entities that 
voluntarily choose to opt in are assigned an initial allocation, much as it they had been one of the covered 
sources to begin with. Thereafter, they have to meet compliance obligations just like any other member 
of the closed system and are able to transfer and/or acquire allowances from others."). 
72 See Dennis Hirsch et aI., Emissions Trading - Practical Aspects, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
U.S. LAW 627,629 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) ("Cap·and·trade programs require that at end ofa 
specified compliance period, each facility must hold the rights to enough allowances to cover its 
emissions for that period. Facilities can meet this requirement by reducing their emissions to the level of 
their allocation. Or, they can purchase emission permits from other sources that have reduced their 
emissions below their own allocation and so have excess allowances to sell."). 
73 See Dennis Hirsch et al., Emissions Trading - Practical Aspects, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
U.S. LAW 627,636 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) (referring to a pure cap-and-trade program, like the 
International Emissions Trading of the Kyoto Protocol, for which it "does not need many of the 
implementatIon rules common to baseline-credit systems. It contains no certification requirement, no 
baseline calculation methods, and no additionality mandate. "). 
74 Rosimeiry Portela et aI., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and Climate 
Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTIlNlTIES 11, 25 
(Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008). 
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promising program to boost conservation efforts worldwide.75 It is also part of a debate 
to include in the Kyoto Protocol's forest policy incentives a program allowing for 
avoided deforestation activities named "reduced emissions from deforestation and 
degradation" ("REED,,).76 Currently, forest conservation practices are not allowed 
under the climate change regime. Only afforestation and reforestation practices that are 
human-induced are permitted under the policy incentives created by the Kyoto 
Protocol.77 
In a project-based system, no emission limitations or reduction commitments 
exist. In this kind of program, an entity with emissions reduction targets imposed by a 
cap-and-trade regime is entitled to acquire or invest in a carbon offsetting project 
elsewhere, obtaining credits to meet its commitments before an allowance-based 
scheme.78 Or else, even if not regulated by a cap-and-trade regime, such an entity shall 
invest in carbon offsetting projects just for the sake of advertising its pollutant neutral 
business activity. Whenever that is the case, investment in conservation or regeneration 
forest projects belong to a voluntary market initiative, rather than as a result of a 
mandatory economic policy instrument imposed under the format of a regulated 
market.79 
75 See Rosimeiry Portela et aI., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
11,25 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("[W]hat holds the greatest promise for cost-effective climate change abatement and forest conservation 
is allowance-based emissions credits for developing countries that make commitments to reduce 
deforestation. "). 
76 See Andrew Schatz, Discounting the Clean Development Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 
703,733 (2008) ("While no current mechanism offers developing nations credits for preserving forests, 
parties at Bali agreed to begin work on such a program. The agreement on reducing emissions from 
deforestation in developing countries (REDD) paves the way for developing countries to receive subsidies 
for avoided deforestation. "). 
77 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume II), Decision l7/CP.7, , 7(a), U.N. DOC 
FCCCICPI200lI13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COP-7 Report - Part Two (Volume II)]. 
78 See Dennis Hirsch et al., Emissions Trading - Practical Aspects, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
U.S. LAW 627, 630 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) ("Baseline-credit emissions trading programs do not 
set an overall cap on emissions or allocate emissions allowances to sources. Instead, they allow sources 
to earn emission reduction credits by reducing their emissions below a specified baseline. Such system 
identify a 'baseline' emissions level for each individual sources. They then assign emission reduction 
'credits' to those entities that reduce their emissions below their baseline. Finns that obtain such credits 
can transfer them to other regulated parties who can use them to meet emission limits."). 
79 See Katherine Hamilton et a!., Carving a Nichefor Forests in the Voluntary Carbon Markets, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 292, 292-93 
(Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby lanson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("By 
definition the voluntary carbon markets consist of carbon offset trades that are not required by regulation. 
These trades include purchases in the rapidly growing retail offset markets, purchases of credits by 
organizations directly from project developers for retirement or resale, and donations to GHG reduction 
projects by corporations, which then receive credits."). 
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However, due to the possibility of credits being used as allowances within a cap-
and-trade program, strict rules of"additionality" and "identification of baseline 
scenarios" are required in baseline-credit schemes. That is the case of the Clean 
Development Mechanism ("CDM") of the Kyoto Protocol. Because CDM credits can 
be used within the cap-and-trade regime created for developed countries (emissions 
trading - "ET"), the offsetting project must demonstrate that the proposed activity is 
more progressive than what would otherwise happen without the project.80 But further 
considerations about the Kyoto Protocol project-based forestry economic incentives are 
dealt in deeper details in chapters 3 and 4. Prior to that, a panorama of existing forest 
market mechanisms is draw for the purpose of identifYing the ones applicable and better 
suitable to assist on maximizing the existing domestic command-and-control regime in 
place for the Atlantic Rainforest. 
The idea behind a market mechanism is that it cannot replace strong domestic 
policies towards ambitious emissions reduction targets.81 Political will and 
environmental awar 
c. Existing Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and 
Regeneration Practices 
29 
The first element to consider when analyzing existing market-based mechanisms 
for forest conservation and regeneration practices is the characteristics of the forest 
under examination. Most of what once was the Atlantic Rainforest is now taken by 
large metropolises, towns, agriculture and industry.83 The history of the settlement of 
the Atlantic Rainforest is detailed in the following section. Fact is that only 7.26% of 
the original forest cover remains preserved.84 Therefore, while economic policy 
instruments privileging conservation efforts are of great value for the few remaining 
primary forested areas, market-based incentives that include commercial or non~ 
commercial reforestation/afforestation and natural regeneration practices are likely to be 
more promising due to the current stage of deforestation of the Atlantic forest. 85 
Innumerous carbon markets current exist at the local, national and international 
level with different implementation rules, but they can be divided into two distinct 
categories examined in deeper details in the following sections: regulatory and 
voluntary markets.86 Then, this study turns to comparing the potentialities of both of 
them aiming at analyzing how conservation and regeneration practices under each of 
them can be applicable to the Atlantic Rainforest's biome. 
i. Voluntary Forest Carbon Markets 
83 See Mirian Prochnow, Mota Atlantica [Atlantic Forest], in ALMANAQUEBRASlL SOCIOAMBIENTAL 144, 
153-162 (Beta Ricardo and Maura Campanili eds., 2008) (listing the threats faced by the Atlantic forest, 
including urban sprawling and high demographic density). 
84 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Florestais do Mota Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005, 74 (2008) available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site medial A TLAS%20MA T A %20A TLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORI02000-2005.pdf(last visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
8S See Miriari Prochnow, Mata Atlantica [Atlantic Forest], in ALMANAQUEBRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL 144, 
152 (Beta Ricardo and Maura Campanili eds., 2008) (stressing that most of the few preserved areas of 
Atlantic forest fall within private property types of conservation units, so-called 'private reserves of 
natural patrimony'). 
86 See Katherine Hamilton et a1., Forging a Frontier: State a/the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2008, 
ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE & NEW CARBON FINANCE, 17 (2008) available at 
http://v.,'Ww.ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/cms documents12008 StateofV oluntatyCarbonMarke 
t2.pdf (last visited 31 Mar., 2009) ("In general, the worlwide carbon markets can be divided into two 
segments: the voluntary markets and the regulatory (compliance) markets.") . 
. ~ . 
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Voluntary carbon forest markets are based on an entity's will to invest in 
conservation or regeneration forest projects to offset its greenhouse gases emissions.87 
They almost always take the format of a project-based market incentive, because 
voluntary initiatives are not bound by any set of mandatory emissions reduction 
targets.88 One exception to this general rule is private cap-and-trade markets on which 
adhesion to the program is voluntary, but meeting emissions reduction targets is 
contractually binding.89 . 
In fact, one ofthe first voluntary market initiatives on record dates back to 1989 
and it was a forestry project-based one. Sponsored by AES Corporation, the project took 
place in Guatemala and consisted on "paying farmers in Guatemala to plant 50 million 
pine and eucalyptus trees on their land. AES, like any other companies since, hoped to 
reduce its 'carbon footprint' for philanthropic and marketing reasons, not because it was 
forced to do so by legislation or global treaty.,,90 Since then similar projects spanned 
throughout the globe, including in the Atlantic Rainforest.9! Due to the lack of 
regulating institutions, rules under voluntary markets are the ones defined by an entity's 
will or by any giving voluntary program currently in place.92 Therefore, projects can 
87 See Katherine Hamilton et aI., Carving a Niche/or Forests in the Voluntary Carbon Markets, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICV AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 292, 293 (Charlotte 
Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) (stating that an 
entity's (buyer's) will to invest in voluntary markets is driven by "the wish to manage climate change 
effects, interest in innovative philanthropy, desire for public relations benefits, the need to prepare for (or 
deter) regulations, and plans to resell credits at a profit. "). 
88 See Katherine Hamilton et ai., Forging a Frontier: State a/the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2008, 
ECOSVSTEM MARKETPLACE & NEW CARBON FINANCE, 18 (2008) available at 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/cms documents/2008 StateoN oluntarvCarbonMarke 
t2.pdf(last visited 31 Mar., 2009) ("Because this market is not part ofa cap-and-trade system, where 
emission allowances can be traded, almost all carbon offsets purchased in this voluntary market originate 
from project-based transactions."). 
89 See Katherine Hamilton et aI., Forging a Frontier: State o/the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2008, 
ECOSVSTEM MARKETPLACE & NEW CARBON FINANCE, 17 (2008), available at 
http://www.ecosvstemmarketplace.com/documents/cms documents/2008 StateofV oluntaryCarbonMarke 
tZ.pdf(last visited 31 Mar., 2009) ("At the broadest level, the voluntary carbon markets themselves can be 
divided into tow main segments: the voluntary, but legally binding, cap-and-trade system that is the 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), and the broader, non-binding, over-the-counter (OTC) offset 
market."). 
90See RICARDO BA VON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARVCARBON MARKETS-
AN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO WHATTHEv ARE AND How THEVWORK 12 (Earthscan 2007) 
(2007). 
91 In a project developed by Society for Wildlife Research and Environmental Education ("SPVS") - an 
Atlantic Rainforest based NGD - in partnership with The Nature Conservancy, American Electric Power, 
Chevron and General Motors, is promoting conservation and natural regeneration in an area of Atlantic 
forest of approximately 19,000 hectares. Projetos Sequestra de Carbono - Projetos de Ac;:ao Contra a 
Aquecimento Global [Carbon Sequestration Projects -Action Projects Against Global Warming], 
available at http://www.spvs.org.br/projetos/sdc index.php (last visited 6 Feb. 2009). 
92 See ANDREABARANZINIANDPHILIPPE THALMANN, VOLUNTARY APPROACHES IN CLIMATE POLICV 5 
(Edward Elgar 2004) (2004) (differentiating voluntary self-regulating approaches as "abatement efforts 
range from afforestation/reforestation like the abovementioned AES project in 
Guatemala, to conservation efforts like the aforementioned one referred to as taking 
place in the Atlantic forest.93 
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The lack of strict rules allowing for different modalities of project-based forestry 
activities is as promising as the criticisms over such initiatives. Under this unregulated 
environment, the voluntary market "suffers from fragmentation and a lack of widely 
available impartial information,,94, which transforms it into a large retail market, 
"composed of deals that are negotiated on a case-by-case basis, and that many of these 
deals neither require the carbon credits to undergo a uniform certification or verification 
process nor register them with any central body.,,95 That translates into the voluntary 
market's inability to provide a safe,96 uniform and transparent environment.97 
On the flip side, the lack of a strict mandatory regime lowers a project's costs of 
implementation and lessens transaction costs in comparison with regulatory markets.98 
Due to its flexibility, voluntary markets provide a fertile environment for innovation, 
allowing not only private and public organizations to trade carbon credits, but also 
individuals. That has an enormous educational potential, especially when taken into 
consideration that individual behavior enjoys a great share of the overall greenhouses 
emissions.99 
initiated by firms without substantial counterpart by the regulator" from those public voluntary 
programmes as "pachages of required efforts and compensations that firms can choose to accept or not. "), 
93 See Marisa Meizlish and David Brand, Developing Forestry Carbon Projects/or the Voluntary Carbon 
Market: A Practical AnalYSiS, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET 
OPPORTIINITIES 311, 313 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) (describing the different types of project-activities under voluntary carbon forest 
markets, including afforestation, reforestation. conservation and avoided deforestation). 
94 RICARDO BA YON, AMANDA HAWN AND KA THERINEHAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS - AN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEy ARE AND How THEY WORK 12 (Earthscan 2007) 
(2007). 
95 RICARDO BA YON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS - AN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEy ARE AND How n{EY WORK 12 (Earthscan 2007) 
(2007). 
96 See RICARDO BA YON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS-
AN INTERNATJONALBUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEy ARE AND How THEY WORK 12 (Earthscan 2007) 
(2007) ("Many buyers also say they are wary ofthe voluntary carbon market since transactions often 
carry real risks of non-delivery. Some companies buying carbon credits also fear that they will be 
criticized by NGOs if the carbon they are buying isn't seen to meet the highest possible standards. "). 
97 RICARDO BA YON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS - AN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEY ARE AND How THEY WORK 12 (Earthscan 2007) 
(2007). 
98 RICARDO BAYON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS - AN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEy ARE AND How THEY WORK 12-13 (Earthscan 2007) 
(2007). 
99 See RICARDO BAYON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS-
AN INTERNA TIONALBUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEy ARE AND How THEY WORK 13 (Earthscan 2007) 
(2007) ("Having weighed pros and cons, many non-profit organizations are supportive of the voluntary 
32 
Additionally, innovation in the voluntary market attracted NGOs' participation 
to enhance carbon storage and sequestration beyond climate change mitigation. Through 
the voluntary market, NGOs are developing sustainable development standards to 
include in forest conservation and regeneration projects additional ecosystem services 
ignored by the climate change regulatory market. IOO Unlike the international climate 
change legal framework, other ecosystem services provided by forests are dealt in the 
international level mainly by international cooperation resembling a domestic 
command-and-control regime.IOI That is the case, for instance, of the other "Rio 
Conventions": the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD") and the 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification ("UNCCD"). The general idea is 
that, because they do not rely on market-based incentives, their ability to maximize the 
means through which their provisions are enforced and complied with is limited. 102 
In light ofthe still limited size of voluntary markets to the point experts predict a 
twofold increase is not going to impact the problem of climate change, they can serve a 
carbon market because it provides individuals - not just corporations and large organizations - with a 
means of participating in the fight against climate change in a way that the compliance markets do not. 
And since individuals account for most of the GHG emissions currently being put into the atmosphere 
(more than 50 per cent by some counts; Siello, 2006\ some environmentalists view the voluntary carbon 
market as an important tool for educating the public about climate change and their potential role in 
addressing the problem."). 
100 See Katherine Hamilton et ai., Carving a Niche for Forests in the Vo/untwy Carbon Markets, in 
CLlMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 292, 300-305 
(Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) (listing 
different not-for-profit initiatives on an attempt to create a set of standards in the voluntary market that 
reaches beyond merely climate change mitigation). 
101 See generally Kenneth Hanf, The Domestic Basis of International Environmental Agreements, in 
INTERNATIONALENVlRONMENTALAGREEMENTS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS I, 5 (Arild Underdal and 
Kenneth Hanf eds., 2000) ("Analysts of international regimes as a vehicle for international cooperation 
recognize that the international community is not confronted with the choice between anarchic, 
competitive international politics and hierarchically-ordered international policy making. A further, and 
increasingly prominent, alternative is some form of international collective self-regulation, Le. the 
voluntary participation of states and other international actors in collective action to achieve joint gains or 
to avoid joint losses. International regimes are one manifestation of these efforts at collective self-
regulation by states. Like domestic society, international society in many areas is characterised by non-
hierarchical politics through which joint regulatory actions can be taken to deal with common 
problems."). 
102 See Rosimeiry Portela et aI., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLlMA TE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
11,25 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("At 
the intemationallevel, many environmental treaties, such as the UN Convention- on Biological Diversity 
and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, are in essence command-and-control regulatory' 
regimes. And although they represent important global efforts to protect natural resources, their ability to 
do so is often limited by their voluntary nature (no enforcement of compliance), their lack of binding 
obligations (with the exception of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, or 
CITES), and.the absence of sustainable funding mechanism."). 
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rapid and short-term solution for other ecosystem services.103 Although also object of 
international preoccupation, markets valuing biodiversity, aesthetic attributes, 
community-based educational opportunities, watershed protection, rainfall patterns, 
among others, are mainly of local and regional concern because these are the levels 
upon where the impacts oflosing ecosystem services are most severely felt. 104 
Following this tendency, voluntary forest initiatives in the Atlantic Rainforest are 
increasing. 
To this end, three major initiatives taking place on the Atlantic Rainforest biome 
are note worthy: 1) a 100 million dollars joint project among the HSBC, Climate Group, 
Earthwatch Institute, Smithsonian Institute of Tropical Research and Worldwide Fund 
for Nature (WWF). The project's aim is fourfold: watershed protection, mitigation of 
the impacts of CO2 concentration in large metropolitan areas, biodiversity and tropical 
forest research and individual engagement on raising environmental awareness;105 and 
2) a project developed by Society for Wildlife Research and Environmental Education 
("SPVS") - an Atlantic Rainforest based NGO - in partnership with The Nature 
Conservancy, American Electric Power, Chevron and General Motors aimed at 
promoting conservation and natural regeneration in an area within the Atlantic forest of 
approximately 19,000 hectares. 106 A third voluntary initiative worthy of noticing is 
underway under the auspices of The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance 
("CCB"), but has not yet been implemented on the Atlantic Rainforest as per the writing 
of this study. According to the project's design document, the proposed activity 
"constitutes the first stage of an overarching reforestation scheme aiming at the 
103 See RICARDO BA YON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS-
AN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEy ARE AND How THEy WORK 12 (Earthscan 2007) 
(2007) (referring to a general feeling that the voluntary market still needs to increase in quantity and 
volume to actually impact the problem of global climate change). 
104 See Manuel Estrada Porrua and Andrea Garcia-Guerrero, A Latin American Perspective on Land Use, 
Land-Use Change, and ForestlY Negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
209,220 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby lanson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("The role of forests in fostering development is particularly relevant at the local level, because some of 
the poorest people in Latin America- almost a third of them indigenous people -live in rural areas and 
depend to large extent on the resources provided by forests for their survival (including the opportunity of 
using them for other land uses as short-term solutions to cover their most urgent needs)."). 
105 See Mater Natura e Instituto Earthwatch Finnaram Parceria para Desenvolver Programa 'HSBC 
Climate Partners' [Mater Natura and Earthwatch Institute Signed a Partnership to Develop 'HSBC 
Climate Partners' Program], available at 
http://www.nna.erg.br/v3/action/news/detail. php?-id= 1638&stvle=ne\vs. 
106 See Projetos SeqUestro de Carbono - Projetos de Ayao Contra 0 Aquecimento Global [Carbon 
Sequestration Projects - Action Projects Against Global Wanning], available at 
http://www.spvs.erg.br/nrojetos/sdc index.php (last visited 6 Feb. 2009). 
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establishment of a corridor that will join two significan protected fragments of Atlantic 
Forest: the Pau Brasil National Park and the Monte Pascoal National Park.,,107 All of 
these three voluntary initiatives are good examples of how the voluntary market can 
assist on maximizing the command-and-control regime in place. 
Although facing rapid expansion, the voluntary market is still far from reaching 
the magnitude ofthe regulatory market. 108 In the forest sector though more projects take 
place in the voluntary market, but in contrast, credits generated in the regulatory market 
enjoy much higher market values.109 Therefore, understanding how the international 
community replicated market -based policy instruments - that were restricted to some 
few United States' initiativesllO - assists on the analysis of maximizing the 
implementation of the available regulatory market (the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol) to 
the Atlantic Rainforest biome. Prior to that, a brief panorama of existing regulatory 
market-based instruments serves as an useful introduction to the historical evolution of 
how forest and forestry practices made their way into the climate change legal regime 
and, once causation was established between forest practices and climate change, how 
policy instruments were shaped to promote sustainable forestry activities. 
ii. Regulatory Carbon Markets 
Besides voluntary markets, the only regulatory market available from which the 
Atlantic Rainforest can currently benefit from is the Clean Development Mechanism 
107 The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance ("eeB"), The Monte Pascoal- Pau Brasil 
Ecological Corridor: Carbon, Community and Biodiversity Initiative - Monte Pascoal Farm - CPA# 1, 7, 
available at http://www.c1imate-standards.org/projects/files/cpa dd caraiva.pdf (last visited 31 Mar., 
2009). 
108 See RICARDO BA YON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, V OL\JNTARY CARBON MARKETS-
AN INTERNA TlONAL BUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEY ARE AND How DfEY WORK 12-13 (Earthscan 
2007) (2007) ("Although nobody has exact numbers on the size of the voluntary carbon market, most 
think it has grown rapidly in the last two years."). 
109 See Rosimeiry Portela et al., The Idea a/Market-Based Mechanisms/or Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
11,25 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, TobyJanson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Forest carbon projects account for a very small share, in both volume and value, of all emission 
reduction projects in the regulatory and voluntary carbon markets. The voluntary markets see a larger 
number of forest carbon projects .... the regulatory carbon markets are orders of magnitude larger than 
the voluntary markets. "). 
110 See RICARDO BA YON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMIL TON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS-
AN INTERNATlONALBUSINESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEY ARE AND How DfEY WORK 12-13 (Earthscan 
2007) (2007) ("Ever since the US established the first large-scale environmental market (to regulate 
emissions of gases that lead to acid rain), we have seen environmental markets emerging to trade in 
everything from wetlands to woodpeckers."). 
( 
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("CDM") of the Kyoto Protocol. I I I Under the rules of this regulatory policy incentive, 
the only forestry activities allowed are afforestation/reforestation projects. ll2 A detailed 
analysis of how the CDM forestry market operates, how it evolved since its conception 
in 1997 and future perspectives are further explored in Chapter 4. For what is worthy in 
this section, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol launched a worldwide carbon market inspirational 
for other regional and local regulatory initiatives.113 
Albeit limited in scope, credits generated from the CDM carbon market are 
priced higher than those from the voluntary market1l4 Because the Kyoto Protocol's 
aim is to facilitate accomplishment ofthe UNFCCC's main objective, policy market 
instruments therein are not designed to value ecosystem services other than mitigating 
global climate change in a way that respects a developing country's sustainable 
development agenda. I IS In a compilation prepared by Rosimeiry Portela et al., 2008, 
the table below identifies different regulatory and voluntary markets, eligible forestry 
activities under each of them and their potentials to incorporate additional ecosystem 
services: 
Forestry Project Types and Allowances in Regulatory and Voluntary Markets 
J J 1 See generally Peter Duncanson Cameron, The Kyoto Process: Past, Present and Future, in KYOTO: 
FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE 3, II (Peter D. Cameron and Donald Zillman eds., 2001) (describing the 
Clean Development Mechanism as "a new mechanism was set out in Article 12 to assist Parties not 
included in Annex I to achieve sustainable development and attain the ultimate objective of the 
Convention. Under the CDM the Annex I countries receive GHG credits or Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs) by sponsoring actual GHG offset projects or other actual technology transfer in a 
developing country. "). 
112 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Morocco, 
Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report a/the Conference o/the Parties an its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the COfiferenee oJthe Parties (Volume II), Decision 17/CP.7, ~ 7(a), U.N. Doc 
FCCCICP/2001113/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COP-7 Report - Part Two (Volume JJ)]. 
113 See Farhana Yamin, Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS xxix, xxx (Farhana 
Yamin ed., 2005) (noting that "domestic trading and offset schemes are also being devised in other parts 
of the world, including the US and Australia, that are Kyoto consistent and in many cases actually 
anticipate future linkages with the Kyoto mechanisms. "). 
114 See The World Bank, State and Trends oJthe Carbon Market 2008, Exe. Sum., Table I: Carbon 
Market at a Glance, Volumes & Values in 2006-07, available at 
http://siteresources. worldbank.orgINEWS/Resources/State&Trendsformatted06May 100m .pdf 
(comparing the volumes and values of different carbon markets including transactions under the CDM 
and the voluntary markets). 
115 See Farhana Yamin, The International Rules on the Kyoto Mechanisms, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
CARBON MARKETS I, 30 (Farhana Yamin ed., 2005) ("[ oJne strategic rationale for the CDM's inclusion in 
the Protocol was to provide a quantified means for non-Annex I Parties to contribute to mitigation 
commitments and to get a better understanding of trading mechanisms, but without such Parties having to 
take on legally binding mitigation 'targets. Participation by developing countries in the CDM is thus part 
of their broader efforts to contribute to climate change mitigation in a manner which provides for 
'learning by doing' while respecting their sustainable development priorities."). 
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Market Eligible forestry options Potential for incorporation 
of other forest benefits 
Regulatory 
Kyoto Protocol CDM Afforestation and Low-medium 
reforestation 
EU Emissions Trading All forestry excluded until Low 
Scheme at least 2008 
Emerging U.S. regulatory U.S.-based forest Medium 
markets (ROGI, Calif., conservation and 
federal) restoration 
New South Wales Australian forest Medium 
Abatement Scheme, restoration only 
Australia 
Voluntary 
Voluntary retail carbon Tropical forest High 
market conservation and 
restoration 
Chicago Climate Exchange Tropical forest restoration High 
and forest conservation 
Source. Roslmelry Portela et al. "0 
In comparison with renewable energy, energy efficiency and fuel switching 
projects under the CDM policy market incentives, forest projects remain minor in both 
volume and credits generated. I 17 However, that was not always the case. Prior to the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol, the period following the 1992 UNFCCC was marked by a 
learning phase in which forestry projects, including conservation, were promising. 11 8 
116 Rosimeiry Portela et aI., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and Climate 
Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 11,21 
(Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008). 
117 See UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development ("UNEP Risoe"), The 2009 
January 1st Updates olthe UNEP Risoe CDM and JI Pipelines, available at 
www.CDMPipeline.org/Publications/CDMPipeline.xls (last visited 31 Mar., 2009) (providing an updated 
list with different CDM project-activities by types). 
lIS See Fifteen Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and TeChnological Advice, Marrakesh, 
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 9, 2001, Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Fiflh SynthesiS 
Report on Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase - Note by the Secretariat, Annex fig.4, 
U.N. DOC FCCC/SBSTAl200117 (Sept. 12,2001) [hereinafter 2001 SBSTA Report] (revealing significant 
( 
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But because forestry activities for the first commitment period (2008-20012) are 
restricted to afforestation/reforestation projects with strict procedural rules typical to a 
regulated baseline-credit program, they ended up underutiIized.119 
On the flip side, different stakeholders from the industry, government and non-
governmental sectors, for vario'us reasons, started lobbying for the inclusion in the post-
2012 commitment period, conservation forest activities beyond those currently 
permitted. Industry view carbon forest markets as the most cost-effective policy 
instrument in assisting with emissions reduction regulations. 12o Some countries with 
large forest stocks - excluding Brazil - envision forest conservation as an opportunity to 
attracting foreign investments, building and strengthening technical capacity.121 NGOs 
seek to expand the scope of a worldwide market-based policy instrument designed for 
climate change mitigation to promote additional ecosystem services likewise is 
currently happening in the voluntary market. 122 
This international lobbying around expanding the scope of forest activities under 
the Kyoto regulated market is named "reducing emissions from deforestation and 
degradation" ("REDD,,).123 Under REDO different approaches are being debated on the 
numbers of forest preservation, reforestation or restoration and afforestation project-activities under the 
Activities Implemented Jointly Pilot Phase). 
119 See Johannes Ebeling: Risks and Criticisms of Forestly-Based Climate Change Mitigation and Carbon 
Trading, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 43, 44 
(Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) (noting 
that "[p]artly as a result of complicated requirements and the delayed agreement on these requirements, 
only one forestry project had gained the approval of the CDM Executive Board as of February 2008, 
versus more than 900 registered projects overall. "). 
120 See N. Stern et ai., Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 217 (2006), available at 
http://www.hm~treasury.gov.uk/sternreviewreport.htm (demonstrating that the forestry sector 
represents the most cost-effective climate change mitigation option). 
121 See Summary of the Thirteenth Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and Third Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, EARrnNEGOTlATIONSBuLL., Dec. 18,2007, 
at 7, available at http://www.iisd.caldownload/pdf/enb12354e.pdf (regarding the issue ofreducing 
emissions from deforestation in developing countries, "[ d]iscussion centered mainly on the inclusion of 
conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks, as proposed by India, Bhutan and others and 
opposed by Brazil, the EU and others:"). 
122 See DANIEL NEPSTAD, THE WOODS HOLE RESEARCH CENTER: REED - REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM 
DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION - THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING CARBON 
EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION IN THEBRAZILlAN AMAZON (2007), 
a»ailable at http://www.whrc.org/resources/published literature/pdf/WHRC REDD Amazon.pdf, (last 
visited Jun. 10,2008) (a report from different not-for-profit organizations supporting forestry activities 
aimed at reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation). 
123 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsfi'om Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 
181 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("The 
discussions were initiated by a proposal put fonvard in 2005, at the eleventh session of the Conference of 
the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, by the governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica. The 
formation of the Colation for Rainforest Nations created additional momentum to address the issue, and it 
• 
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road to the next Kyoto Protocol's meeting of the parties in the end of2009, in 
Copenhagen. From financial incentives to countries reducing deforestation rates below 
a predefined baseline to a proposal of a cap-and-trade forestry program distributing 
deforestation allowances among regulated countries are all among the proposed 
approaches focusing on promoting conservation and preservation activities under the 
climate change regime. 124 But considering the Atlantic Rainforest's reality of only 
7.26% primary forested areas left and considering this left remaining area is protected 
by a command-and-control system combined with different economic policy 
instruments (i.g. taxes and subsidies, tradable permits and market enhancement), the 
overall data suggests that regeneration and afforestation/reforestation types of 
projects/policy approaches are better suitable - at least in the short term - to benefiting 
the Atlantic Rainforest biome.125 
Thus, prior to exploring in deeper details the history underlying conflicting 
interests over the introduction of forestry activities into the climate change regime and 
how the scope of projects under the market-based Kyoto policy instrument was 
narrowed throughout the negotiation process, the following section examines the 
Atlantic Rainforest biome's main historical, ecological and socio-economic features. 
The next section also includes the command-and-control regime currently in place and 
available economic policy incentives. In order for a more accurate assessment of 
whether the dominant regulatory market-based policy instrument - the CDM of the 
Kyoto Protocol - or voluntary markets can maximize current conservation and 
regeneration laws and regulations, understanding the main historical, ecological and 
socio-economic features of the region under examination, the Brazilian Atlantic 
Rainforest, is essential. 
has since become a highly visible topic discussed at a111evels, from the UN Security Council to 'talk 
back'radio."). 
124 See generally Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissions/rom Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGlliIG POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 
182-184 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby lanson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
(discussing the different policy approaches for REDD activities for a post-2012 climate deal under the 
UN),CCC and Kyoto Protocol). 
125 The AES-Tiete Afforestation/Reforestation CDM project-activity taking place on the Atlantic 
Rainforest biome is an example of how the Kyoto regulatory afforestation/reforestation market can be an 
effective auxiliary policy instrument aimed at enhancing the provisions of the existing protective 
command-and-control regime currently in place. See Clean Development Mechanism Project Design 
Document for Reforestation and Afforestation Project-Activities, AES-Tiete Afforestation/Reforestation 
Project Activity Around the Borders o/Hydroelectric Plant Reservoirs, ARNM0034, 2007, at 3, U.N. DOC 
FCCC/SB/2000IXX, Version 3, (Mar. 5, 2007). 
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d. The Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest Biome 
Brazil is the largest and most populous country in South America, and fifth 
largest in the world in both area and population. Brazil is bigger than the continental 
United States. It has a population of approximately 190 million inhabitants126, and a 
total area of3,287,597 square miles. According to the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, Brazil's GDP of 1.6 trillion dollars is ranked 9th in the world. Brazil is 
also home to extensive agricultural land, rain forests and wetlands and one fourth of the 
world's surface and underground freshwaters. I27 
Due to the country's continental size, Brazil is divided into different biomes 
according to the ecological attributes and similarities of each of its diverse regions. A 
"biome" is defined as a combine contiguous group of similar fauna and flora, 
identifiable in regional scale, with similar climatic conditions and shared historical 
changes, resulting in a unique biological diversity.128 Being able to differentiate the 
notion of"biome" from that of "forest" - for instance - is crucial to understanding the 
challenges and opportunities of forest carbon markets within the Atlantic Rainforest 
region. Therefore, a biome can be home to different kinds of ecological formations, 
including forests, grasslands or other types of vegetation that are grouped into a 
"biome" due to similar and linked biological features. 
The purpose of classitying similar regions into "biomes" is to facilitate the 
study and planning so as to maximize conservation, preservation and sustainable 
development policies. In that sense, the Brazilian official map of biomes (figure I) 
identifies six different environmentally important regions. The Atlantic Rainforest is 
one of them. This forest is a biodiversity mosaic, "composed of numerous vegetation 
types distributed along 27 degrees of south latitude, with great variations in 
elevation.,,129 The other listed biomes are the Amazon Rainforest, the Savanna 
("Cerrado"), the Caatinga, the Pantanal and the Pampa. 
126 THE BRAZILIAN INSTITUTE OF GEOGRAPHY AND STATISTICS [IBGE] available at 
http://www.ibge.gov.hr/english/. (last visited Sep. lIlli, 2008). 
127 THE BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF MINING AND ENERGY available at 
http://vvww.mme,gov.br/site/menu/selectmainmenuitem.do?channelId=981O, (last visited Sep. 11th, 
2006). 
128 THE BRAZILIAN INSTITUTE OF GEOGRAPHY AND STATISTICS [IBGE] available at 
hftp:l.www.ibge.gov.brl/tomeipresidencia/noticiasinoticia visualiza.php?id noticia-169&id pagina-I. 
129 Luiz Paulo Pinto and Maria Cecilia Wey de Brito, Dynamics of Biodiversity Loss in the Brazilian 
Atlantic Forest: An introduction, in nIEATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 27, 27 (Carlos Galindo-
Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003). 
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Starting with the Amazon biome, considering the region is home to the largest 
tropical rainforest in the world, and currently faces great tension between economic 
development and environmental preservation, the region is the center of domestic and 
international attention. The biome is the largest in the country, occupying 
approximately 50% of the entire Brazilian territory (Table I). Worth noticing, though, 
that while the majority of the biome is dense forest, a smaller portion is composed of 
other types of vegetation, like grasslands and savannahs, for example.130 Despite not 
being entirely composed by forest formation, those other kinds of vegetation are 
considered part of the biome because oftheir ecological link to the overall ecosystem, 
illustrating the difference between a biome and one specific type of vegetation. But the 
importance of the Amazonian biome spans over its ecological formation: the country's 
biggest river basin is found in the Amazon, which makes it the region with the largest 
concentration of fresh water resources. Yet, the Amazon Rainforest is of crucial 
importance to regulate climatic patterns in the South and Southeast regions of Brazil, 
being directly responsible for rainfall rates, crucial to the last remaining preserved areas 
of the Atlantic Rainforest 131 
According to the FAO, the "Cerrado" is the second largest ecological region in 
Brazil, situated in Central Brazil and comprising an area of approximately 25% of the 
country. Vegetation found on the biome presents savannahs and forests composed of 
continuous herbaceous stratum joined "to an arboreal stratum with variable density of 
woody species.,,132 The "Cerrado" is where most ofthe current agribusiness activities 
in Brazil take place and, therefore, is the last development frontier before the Amazon 
biome to the north. 
130 See generally Food and Agriculture Org. ofthe U.N. [FAO], Brazil: Country Report To The FAG 
International Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, 9 (1996), available at 
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGPlAGPS/pgrfa/pdflbrazil.pdf[hereinafier Brazil Country Report to the FAG 
1996] ("The Brazilian Amazon Forest [tropical rainforest] covers a surface of approximately 3.5 million 
square kilometers and corresponds to nearly 40% of all national territory. Of this total, a 2 million km2 are 
made up of 'dense ombrofila' forest [57%], and 1.1 million km2 are composed of open 'ombrofila' forest 
[31 %]. The remaining land, 400 thousand km2 [12%] is covered with other kinds of vegetation, including 
ecotones, stationary forests, natural fields, and grasslands and savannahs".). 
131 See Charles R. Clement & Niro Higuchi, A Floresta Amaz6nica eo Futuro do Brasil [The Amazon 
Forest and fhe Future of Brazil] , Vol. 58, n. 3 CIilNCIA E CULTURA [SCIENCE AND CULTURE] 44,45 
(Jul/Sept, 2006), published by The Brazilian Society for the Development of Science, available at 
http://cienciaecultura.bvs. br/scielo.php?pid~S0009-672520060003000 l8&script~sci arnext&tlng (stating 
that between 25 and 50%.ofthe rainfall in the Southeast part of Brazil originates in the Amazon biome). 
132 Food and Agriculture Org. offhe U.N. [FAO], Brazil: Country Report to the FAG International 
Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, 9-10 (1996), available at 
http://www.fao.orgiag/AGP/AGPS/pgrfaJpdflbrazil.pdf[hereinafier Brazil Country Report to the FAG 
1996]. 
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The Caatinga biome in the Northeast part of Brazil is the driest region of the 
country. This biome resembles a desert landscape, "characterized by the xerofitic 
vegetation typical of a semi-arid climate.,,133 The region is situated between the 
Northeastern part of the Atlantic Rainforest and the "Cerrado" biome, and presents the 
lowest human development indexes in the country. 
Westward of the "Cerrado", is one of the World's largest wetlands, classified as 
the biome known as the Pantanal. This large area of floodplains is described by the 
F AO as "a geologically lowered area filled with sediments which have settled in the 
basin of the Paraguay River( ... ).,,134 Although most of the Pantanal lies within Brazil, 
smaller parts of the region stretch out into Bolivia and Paraguay as well.I35 The 
Pantanal, just like parts of the remaining Atlantic Rainforest - for their environmental 
importance, was also designated by the United Nations Educational Scientific and 
Cultural Organizations ("UNESCO") as a biosphere reserve and was inscribed in the 
UNESCO World Heritage List in 2000.136 
In the Southern most part of Brazil, where the country borders Argentina and 
Uruguay, lies the Pampa biome. The region is restricted to the Rio Grande do SuI state. 
It comprises 63% of that state's territory and it is one of the most biodiverse campestral 
types of ecosystems in the world. Three thousand species of plants, out of which four 
133 Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Brazil: CountlY Report To The FAD International 
Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, 11 (1996), available at 
http://www.fao.org/agiAGP/AGPS/pgrfaJpdf/brazil.pdf [hereinafter Brazil CountlY Report to the FAD 
1996]. 
134 See generally Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Brazil: Country Report To The FAD 
International Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, l3-14 (1996), available at 
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPS/pgrfaJpdf/brazil.pdf [hereinafter Brazil Country Report to the FAD 
1996] ("Of these lands [within the Pantanal region], approximately 140.000 lan' are on Brazilian 
territory, covering parts of the States of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do SuI. The water cycle conditions 
life in this ecosystem. The floods in this region can be caused by pluvial waters, fluvial waters due to 
overflowing of the rivers, and by an elevation in the water table. During the flooding process, many rivers 
flow along a growing series of branching beds. False rivers also arise, without their own basin, and some 
rivers may lose their identity. This complex system of drainage, branched and undefined, by its dynamic 
nature of seasonal and multi-annual floods, decisively influences the biodiversity and productivity of the 
ecosystem, demanding systems of multiple sustainable use of its natural resources."). 
135 See Mario Dantas, Pantanal: Use and Conservation 2 (Nov. 27, 2000) (paper presented at the III 
Simp6sio sobre Recursos Naturais e S6cio-econ6micos do Pantanal- Os Desafios do Novo Milenio 
[Third Symposium on the Natural and Socio-economic Resources of the Pantanal- The Challenges of the 
New Millenium], on file with the author). 
136 See U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], World Heritage List, a:vailable at 
http://whc.unesco.org!enflist/999 ("The Pantanal Conservation Complex consists of a cluster of four 
protected areas with a total area of 187,818 ha. Located in western central Brazil at the south-west comer 
of the State ofMato Grosso, the site represents 1.3% of Brazil's Pantanal region, one of the world's largest 
freshwater wetland ecosystems. The headv..raters of the region's two major river systems, the Cuiaba and 
the Paraguay rivers, are located here, and the abundance and diversity of its vegetation and animal life are 
spectacular."). 
hundred are different types of grasses used for cattle ranching, can be found in the 
Pampa. The region is also home for over ninety species of mammals. 137 
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In short, the above description of the Atlantic Rainforest neighboring biomes 
provides useful guidance and comparison standards to situate the Atlantic forest region, 
one of the most degraded ecosystems in the world. 138 The exact defmition of the 
Atlantic forest was not clear until a meeting of over forty experts agreed that this biome 
"should encompass the coastal rainforests; the mixed forests of Brazilian pine, also 
known as Parana pine or araucaria (Araucaria angustifolia); and forests dominated by 
the laurel family (Lauraceae) in the south, the deciduous and demideciduous forests of 
the interior, and the ecosystems associated with these, including mangroves, restingas 
(coastal, sandy-soil forest and scrub), high-altitude grasslands, pockets of pastures and 
grasslands, and the montane brejos and chits .,,139 Though not as well known as its 
Amazon cousin, the destruction of a forest that combines tropical and subtropical 
climate, the size ofthe Atlantic Rainforest is, nevertheless, without parallel.140 The 
magnitude of more than five centuries of degrading economic activities is even greater 
considering the forest's ecological attributes,141 explored in deeper details below. 
The Brazilian official map of biomes puts into perspective the country's division 
into the above described ecological regions (figure 1), while also highlighting the 
Atlantic Rainforest biome along the east coast of Brazil, which was recognized by the 
137 See Camila Vassalo, Mapeamento Mostra que Bioma Pampa Conserva 41 % da Cobertura Vegetal 
Nativa [Mapping Shows that Pampa Biome Conserves 41 % of its Native Vegetation], available at 
http://www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/noticias/2007112121 imateria. 2007-12-21. 099073205 4/view (last visited 
Jun. 2, 2008). 
138 See Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Atlantic Forest Hotspot Status: An Overview, 
in DIE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 3, 3 (Carlos Galindo·Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara 
eds., 2003) ("The Atlantic Forest hotspot is arguably the most devastated and most highly threatened 
ecosystem on the planet. It is a hotspot where the pace of change is among the fastest and, as a 
consequence, where the need for conservation action is most compelling. Although the Atlantic Forest is 
thought to have originally ranged from 1 to 1.5 million km2, only 7-8 percent of the original forest 
remains."). 
139 Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Brie/History a/Conservation in the Atlantic Forest, in THE ATLANTIC 
FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 31, 31 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) 
140 See Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Atlantic Forest Hotspot Status: An Overview, 
in DIE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 3, 4 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara 
eds., 2003) ("Since the colonization by the Portuguese and Spanish, ihe Atlantic Forest has had a long 
history ofintensive land use for commodity exports, including cycles of exploitation of brazil wood, 
sugarcane, coffee, cocoa, and cattle grazing, all of which have utterly transfonned the landscape. More 
recent drivers of biodiversity loss include intensive forms of government-subsidized soy agriCulture and 
expanding forest plantations of pine and eucalyptus."). 
141 See Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Atlantic Forest Hotspot Status: An Overview, 
in DIE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 3, 3 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara 
eds., 2003) ("The Atlantic Forest is one of the world's 25 recognized biodiversity hotspots, areas where 
the original vegetative cover has been reduced by at least 70 percent but that together house more than 60 
percent of all terrestrial species on the planet. "). 
( 
National Environmental Council ("CONAMA") in 1992 as the "Atlantic Rainforest 
Domain~':142 
Figure I: 
Source: The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics [lEGE] 
To illustrate the magnitude of the Atlantic Rainforest region, the entire biome 
encompasses 13,04% of the total area ofthe country. An area that once was fully 
covered with and composed by different similar groups of rich and biodiverse 
ecosystems, including large areas of rainforest. A description ofthe Atlantic Forest is 
provided below: 
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142 See Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, BriefHistOlY a/Conservation in the Atlantic Forest, in THE ATLANTIC 
FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 31,32 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Ciimara eds., 2003) 
("After subsequent refinement, this definition was approved in 1992 by the National Council on the 
Environment (CONAMA), and the area was given the name "Atlantic Forest Domain." The boundaries 
conformed to the Map of Brazilian Vegetation published in 1988 (and revised in 1993) by the Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (lBGE), a federal government agency."). 
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"The Atlantic Forest once covered an area of nearly 1,400,000 km2 in Brazil 
alone. It covered a broad latitudinal strip along the Brazilian coast, from Rio 
Grande do Norte to Rio Grande do SuI. More than 75 percent was forest, with 
enclaves of scrub, montane, ruperstrine (rochky) grasslands, and open country-
side with low-growing vegetation (caatinga [open forest ecosystem consisting of 
thorny shrubs and stunted trees], dry xeromorphic, scrub and deciduous forest 
and cerrado [woodland-savannah ecosystems that support a unique array of 
drought- and fire-adapted plan species], bush savanna typical of the central 
plateau of Brazil), as well as coastal mangrove swamps and forests and restingas 
(coastal scrub and forest on sandy soils).,,143 
Within Brazil, in comparison with the other listed Brazilian biomes, the Atlantic 
Rainforest is the third largest, falling behind only the Amazon and "Cerrado". The total 
area ofthe forest within Brazil, currently confirmed and provided the Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and Statistics, is of approximately 1.110.182 km2 (table below). That is 
equivalent to over twice the size of France, for instance. 144 Out ofthe total area 
encompassed by the Atlantic Rainforest biome, though, only 7.26%, or 80.600 km2, 
remain preserved. 145 A complete list with the total areas and the percentage each biome 
occupies in the country appears in the table below: 
Table 1: 
'Area Total BRASIL 
. "._.~~ __ L~ .................. . B.sf4. 77 
143 Jose Maria Cardoso da Silva and Carlos Henrique M. Casteleti, Status of the Biodiversity of the 
Atlantic Forest of Brazil, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 43, 44 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and 
Ibsen de Gusmilo Camara eds., 2003) 
144 See EUROPEAN UNION [EUROPA], 
http://europa.eu/abc/europeancountries/ellmembers/france/indexen.htm (last visited Jun. 3, 2008) 
(providing for the total area of France 550.000 Ian'). 
145 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Florestais da Mala Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005,74 (2008) available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site mediaiA TLAS%20MA TA %20ATLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORl02000-2005.pdf (last visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
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Source: The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics [IBGE] 
In one of the most comprehensive studies ever published in English about the 
history ofthe relationship between human settlement and the Brazilian Atlantic 
Rainforest, Waren Dean described this biome, highlighting its connection with the 
Amazon Forest and its complex composition of different forest types: 
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"On the eastern margin of South America there once stretched an immense 
forest, or more accurately, a complex offorest types, generally broadleaved, rain 
loving, and tropical to subtropical, stretching from about 8° to about 28° south 
latitude and extending inland from the coast about 100 kilometers in the north, 
widening to more than 500 kilometers in the south. Altogether the forest covered 
about a million square kilometers. This complex has been referred to as the 
Brazilian Atlantic Forest, related to the much larger Amazon Forest but distinct 
from it. Together, these two great forests formed a life zone distinct from and 
richer in species than those of the other tropics of our globe, situated in Africa 
and Southeast Asia. The Atlantic Forest was itself remarkably diverse, 
considering its relatively modest size. And it contained a remarkable number of 
endemic species - that is, life forms peculiar to it - even though it shared the 
same continental landmass with the Amazon Forest and was for long geological 
periods in partial contact with it.,,146 
This nostalgic, yet precise description of the Atlantic Rainforest biome provides 
a glimpse of what once was this diverse group of similar ecosystems. However, 
throughout the years, since the first wave of Portuguese settlers back in the sixteenth 
century, the Atlantic Rainforest was heavily disturbed for the aggregated value of its 
natural resources in Europe. I47 More recently, unsustainable land-use and development 
patterns added on to the critical situation currently facing the few preserved areas of 
146 WAREN DEAN, Wrm BROADAX AND FIREBRAND - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC 
FOREST 6 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995). 
147 See Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Brie! His/my a/Conservation in the Atlantic Forest, in THE ATLANTIC 
FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 31, 36 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) 
("According to historical accounts, the deliberate destruction of the forest got under way when the 
colonists began to clear land for settlement, planting, and better defense against indigenous attacks. They 
burned extensive areas for these purposes and also later during military skirmishes against other 
Europeans. Wood was steadily consumed for all purposes; indeed, for centuries it was the only available 
form offuel."). 
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native Atlantic forest. 148 Altogether, historical factors and social-economical indicators 
of the region are the starting point of the following sections providing the basis for a 
detailed analysis of the challenges and obstacles facing conservation and preservation 
policies of existing forested areas and restoration practices of currently degraded lands. 
i. The Region's ProfIle 
During the constitutional reform in Brazil in 1988, the Atlantic Rainforest was 
included into the Constitution and received special protection as a result oflawmakers' 
recognition of its ecological, historical and cultural values. Out of the other five biomes, 
along with the Amazon Rainforest and the Pantanal,149 the Atlantic forest was declared 
by article 225, paragraph 4 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution as being part of the 
"national patrimony,,150, one that deserves special protection in its use and exploitation. 
By "national patrimony", this constitutional provision emphasized the importance of the 
Atlantic forest for the entire Brazilian society. Consequently, it authorized reasonable 
restrictions on property rights within the biome. This was significant considering over 
70% of the region currently falls within private property domain. lSl 
Nonetheless, the "national patrimony" designation did not represent regulatory 
or ordinary takings. 152 "National patrimony" is a Brazilian domestic version of the 
148 See Luiz Paulo Pinto and Maria Cecilia Wey de Brito, Dynamics a/Biodiversity Loss in the Brazilian 
Atlantic Forest: An Introduction, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTIIAMERICA 27, 28 (Carlos Galindo-
Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) ("Threats to the biodiversity of the Atlantic Forest are 
exacerbated by the fact that the region is home to approximately 70 percent of Brazil's 169 million 
people. Most of this population lives in megacities such as Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, 
about 80 percent of Brazil' s gross domestic product is generated in the Atlantic Forest, and the region 
shelters Brazil's largest industrial and sivicultural centers."). 
149 See Colin Crawford & Guilherme Pignataro, The Insistent (And Unrelenting) Challenges Of 
Protecting Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding "The Law That Sticks", 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1,9 
(2007) ("The significance and variety of Brazilian ecosystems is such that a number of the most important 
biomes receive constitutional protection."). 
150 Paulo de Bessa Antunes, Direito Ambiental [Environmental Law] 335 (J Ith ed. 2008) (pointing out to 
the fact that 73% ofthe Atlantic Rainforest fall within private properties). See also id. at 500 (expressing 
the understanding that the_term "national patrimony" in the constitution does not expropriate the property 
of those in the Altantic Rainforest region. The intention was to require from landowners within those 
designated biomes sustainable use of their property and resources so as to reinforce the constitutional 
right of an ecologically balanced environment for which the conservation of the Atlantic and Amazon 
Rainforests and the Pantanal are a crucial part of it). 
151 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil ("Constitui9ao da Republica Federativa do Brazil") 
[C.F.] art. 225, §4 (1988). See also The Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University, 
available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazilibrazil.htrnl (containing an English version 
of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution) (last visited Jun. 2, 2008). 
152 The Brazilian Supreme Court ("Supremo Tribunal Federal") has interpreted art. 225, paragraph 4, and 
decided that the Atlantic Rainforest does not fall within public property, nor it is in trust with the Federal 
Government, in spite the constitutional reference that the forest is part of the national patrimony. In 
r 
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notion embedded in the international principle of common concern of humankind. In 
other words, that means that a legal regime (either a domestic or the international one) 
recognizes and respects private rights (property rights in national regimes, sovereignty 
rights internationally), but due to the special features of the regulated good (the 
environment), it establishes a governing principle dictated by "public conscience and 
the fundamental values of humanity" (in the international context - or fundamental 
values ofthe Brazilian society within the national context), that will implicitly allow for 
reasonable regulated restrictions. IS3 
The special constitutional recognition conferred upon the Atlantic Rainforest 
biome was reaffirmed by the UNESCO. One of the most preserved areas of the Atlantic 
forest, the so-called South-East Reserves, was designated an international biosphere 
reserve in 1992 and inscribed in the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1999.154 From 
that moment onwards, and with the international community agreeing upon the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the forest's ecological attributes became not only a 
common concern of the Brazilian inhabitants, but one of the humankind. l55 
Within this context of national and international recognition, this section 
highlights some of the Atlantic Rainforest's main features, including its ecological 
attributes, geographical and demographical information, colonial history, social, 
economic and political profiles. It describes the importance of this particular biome as a 
case study of forest restoration and preservation in light of the current available forest 
market mechanisms. 
ii. The Atlantic Rainforest's Ecological Attribntes 
practical terms, the constitutional inscription is limited to confer upon the Atlantic Rainforest special 
protection and care from the Brazilian society. See S.T.F.P-I, RE No. 134.297-8, Relator: Min. Celso de 
Mello, 22.09.1995, (find at http://www.slf.gov.br/) (Brazil). 
153 The notion of the principle of common concern of humankind was shaped by Article 3 of the Draft 
Covenant on Environment and Development of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUeN), available at http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/pdfdocumentsIEPLP3J EN rev2.pdf, (last visited 
May 6, 2006) (,"Common Concern ofHurnankind: The global environment is a common concern of 
humankind. Accordingly, all its elements and processes are governed by the principles of international 
law, the dictates of the public conscience and the fundamental values of humanity."). 
154 See V.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], World Heritage List, available at. 
http://whc.unesco.org/enJlist/893. C'The Atlantic Forests (Southeast) contain the best and the largest 
remaining examples of Atlantic forest in the southeast region of Brazil. The 25 protected areas that make 
up the site display the biological richness and evolutionary history of the few remaining areas of Atlantic 
forests of southeast Brazil. The area is exceptionally diverse with high numbers of rare and endemic 
species. With its "mountain to the sea" attitudinal gradient, its estuary, wild rivers, karst and numerous 
waterfalls, the site also has exceptional scenic values. "). 
155 See United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl., Jun. 5, 1992, 1760 V.N.T.S. 79, 
("Affirming that the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind.") 
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The importance ofthe Atlantic Rainforest biome outweighs the fact it is home to 
the most industrialized and wealthy parts of the country.156 Putting aside the region's 
social and economical indicators, the biodiversity rates of the Atlantic forest are 
extremely high. And that is due to a combination of ecological features, including the 
forest's latitudinal span, strong altitudinal gradients and extreme climate changes in the 
pastY7 
However, after over five hundred years of intense exploitation patterns since the 
arrival of the first Portuguese expedition fleet in April 21, 1500 and up until today, only 
7.26% of the entire biome remains preserved.158 Out of those few 7.26% left, official 
data reveals that approximately only 4% are native forest and the remaining 3.26% are 
restored forested areas159. For better or for worst, this data could indicate successfully 
restoration policies or, more likely - considering the information on recent decades - that 
restoration efforts are not keeping up with the deforestation rates. 160 Corroborating the 
156 See Antonio Herman Benjamin, Claudia Lima Marques & Catherine Thinker, The Water Giant 
Awakes: An Overview of Water Law in Brazil, 83 TEx. L. REV. 2185, 2187 (2005) (referring to the 
Southeast region, within the Atlantic Rainforest, as "[t]he economic heart of the country, this region 
brings together the states with the greatest population and industrial production. "); see also See Luiz 
Paulo Pinto and Maria Cecilia Wey de Brito, Dynamics of Biodiversity Loss in the Brazilian Atlantic 
Forest: An Introduction, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 27, 28 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and 
Ibsen de Gusmilo Camara eds., 2003). 
157 See generally Jose Maria Cardoso da Silva and Carlos Henrique M. Casteleti, Status a/the 
Biodiversity of the Atlantic Forest of Brazil, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 43, 44-45 
(Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) ("The biota of the Atlantic Forest is 
extremely diverse (Conservation International do Brasil et al. 2000). Although our biological 
understading of extensive areas is still incomplete, the region is believed to harbor 1 to 8 percent of 
world's total biodiversity. Considerable environmental diversity within the Atlantic Forest biome may be 
the reason for the diversity of species and the high degree of endemism. Latitude is an important axis of 
variation: unlike most other tropical forests, the Atlantic Forest extends over 27 degrees. Latitude greatly 
affects the geographic distribution of lizards, for example, and only One species is found throughout the 
region (Vanzolini 1988). Altitude is also important: the Atlantic Forest covers terrain ranging from sea 
level to 2,700 m, with consequent altitudinal gradients of diversity (Holt 1928; Buzzetti 2000). Finally, 
there is also longitudinal variation: the forests of the interior differ significantly from those nearer to the 
coast (Rizzini 1997). These three factors together create a unique diversity of landscapes, and explain, at 
least in part, the extraordinary species diversity of the region."). 
158 See Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE}, Atlas 
das Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005,74 (2008) available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site mediaiATLAS%20MA TA %20ATLANTICA%20-
%20RELA TORI02000-2005.pdf (last visisted Jun. 23, 2008) (estimating precisely the remaining forested 
areas in the Atlantic Rainforest biome in 7,26% of its original coverage). 
159 Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuaria (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation) 
[EMBRAPAj, A Embrapa nos Biomas Brasileiros (Embrapa in the Brazilian Biomes), I 1(2007), 
available at http://ww.vv.embrapa.br/publicacoes/institucionaisllaminas-biomas.pdf (last visited Jun. 9, 
2008). 
160 See Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas 
dos Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005,74 (2008), available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site medial A TLAS%20MA TA %20ATLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORI02000-2005.pdf(1ast visisted Jun. 23, 2008) (streSSing out that in spite of the reduction 
( 
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challenges of restoration and preservation efforts,161 botanical studies demonstrate that 
the forest's natural restoration capacity varies anything from twenty - in its primitive 
stage of recovery - to over one hundred years - in its more mature stage ofrecovery.162 
Another special feature ofthis biome refers to its biodiversity numbers, both in 
fauna and flora. Even within the remaining 7.26% left of preserved forested areas, the 
biodiversity rates are among the highest in the world. 163 For example, in a comparison 
with the Amazon forest, the Atlantic Rainforest has proportionally more species of 
plants and animals. 164 It would fall outside the scope of this study to lay down these 
numbers, especially because they are not consensual,165 and because many species have 
not yet been cataloged or known. 166 
The positive side of the described degradation trend though is that modem 
satellite imaging improved significantly over the past two decades167 and, therefore, is 
in the deforestation rates verified in the period 2000-2005, when comparing them with previous versions 
of the monitoring reports [1985-90, 1990-95 and 1995-00], the deforestation rates are still high taking into 
consideration the entire monitoring period since its conception in 1985). 
161 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND -1HE DESTRUCTION OF THEBRAZ1L1AN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 15 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("The complexity of this forest, then, considered as a 
single system, is extreme. It cannot be regarded as more resilient than simpler systems, however. Indeed, 
the opposite may be true: Its complexity may render it more vulnerable to trauma. The integrity of the 
system may prove extremely difficult to maintain or to reconstitute, in the event of external 
intervention. "). 
162 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF THEBRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 14 (u. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (detailing the timeframe of restoration processes in 
the Atlantic Forest based upon different disturbing causes). 
163 Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Dassie Mata Atlantica 2001, 24-25 
(2001) available at http://www.socioambiental.orglbanco imagens/pdfs/54.pdf (last visited Jun. 17, 
2008) (providing the biodiversity numbers for the Atlantic Rainforest in both fauna and flora). 
164 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005,74 (2008), available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site medial A TLAS%20MA TA %20ATLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORI02000-2005.pdf(last visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
165 See Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Brie/Histmy a/Conservation in the Atlantic Forest, in THE ATLANTIC 
FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 31, 35 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) 
("Published data on the number of species and the degree of endemism of the Atlantic Forest flora and 
fauna are variable."). 
166 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF THEBRAZ1L1AN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 5 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("What is lost when tropical forest is destroyed is not 
only greater in variety, complexity, and originality than other ecosystems, it is incalculable. For although 
cataloguing of a tropical forest is well beyond our resources, now or in the imaginable future. The 
disappearance of a tropical forest is therefore a tragedy vast beyond human knowing or conceiving."). 
167 See Marcia Makiko Hirota, Monitoring the Brazilian Atlantic Forest Cover, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST 
OF SOUTH AMERICA 60, 60 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) ("In recent 
years the SOS Atlantic Forest Foundation (Fundayao SOS MataAtlantica) and the National Institute for 
Space Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, or INPE) have enlisted satellite imaging, 
information technology, and remote sensing to prepare the Atlas of Remaining Forest Areas and 
Associated Ecosystems of the Atlantic Forest (Funda,ao SOS Mata Atlantica et al. 1990, 1998; Fundal'ao 
SOS Mata AtlanticaiINPE 1992,2001; http.sosmatatlantica.org.br)."). 
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being able to reproduce pictures of deforestation practices in the smallest parcels.168 As 
a result, the data is being widely advertized and, consequently, known in Brazil and 
abroad. 169 Better and publicized data improves access to information, which, in turn, is 
crucial to qualifying public participation not only in the decision-making process, but 
also in monitoring environmental law compliance and enforcement.170 It is also critical 
for monitoring, verification and accounting under any forest market mechanism. 
To the extent protective legislation are being complied with or enforced, is 
decisive to investigating whether an economic or market incentive, such as the CDM of 
the Kyoto Protocol, can be an effective auxiliary conservation and regeneration policy 
instrnment. l7l Compliance and enforcement with protective legislation is a requirement 
under the CDM rules for selecting a baseline scenario from which additionality is 
measured. l72 But that is examined in deeper details in Chapter 5 along with the degree 
of enforcement and compliance with the current protective domestic Atlantic forest 
legal framework. 
iii. Geographical and Demographical Information 
168 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005, 14 (2008), available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site media! A TLAS%20MA TA %20ATLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORI02000-2005.pdf(last visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
169 See Colin Crawford & Guilherme Pignataro, The Insistent (And Unrelenting) Challenges Of 
Protecting Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding "The Law That Sticks", 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 9 
(2007) ("The Atlantic Rainforest has suffered so greatly as the result of 500 years of intense exploitation 
that it is often labeled 'the most threatened tropical forest in the world.' As a result, it is now a mere 7% 
of its original size."). 
170 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe ("UNECE") Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
pmbl., June 25,1998,2161 U.N.T.S. 447 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention] ("Recognizing that, in the field 
of the environment, improved access to information and public participation in decision-making enhance 
the quality and implementation of decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give 
the public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due account of 
such concerns. "). 
171 See generally Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Brief History of Conservation in the Atlantic Forest, in THE 
ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 31, 39 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmiio Camara eds., 
2003) (noting that strict application of the Atlantic forest protective legislation "would have kept the 
Atlantic Forest from shrinking to less than 8 percent of its original size."). 
172 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development MECHANISM, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-
19,2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty-Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: 
Toolfor the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM"Project Activities, at 5, U.N. 
DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007) ("12. Apply the following procedure: ( ... ) Ifan alternative does not 
comply with all mandatory applicable legislation and regulations then show that, based on an examination 
of current practice in the region in which the mandatory law or regulation applies, those applicable 
mandatory legal or regulatory requirements are systematically not enforced and that non-compliance with 
those requirements is widespread, i.e. prevalent on at least 30% of the area of the smallest administrative 
unit that encompasses the project area;"). 
51 
Understanding the biome's geography and current demographical patterns as 
well as being able to visualize the remaining forested area is of especial relevance in the 
analysis of challenges and obstacles for successful carbon forest markets. In that sense, 
as illustrated in figure 1 above, the Atlantic Forest biome ranges from the northermost 
part of Brazil all the way to the southern part of the country along the east coast. 173 But 
a smaller portion of the biome also spans over parts of Argentina and Paraguay. 
Altogether, the region comprises a total area of more than 1.300.000 km2 (table 1), out 
of which 1.110.182 km2 in Brazil. Within Brazil, the biome represents 13,04% of the 
country's territory, encompassing 17 out of the 26 Brazilian states.174 
As already mentioned above, out of the total area encompassed by the Atlantic 
Forest biome, only a minor fraction remains preserved (precisely 7.26% according to 
the most up-to-date figures extracted in 2005).175 That is indicative that traditional 
enforcement and compliance instruments to the command-and-control system are 
ineffective.176 Thus, examining possibilities to maximize the potentials of forest carbon 
markets can contribute to tum them into effective tools of environmental policy in 
Brazil for a biome that combines unique geography with high-density demographical 
patterns for the reasons stated as follow: first, 67% of the Brazilian population resides 
within the biome's confines, which translates into 120 million people in more than 
3,400 towns throughout the biome, which corresponds to 61 % of the existing towns in 
Brazil, and out of which 2,528 of them - or 75% - have their area completely within the 
Atlantic Rainforest biome177; second, the forest influences the water cycle, soil fertility, 
173 See generally Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Brie/History a/Conservation in the Atlantic Forest, in THE 
ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 31,35 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 
2003) (explaining that the Atlantic forest "encompassed all or part of 17 states: Piau!, Ceara, Rio Grande 
do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia, Espirito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, 
Sao Paulo, Parana, Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do SuI, Goias, and Mate Grosso do SuI. "), 
174 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Perfodo 2000-2005, 7 (2008), available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site mediaiA TLAS%20MA TA %20ATLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORl02000-2005.pdf (last visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
175 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPEJ, Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005, 74 (2008) ([Vailable at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site mediaiATLAS%20MATA %20A TLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORI02000-2005.pdf(last visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
176 See generally Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Brief Hist01Y of Conservation in the Atlantic Forest, in THE 
ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 31, 39 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 
2003) (pointing out to the lack of enforcement and compliance of the Atlantic Forest protective legal 
framework), 
177 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005, Inn·o. (2008) ([Vailable at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.brlsite medial A TLAS%20MA TA %20A TLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORI02000-2 005.pdf(last visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
52 
controls the climate, protects the areas close to mountainous terrains and preserves an 
immense historical and cultural patrimony; 178 finally, this region is also home to many 
traditional and local communities and is responsible for supplying potable water for 
millions of people inhabiting the region. 179 All ofthe above stated functions and 
attributes, crucial not only for almost three fifths of the Brazilian population, but also 
for the proper functioning of the ecosystem itself, are sustained by merely 7.26% of 
remaining forested areas distributed geographically as shown in green in Figure 2 
below: 
Figure 2: 
178 See Mirian Prochnow, Mata Atlantica [Atlantic Forest], in ALMANAQUEBRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL 
144, 153 (Beto Ricardo and Maura Campanili eds., 2008). 
179 Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Dossie Mata Atlantica 2001, 24-25 
(2001) available at http://www.socioambiental.org/banco imagens/pdfs/54.pdf (last visited Jun. 17, 
2008) (providing the biodiversity numbers for the Atlantic Rainforest in both fauna and flora). 
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Source: Social-Environmental Institute, SOS Atlantic Rainforest Foundation, National Institute 
for Space Research and Northeastern Ecology Society. 
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Notwithstanding, this small intact portion left is not sufficient to the well 
functioning of the ecosystem as a whole ]80 and to serve as a safe habitat for all the 120 
million dwellers inhabiting the region. As a matter off act, nature is responding 
negatively to over 500 years of unsustainable land-use practices. For instance, just of 
the months of November and December of2008, unusual quantities of rainfall, much 
above the historical average, resulted in dreadful mudslides throughout the southern 
region of the Atlantic Rainforest biome, killing many people that have historically 
settled along hills and mountainous terrains that were once protected by the forest.]8] 
The risks associated to the erosion process resulting from centuries of unsustainable 
land-use practices and demographical policies]82 augment the significance of 
maximizing the efficiency of forest markets operating as conservation, preservation and 
restoration policies.183 
iv. Colonial History and the Socio-Economical Profile 
Brazil was originally occupied by Portuguese colonists in the 16th century, in an 
expedition fleet led by Pedro Alvares Cabral, anchoring on the country's east coast on 
180 For instance, from a total of 473 endangered species listed by the Brazilian Ministry of Environment, 
269 are from the Atlantic Rainforest biome. See MinisU:rio do Meio Ambiente [Ministry of Environment] 
Map of the Total Number of Endangered Species per Biome, available at 
http://www.mma.gov.br/portlsbf/faunalindex.cfin. 
lSI See The Associate Press, Brazil: Death Toll Rises in Flooding, N.Y. TIMES, November 26, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/200811 1I26/worldlamericas/26web·briefs· 
003.htrnl? r=1&scp-l&sg-flood%20brazi1%20santa%20catarina&st=cse (stating that in the south part 
of Brazil, in the State of Santa Catarina, "[m]ost of the dead were killed in mudslides that swept away 
homes and business, and more than 54,000 people were displaced, civil defense officials said. "). See also 
WAREN DEAN, WIlli BROADAX AND FlREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF TIlE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC 
FOREST 268 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (reporting that farming uphill and downhill was a major cause 
of mud slides in the State of Minas Gerais portion of the Atlantic Rainforest region). 
I&Z See Marcia Makiko Hirota, Monitoring the Brazilian Atlantic Forest Cover, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST 
OF SOUTIl AMERICA 60, 61 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) ("Real estate 
development is also the major factor contributing to the degradation of coastal areas, restingas, and 
mangrove forests."). 
183 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC'S FOURlli 
ASSESSMENT REpORT: CLIMATECIIANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REpORT 36 (2007), available at 
http://W\\rw.ipcc.ch/pdflassessment-report/ar4/svr/ar4 syr. pdf- [hereinafter IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report] (At continental, regional and ocean basin scales, numerous long term changes in other aspects of 
climate change have also been observed. Trends from 1900 to 2005 have been observed in precipitation 
amount in many large regions. Over this period, precipitation increased significantly in eastern parts of 
North and South America, northern Europe and northern and central Asia whereas precipitation declined 
in the Sahel, tfle Mediterranean, southern Africa and parts of southern Asia. Globally, the area affected 
by drought has likely increased since the 1970s."). 
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April 21, 1500.184 The arrival and settlement of European colonizers launched, 
thereafter, centuries of intense and unsustainable exploitation of the Atlantic 
Rainforest's natural resources.185 That is supported by the aforementioned official and 
current data reporting that merely 7.26% of the biome remain preserved.186 
At the time of discovery, in 1500, a letter sent back to the Portuguese King dom 
Manuel from the expedition's official rapporteur demonstrates that the colonizers' first 
impression was one of astonishment with the natural beauty and the richness of the 
forest's flora. 187 Upon arrival ofthe Portuguese colonists, relatively populated 
indigenous communities were already settled in the Atlantic Rainforest biome, but there 
is no concrete evidence of them degrading the forest. 188 Therefore, for the purpose of 
this section, the analysis' baseline is set by the official recorded date of first European 
contact with the region: April 21, 1500.189 
In that sense, corroborating Portuguese excitement with the splendor ofthe 
region, they named the country after a native tree, at that time abundant in the Atlantic 
Rainforest biome, the "Pau-Brasil".19o That tree became the object of the first wave of 
184 The Portuguese expedition fleet was led by Pedro Alvares Cabral and first arrived in the Brazilian 
town of Porto Seguro, Bahia State, on April 21st, 1500. See generally JOAO CAPISTRANO DE ABREU, 
CAPiTULOS DEHISTORlA COLONIAL [CHAPTERS OF COLONIAL HISTORY] 35·38 (1928) (detaling the 
history behind the Portuguese expedition led by Pedro Alvares Cabral, the first one arriving in Brazil). 
185 See Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Brie/History a/Conservation in the Atlantic Forest, in THE ATLANTIC 
FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 31, 36 (Carlos Galindo·Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) ("It 
was shortly after the Europeans discovered Brazil in 1500 that deforestation began with the large-scale 
exploitation of brazilwood (Caesalpinia echinata), then abundant in the coastal forests from Rio de 
Janeiro presumably all the way to Ceara. "). 
186 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005,74 (2008) available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site medial A TLAS%20MA TA %20A TLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORI02000·2005.pdf(last visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
187 See EDUARDO BUENO, PAUL-BRASIL 88 (Axis Mundi Editora 2002) (2002) (BRAZ.) (describing that 
Pero Vaz de Caminha, the rapporteur in the Portuguese expedition fleet that first arrived in Brazil, once 
confronted with the Atlantic Forest, reported in his letter a luxuriant and vast forest. According to the 
author, it was hard for Caminha to describe the forest, because he was confused by the forest's splendor, 
having stated that the trees were many, gigantic, multifarious and incredibly green. 
188 See JOAO CAFISTRANO DE ABREU, CAPiTULOS DE HISTORIA COLONIAL [CHAPTERS OF COLONIAL 
HISTORY] 19-22 (Sociedade Capistrano de Abreu 1928) (1928) (BRAZ.) (listing and describing the 
indigenous communities and their habits prior to the Portuguese colonization) see also Instituto 
Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Dossie Mala Atlantica 2001, 18 (2001) (reporting 
that numerous indigenous communities lived in the Atlantic Rainforest biome practicing agriculture, but 
highlighting the existence of testimonies from travelers and historians pointing out to no evidence of any 
kind of forest degradation). 
)89 See generally Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, BriefHistOlY a/Conservation in the Atlantic Forest, in THE 
ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 3 I, 36 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 
2003) ("The destruction of the Atlantic Forest started early. Prehistoric indigenous communities, who 
inhabited some areas offorest for at least 11,000 years, already practiced a rudimentary form of 
agriculture; however, any impact they may have had on the great forest is not perceptible today."). 
190 In one of the most comprehensive studies about the origins of the name "Brazil", Adelino D'Azevedo 
attests that Brazil is the name of a red dye. Therefore, due to the abundance of the Pau-Brasil tree in the 
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intense commercial exploitation, launching the degradation process of the Forest. l9l The 
Pau-Brasil tree was of enormous value back in the 16th and 17th centuries due to its 
reddish texture from which Europeans extracted a red paint commonly used to color 
textiles. I92 The lumbering of the Pau-Brasil dyewood lasted for more than two and a 
half centuries and constituted the first natural resource of interest to European settiersI93 
driven by high profits and low, if none, care to the Atlantic Forest's ecological 
attributes. I94 But lumbering was not limited to pau-brasil. Other high value trees were 
heavily logged to fulfill the necessities of the naval, furniture and construction 
industries, among other uses. I95 
Starting with the lumbering ofPau-Brasil and other high value trees, the history 
of the Brazilian colonization process was characterized by different cycles of natural 
resources exploitation. I96 Up until the beginning of the twentieth century, exploitation 
Atlantic Forest where the Portuguese first arrived, the Brazil name became a simplification of the name 
attributed to the Pau-Brasil tree. See generally, ADELINO JOSE DA SILVA D' AZEVEDO, ESTE NOME: 
BRAZIL [THIs NAME: BRAZIL] 263,461 (Agencia-Geral do Ultramar 1967) (1967) (PORT.). 
191 See generally Roberta M. Delson & John P. Dickenson, Perspectives on Landscape Change in Brazil, 
16 J. LATIN-AM. STUD. 101, 103 (1984), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/157289 (Within a few 
years of the discovery, the abundant praise gave way to sober calculations of how the new land might be 
made profitable to the Crown. A dichotomy arose between those predisposed toward quick, speculative 
gain and those who advocated a more rational settlement, carefully analyzing existing resources. The 
former faction held sway at first, as the Crown awarded contracts to individuals willing to travel to Brazil 
and invest in lumbering in the thickly treed coastal fores!."). 
192 EDUARDO BUENO, PAUL-BRASIL 17 (Axis Mundi Editora 2002) (2002) (BRAZ.). See also WAREN 
DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC FOREST 6 (U. 
Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (describing the pau-brasil as "a dyewood, called ibirapitanga - red tree - by the 
Tupi, who colored their cotton fibers with it. The Portuguese called it pau-brasil, probably from brasa-
glowing coal. At the first cut, the core of the trunk displays a golden brilliance, then turns a bright orange-
red. When thrust in water it immediately becomes reddish violet."). 
193 See Roberta M. Delson & John P. Dickenson, Perspectives an Landscape Change in Brazil, 16 J. 
LATIN-AM. STUD. 101, 103 (1984), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/157289 ("By far the most 
profitable tree to cut was Cesaelpinia echinata or pau brasil, a dyewood from which the name of the 
country is derived. This tree represented the first extractive basis upon which the Brazilian economy was 
anchored, and its marketing set in motion a pattern of production for exportation which has only been 
effectively challenged since the late nineteenth century. "). 
194 See generally WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 364 (D. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("'Discovery' was breathtaking asserted to be the 
equivalent of conquest, 'conquest' was imbued with unlimited rights over the conquered, and the forest 
was reduced to booty."). 
195 Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Dassie Mata Atlantica 2001, 24-25 
(2001), available at http://wv.;w.socioambiental.orglbanco imagens/pdfs/54.pdf (last visited Jun. 17, 
2008). 
196 CAIOPRADoJR., THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL 145 (Suzette Macedo trans., Univ. 
Calif. Press 1967) (1963) (explaining that the Brazilian economy "functioned in terms of the combination 
of international circumstances that favored whatever product it could supply and hence gave an illusory 
impression of wealth and prosperity. As soon as the particular combination of circumstances changed or 
the available natural resources were exhausted, production declined and withered away, making it 
impossible to maintain the life it had sustained."). 
t 
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was almost exclusively confined within the Atlantic Rainforest biome.197 It was not 
until the beginning of the 1900s that the development frontier was intensely expanded to 
the Savannal98 and Amazonl99 biomes. Major natural resources exploitation cycles 
within the forest, known in the Brazilian history as "economic cycles,,20o, included: 
197 See generally CAIO PRADO JR., DIE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL 151-156 (Suzette 
Macedo trans., Univ. Calif. Press 1967) (1963) (explaining the ranchers' and farmers' preference over 
coastal land and inland not far from the coast throughout the 16th , 1 th, 18th and 19th centuries, comprising 
areas within the Atlantic Rainforest biome for reasons ranging from proximity to ports of exportation to 
lands suitable for sugarcane, coffee, cotton and cacao); see also WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND 
FIREBRAND - DIE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC FOREST 266 (u. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) 
("Nearly all of the physical and economic transformations of the 1950s through the 1970s that might be 
called development were confined to the region of the Atlantic Forest. Very nearly all the investment of 
multinational and state-owned corporations came to be concentrated in the 'industrial triangle' fonned by 
the cities of Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, and Rio de Janeiro. "). 
198 See Joao Carlos Ker et ai., Cerrados: Solos, Aptidilo e Potencialidade Agricola [Savanna: Soils, 
Suitability and Agricultural PotencialityJ, in CARGILL FOUND., PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON 
MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION OF THE SA VANNA SOIL 1, 2 (Cassimiro Vaz Costa & Luiz Carlos 
Valadares Borges eds., 1992) (comparing the 1970 demographic census of the savanna biome with the 
1990 one showing a twofold increase in the region's population and attributing it to a growing migration 
in search of new arable lands for agriculture). 
199 See generally Michael S. Giaimo, Deforestation in Brazil: Domestic Political Imperative-Global 
Ecological Disaster, 18 ENVTL. L. 537, 541-544 (1988) (laying down a chronology of Amazonian 
development efforts effectively launched in the post-World War II with the 1946 Constitution setting 
apart tax revenues to be invested in the Amazon region). 
200 See generally WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND -1HE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 170 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("The export 'cycles' so characteristic of Brazilian 
economic history, in which a product is produced successfully for a time, even though inefficiently, 
relying on the bounty of nature, but then falls out of world trade as that bounty grows scarce and as more 
efficient techniques of production fail to be applied, is largely the result of the inability to join together 
capital and proceed to more intensive exploitation and to shake off bureaucratic parasitism. "). 
agriculture201 (sugarcane202, coffee203, cotton204 and cattle ranching205), mininio6 and 
the industrialization process following the late 1920s Great Depression?07 
58 
Considering land was abundant, those different natural resources' exploitation 
phases had one similar characteristic: the disregard for the forest and its ecological 
attributes?08 Over five centuries after the first wave of colonizers, the results of such 
unsustainable patterns of exploitation and settlement are reflected by, but not limited to, 
the following objective indicators: first, only less than ten percent of the biome remains 
preserved209; second, current high susceptibility ofthe region's dwellers to natural 
disturbances (floods, droughts, tornadosi 10; third, more than half of the Brazilian 
201 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF THEBRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 26 (u. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("Agriculture was much more viable on forest soils. 
From the beginning, farming in the region of the Atlantic Forest - indeed, throughout the lowland areas of 
the continent - required the sacrifice of the forest."). 
202 See CAIO PRADO JR., THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL 166 (Suzette Macedo trans., 
Univ. Calif. Press 1967) (1963) ("Sugarcane was widely distributed throughout the colony. We find it all 
along the coastal fringe from the extreme north, in Para, to the South, in Santa Catarina."), 
203 See generally WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND - THE DESTRUCTION OF THEBRAZIUAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 178 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (noting that the expansion of coffee throughout the 
nineteenth century posed more threat to the Atlantic Forest than any other previous economic cycle). 
204 See CAIO PRADO JR., THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL 173 (Suzette Macedo trans., 
Univ. Calif. Press 1967) (1963) ("In the peak period of the early years of the nineteenth century, when 
Brazil took its place among the world's great cotton producers, cotton planting was widely spread 
throught Brazilian territory."). 
205 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 113 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (noting that cattle "spread out over forest land that 
had been farmed and was abandoned", preventing the regeneration of the forest). 
206 See CAIO PRADO JR., THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL 197 (Suzette Macedo trans., 
Univ. Calif. Press 1967) (1963) (1995) (noting that "in spite of the wealth produced by mining - most of 
which, incidentally, was drained out of the country - it has left so few traces, other than the wholesale 
destruction of natural resources wreaked throughout the mining districts ... ".). 
207 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF THEBRAZILIAN 
ATLANTlcFOREST 265 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (stressing how depression and the postwar launched 
a general feeling of economic development at any cost in the Brazilian domestic policies which 
eventually was concentrated mainly in the Atlantic Rainforest biome). 
208 See generally WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 57 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (noting that "[tlhe conservation of natural resources 
was to prove irrelevant in a society in which the conservation of human life was irrelevant."). 
209 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas das 
Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periada 2000-2005, 74 (2008) available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site mediaiA TLAS%20MA TA%20A TLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORI02000-2005.pdf (last visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
210 For instance, in the State of Santa Catarina with its territory within the Atlantic Rainforest biome, the 
Governor issued a decree constituting a technical and scientific working group to assess and propose 
droughts, floods and tornados mitigation policies. More importantly, this working group is set 
permanently to investigate the causes of growing natural catastrophes in the State, which are, in many 
cases, believed to have a direct relationship with human actions. See Universidade Federal de Santa 
Catarina (Federal University of Santa Catarina) [UFSC], Researchers Get Together to Investigate the 
Causes a/Growing Occurrence a/Natural Catastrophes, available at 
http://www.agecom.ufsc.br/index.php?secao~arg&id~8308 (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). See State Decree 
1.940 (3 Dec. 2008), available at 
http://www.gruporeacao.sc.e:ov.br/index.php?option=com content&task=view &id= 17 &ltemid=28 (last 
( 
endangered species are from the Atlantic Rainforest region;211 and fourth, air, soil, 
water and costal pollution?12 Warren Dean summarized over half-millennium of the 
Atlantic Rainforest exploitation periods as follow: 
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"For five hundred years the Atlantic Forest has yielded easy pickings: parrots, 
dyewood, slaves, gold, ipecac, orchids, and timber for the profit oftheir colonial 
masters and, burned and ravaged, an immensely fertile layer of ashes that made 
possible an effortless, mindless, and unsustainable agriculture. Population grew 
and grew, capital "accumulated" while the forests disappeared; further capital 
was then "accumulated" - in barriers to the gullying of farmland, aqueducts, 
flood control and flood relief, dredging equipment, planted woodlands, and the 
industrialization of substitutes for hundreds of products once plucked freely in 
the wild. No restraint was observed during this half-millennium of gluttony, 
even though, almost from the beginning, solemn interdictions were intoned 
intermittently and in latter days, continually and frantically.,,213 
For reasons ranging from technological innovation to the shift from an 
exclusively agrarian economy to investment in industrial growth after the Great 
Depression, each cycle arrayed from exponential augmentation to decline or even 
extinction.214 The collapse ofthe Pau-Brasil cycle in the second half of 19th century 
was due to the development of synthetic dyes.2!5 The gold rush was over when 
overexploitation led to the shortage of this precious metal in the Atlantic Forest 
visited, Jan. 21, 2009) (instituting a Reaction Group under which the Technical and Scientific Working 
Group was established). 
211 See Mirian Prochnow, Mata Atlantica [Atlantic Forest], in ALMANAQUEBRASlL SOCIOAMBIENTAL 
144, 153 (noting that out of 510 endangered species, 357 are found in the Atlantic Forest). 
212 See Marussia Whately, Agua [Water], in ALMANAQUEBRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL291, 292 (noting that 
clean and affordable water on the Atlantic Rainforest region (coastal area) is becoming increasingly rare). 
See Helena Ribeiro, Po/ui,{io Urbana [Urban Pollution], in ALMANAQUEBRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL405, 
405~408 (noting the problem of urban pollution in major metropolises on the Atlantic Rainforest 
including Sao Paulo); see also Marcia Makiko Hirota, Monitoring the Brazilian Atlantic Forest Cover, in 
THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 60, 61 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara 
eds., 2003) ("Other fonus of encroachment that directly or indirectly affect the Atlantic Forests are 
industrial or agricultural pollution of the air, water, and soil, oil spills, mining, the construction of new 
roads and highways, and energy projects such as hydroelectric power plants and gas pipelines. "). 
213 WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND - THE DES1RUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC 
FOREST363 (u. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) 
214 See CAIO PRADO JR., THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL 144 (Suzette Macedo trans., 
Univ. Calif. Press 1967) (1963) (describing the cyclical nature of the history of the Brazilian economy). 
215 See EDUARDO BUENO, PAUL-BRASIL 36 (Axis Mundi Editora 2002) (2002) (BRAZ.) (noting that in 
1856 when the English chemist Willian Henry Perkin developed a synthetic dye, the Pau-Brasil tree lost 
its value). 
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region.216 Canefields were never gone, but faced major decline with the insertion of 
coffee plantations due to declining international sugar prices around 1850.217 Finally, 
increasing urban sprawling attributed to the region's industrialization shift during the 
twentieth-century contributed to the aforementioned degraded scenario of few 
remaining preserved areas, the majority of the country's endangered species, along with 
. ·1 d I II· 218 air, water, SOl an coasta po utlOn. 
That was a result of unsustainable exploitation patterns, an unfortunate landmark 
in each of those economic cycles. Lumbering of the pau-brasil, relying on native 
knowledge, the Tupi tribe, brandishing axes and by burning forested areas around trees 
degraded 6,000 square kilometers just in the first century.219 Denudation of hillsides, 
burning the forest in the vicinity of mines and diversion of entire streams are illustrative 
of main degradation practices featuring the gold rush.220 An intense slash-and-bum 
regime221 followed by extensive monoculture crops (sugarcane222 and coffee223) and, 
216 See CAIO PRADO JR., THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL 148 (Suzette Macedo ttans., 
Univ. Calif. Press 1967) (1963) ("The gold deposits, which had proved rich only on the surface of the 
soil, had been exhausted, and their exploitation was no longer profitable. "). 
217 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND ~ THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 178 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (noting that international sugar market was only 
briefly favorable and, in contrast, coffee had the potential of much greater profits). 
218 See generally Mirian Prochnow, Mata Atltintica [Atlantic Forest], in ALMANAQUEBRASIL 
SOCIOAMBIENTAL 144, 153; See also Marussia Whately, Agua [Water], in ALMANAQUEBRASIL 
SOCIOAMBIENTAL291, 292; See also Helena Ribeiro, Polui,fio Urbana [Urban Pollution], in 
ALMANAQUEBRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL 405, 405·408. 
219 WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAXANDFIREBRAND~ THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC 
FOREST 47 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995). 
220 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND ~ THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 98 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("[T]he total volume of gold obtained during the 
eighteenth century would have overturned 4,000 square kilometers of the Atlantic Forest region."). 
221 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 26 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (describing the slash-and-burn regime, as follow: 
"[t]he technique was extremely simple: Near the end of the drier season the underbrush in a patch of 
forest, a hectare, more or less, was slashed, so as to dry it out, and the larger trees were ringd with stone 
axes. Then, just before coming of the rains, the area would be set afire, causing the enormous stock of 
nutrients stored in the forest biomass to fall to earth as ashes. A few of the largest trees that had resisted 
the fire would remain, scorched but standing. The rains washed the nutrients into the soil, neutralizing as 
well as fertilizing it. Planting was then carried out with no tool save a digging stick. Forest that had never 
fefore been burned was not only marvelously fertile but also free of the seeds of invasive plants, and 
therefore little weeding was necessary.") 
222 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND ~ THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 79 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("Assuming a yield of 50 tons of cane per hectare and 
an extractive rate of 3 percent by weight, by 1700 sugarcane fields would have occupied about 120 square 
kilometers. This would have been land taken from forest, because sugarcane was thought to be cultivated 
only on forest soils.") 
223 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND ~ THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 188 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("Supposing that 700 kilograms was the average 
yield per hectare, and supposing that the average grove was economically productive for twenty years, 
then it was necessary to clear for this purpose some 7,200 square kilometers of primary forest, the 
equivalent of 300 million tons of forest biomass gone up in smoke. This area equaled nearly 18 percent of 
the surface of the province of Rio de Janeiro, where four-fifths of this coffee was planted. To this must be 
( . 
( 
after the land was no longer suitable for plantation, the introduction of cattle ranching 
activities224 contributed even further for the destruction ofthe Atlantic Forest. The 
general belief that plagues and diseases were associated with the forest was also 
responsible for large areas of forest cJearance.225 
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Unplanned settlement, land-use and socio-economical policies based primarily 
on granting land freely and costless were additional to those unsustainable exploitation 
practices contributing to the destruction ofthe Atlantic Forest.226 More recently, in the 
twentieth-century, in the post-Great Depression and World War II, the threats to the 
Atlantic Forest came from rapidly industrialization of the region accompanied by 
growing urban sprawling and demographic concentration.227 The correlation between 
those factors and the pressures imposed upon the forest are illustrated by the facts of a 
landmark case in which the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice had to balance the 
preservation of the forest and a low-income community development.228 
All in all, those extractive economic cycles translate into over five hundred years 
of unplanned settlements, land-use, economical and social policies characterized by the 
disregard to the environment.229 Consequently, an area over twice the size and 
added the forest cleared for subsistence for the slave work force, which must have averaged 140,000 in 
number. Some unknowable portion of subsistence fields, possibly south-facing hillsides, may have been 
covered with primary forest." 
224 WAREN DEAN, WrrH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND - THE DES1RUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC 
FOREST 1 13 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (J 995) ("The deterioration of native pasture caused it to become, 
paradoxically, a scarce commodity. Therefore cattle spread out over forest land that had been farmed and 
was abandoned. These pastures were often called artificial, suggesting that they were planted to selected 
grasses, but that was never the case in the eighteenth century and was rare in the nineteenth. They were, 
instead, populated by whatever invasive native grasses found degraded fannland congenia1."). 
225 See WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN 
ATLANTIC FOREST 103 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("[Ilt came to be the general belief that fevers 
emanated not only from swamps but also from the forest, so that much clearing came wrongheadedly to 
be carried out merely to espantar asfebres - scare off the fevers."). 
226 WAREN DEAN, WITH BROADAX AND FIREBRAND- THE DESTRUCTION OF THEBRAZILIANATLANTIC 
FOREST 147 (u. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) ("It was a major cause of the destruction of the Atlantic Forest 
that government assigned no value to the land it so freely granted. Having consumed all the most 
promising primary forest in a given sesmaria, a grantee commonly sold it for a trifle and asked for 
another, which he normally experienced no difficulty in obtaining."). 
227 See Roberta M. Delson & John P. Dickenson, Perspectives on Landscape Change in Brazil, 16 J. 
LATIN-AM. STUD. 101, 114 (1984), available at http://www.jstor.org/stab1e1157289(''Amajorfeature, 
therefore, of twentieth-century change has been the introduction of factories, chimneys, dirt, pollution and 
other signs of 'progress' into the Brazilian scene."). 
228 In a landmark decision the Federal Superior Court of Appeals (the highest court of appeals on all non-
constitutional matters), in balancing the Atlantic Rainforest preservation and an illegal condominium 
development for poor people, held in favor of the forest, while also acknowledging the social implications 
of such holding, but deciding that the houses should be demolished and that the forested area restored. 
S.T.J.P·2, REsp. No. 403.190-SP, Relator: Min. Joao Ot'vio de Noronha, 14.08.2006, (find at 
http://www.stj.gov.br/webstji) (Brazil). 
229 See generally CAIO PRADO JR., THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL 155 (Suzette 
Macedo trans., Univ. Calif. Press 1967) (J 963) ("The forests which had once covered most of the areas 
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population of France, with incalculable environmental resources and functions is tainted 
by a history of destructive socio-economical policies, constituting additional challenges 
to carbon forest markets?30 In sum, on one hand, those additional challenges result into 
low availability of degraded land that can be converted into forest in light of increasing 
demographical pressures and the region's rising industrial and agricultural demand 
which, in tum, threatens the few remaining preserved areas.231 
On the other hand, the described challenges have the potential to enhance the 
significance of a well-designed system of economic incentives as instruments of 
environmental policy, complementing an existing command-and-control regime.232 
Whether existing mechanisms -like the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol or voluntary 
markets - are appropriate to assist on conservation and regeneration ofthe Atlantic 
Forest in light of its socio-economical features, regulatory and institutional framework 
are the object ofthe analysis in the following sections and chapters. Prior to that, this 
study turns to the Atlantic Forest's climate change mitigation potential. 
v. The Atlantic Rainforest's Potential Contribution to Emissions 
and Removals of Greenhouse Gases 
occupied by colonization, chosen for the natural fertility of their' residual soils, rapidly disappeared in the 
destructive wake of the fires that devoured them. "). 
230 See generally Carlos Eduardo Frickmann Young, Socioeconomic Causes of Deforestation in the 
Atlantic Forest of Brazil, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 103, 104 (Carlos Galindo-Leal 
and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) ("In general, land occupation cycles have three stages. First 
comes a period of population gro\¥1:h and rapid expansion during which agricultural activities drive 
deforestation. Next comes a slowing of the economic and demographic growth but with deforestation 
continuing in response to other pressures, such as land speculation and expansion of crop and pastureland. 
The final stage is a period of contracting economic and demographic pressures, as natural resources 
become depleted or various techniques are used to increase agricultural output while reducing the need 
for manuallabor."). 
231 See Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas 
dos Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005, Intro. (2008) available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org. br/site medial A TLAS%20MA TA %20A TLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORI02000-2 OOS.pdf (last visisted Jun. 23, 2008) (stressing that the industrialization process 
led to urban sprawling of major Brazilian metropolis in within the Atlantic Rainforest biome which, in 
turn, destroyed most of the region's natural vegetation. In addition, referring to the data from the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, the same report states that 61% of the municipalities in 
Brazil are located within the Atlantic Rainforest biome). 
232 See Carlos Eduardo Frickmann Young, Socioeconomic C;auses of Deforestation in the Atlantic Forest 
of Brazil, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 103, 115-116 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de 
Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) (drawing an outlook for the future of the Atlantic forest, highlights the 
importance of some new laws and regulations adding to the current command-and-control system as well 
as the importance of some economic incentives and "some financial reward for the global benefits 
provided by the Atlantic Forest in tenns of carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation. Even 
though the resources available for such compensation may be limited in the short term, many 
conservationists, policymakers, and others hope that markets will be developed in the future that can 
contribute significantly to the preservation of forest and, in the future that can contribute significantly to 
the preservation of forests and, in the case of carbon sequestration, to their recovery. "). 
( . 
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Having scrutinized the forest's characteristics, this subsection turns to the 
region's contribution to emissions and potential for removals of greenhouse gases. In 
the absence of a greenhouse gas inventory specific to the Atlantic Rainforest biome, 
assumptions are drawn from the region's ecological and socio-economical features and 
current scientific data on Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry ("LULUCF") 
reported by the IPCC.233 The information collected from that examination is then 
combined with the data in the Brazilian Inventory on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
presented to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC?34 
The result of such analysis, on the one side, helps to understand how the biome 
can 'act as a source of greenhouse gases. On the flip side, how conservation and 
preservation policies and, above all, restoration practices have the potential to turn the 
region into a major sink of greenhouse gases. Identitying the region's greenhouse gases 
potentials and threats due to land-use changes and forestry activities brings aboutthe 
benefits of maximizing the designing of alternative auxiliary forest carbon markets and 
the implementation of existing ones. 
Over the last five centuries, the history of the Atlantic Forest cultivation was, as 
described above, tainted by the slash-and-burn method.235 That leads to the first 
assumption: most of the carbon stocked in the region's flora and soil was released in the 
format of CO2 long before the 1990 reference year?36 Corroborating this assumption, a 
report from the National Institute for Space Research ("INPE") reveals that for the 
period of 1985-1990 roughly 93% of the biome was devastated.237 The year of 1990 is 
the reference year for developed countries' greenhouse gases emissions from which an 
233 Important technical and scientific infonnation regarding land use, land-use change and forestry for this 
study is supported by the 2000 !PCC Special Report Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry. See 
generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC"), LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE, 
AND FORESTRY, (Cambridge Univ. Press, Robert T. Watson et aI, eds. 2000). 
234 CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
("UNFCCC"), BRAZIL'S INITIAL NATIONAL COMMUNICATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (I 994), available at 
http:// unfccc. iut/resources/ docs/natclbrazi Inc 1 e. pdf. 
235 See above Chapter 2. 
236 See generally, PHYLLIS BUELL ANO JAMES GIRARD, CHEMISTRY FUNDAMENTALS-AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 346 (Jones and Bartlett 2003) ("As tree grow, they take carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere in the process of photosynthesis; when they decay or are burned in forest fires, 
carbon dioxide is released back into the atmosphere. "). 
237 Instituto NacionaI de Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute for Space Research) [INPE], Atlas dos 
Remanescentes Florestais da Mata Atlantica Periodo 2000-2005,74 (2008) available at 
http://mapas.sosma.org.br/site media! A TLAS%?OMA TA %20A TLANTICA %20-
%20RELATORl02000-2 005.pdf(1ast visisted Jun. 23, 2008). 
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average of 5.2% reduction is expected.238 It is also a baseline set by CDM forestry 
provisions upon when the land could not be forested to be eligible as a forestry project-
activity.239 The rationale was to avoid that forest carbon markets could stimulate 
deforestation to allow for future reforestation practices in exchange of carbon credits?40 
And that is due to the fact that fast-growing homogeneous forests have higher rates of 
carbon sequestration than old-established mature ones.24 ! In the later case the carbon 
offset potential is on forest's carbon storage capacity (avoided deforestation) as oppose 
to carbon removal?42 But as examined earlier avoided deforestation activities are not 
yet permitted under the Kyoto Protocol regime.243 
In that sense, under the CDM legal framework two forestry activities are 
permitted: "afforestation" and "reforestation,,:244 The difference merely being that an 
afforestation project assumes that the land was not forest or has not been a forest for at 
least fifty years, while reforestation presupposes that a forested land was subsequently 
deforested, as long as the land was not forested on 31 December 1989. The FAO 
Global Forest Resources Assessment defines afforestation as the "planting of trees on 
lands that was not previously forested, or through natural expansion of forests", and 
reforestation as "[w]here part of the forest is cut down but replanted ( .... ), or where the 
238 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Annex B, Dec. 
10,1997,37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
239 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, 
Report a/the Conference a/the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties (Volume I), Decision Il/CP.7 Annex,' 13, U.N. Doc 
FCCCICP/2001l13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume I)]. 
240 See Janine Bloomfield & Holly L. Person, Land use, Land-use Change, Forestry, and Agricultural 
Activities in the Clean Development Mechanism: Estimates a/Greenhouse Gas Offiet Potential, 5 
MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 9, 12 (2000) ("There has been concern that 
LUCF projects within the CDM will lead to a replacement of mature forest with fast-growing tree 
plantations."). 
241 See Janine Bloomfield & Holly L. Person, Land use, Land-use Change, Fores{1Y, and Agricultural 
Activities in the Clean Development Mechanism: Estimates a/Greenhouse Gas Offset Potential, 5 
MITIGA nON ADAPTA nON STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 9, 12 (2000) ("Plantations generally have 
higher rates of carbon sequestration than mature forests; that is, the amount of carbon in trees increases 
rapidly in plantations, particularly in those managed for maximum biomass production, while in mature 
forests the uptake may be approximately balanced by mortality."). 
242 See Janine Bloomfield & Holly L. Person, Land use, Land-use Change, Forestry, and Agricultural 
Activities in the Clean Development Mechanism: Estimates a/Greenhouse Gas Offset Potential, 5 
MITIGA nON ADAPTA nON STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 9, II (2000)("Mature forests can yield 
carbon benefits through their conservation -leaving the forests standing prevents the C02 emissions that 
would have occurred through deforestation. Avoiding deforestation also offers many environmental 
benefits in terms of biodiversity, water and air quality, and maintenance oflocal climate."). 
243 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29 - Nov. 10,2001, 
Report a/the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties (Volume I), Decision IIICP.7 Annex, , 1. 
244 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29 - Nov. 10,2001, 
Report a/the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties (Volume I), Decision IIICP.7 Annex,' I(b) and, I(c). 
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forest grows back on its own within a relatively short period (natural regeneration).,,245 
In practice, CDM forest project developers commonly use those terms as synonyms as 
long as the proposed area meets the 1990 baseline requirement of not being forested?46 
In light of the diversity of the Atlantic Rainforest biome, mixing well-
established industrial zones with areas of environmental preservation, it is reasonable to 
assume that forest carbon markets have, in principle, the potential to stimulate 
environmentally sound practices in many areas of the biome. Taking into consideration 
that tropical forests have much higher biodiversity rates than temperate forests or 
homogeneous commercially planted formations, their regeneration process is more 
complex247. Therefore, natural regeneration projects tend to be more burdensome and of 
less commercial value to a project developer than a fast-growing tree plantation, 
considering the later has an additional advantage of profiting not only from the 
commercialization of carbon forest credits but also from supplying wood resources to 
the industrial sector.248 Nonetheless, an assessment on the potentialities of carbon forest 
mechanisms for the Atlantic Forest is still dependent upon a thoroughly understanding 
of the biome's capacity to remove and contribution to emissions of greenhouse gases. 
For that, this study turns to the 1994 Brazilian Inventory on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions presented to the UNFCCC. Based on that inventory, approximately two 
thirds ofthe country's emissions derive from land-use and forestry (see figure below). 
Since the information was based on data extracted from the period 1990-1994249, that 
245 See Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAD], Global Forest Resources Assessment: Towards 
Sustainable Forest Management, Executive Summary, xiv (F AO Forestry Paper 147, 2006), available at 
fip:llfip.fao.org/docrcp/faoIOOS/A0400E/A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafier Global Forest Resource Assessment 
2005] 
246 See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCee") Official 
Homepage, http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/ARmethodologies/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2009) 
(providing a list of proposed forestry methodologies in which the terms" afforestation" and" 
reforestation" are commonly used as synonyms). 
247 WAREN DEAN, WIlli BROADAX AND FIREBRAND -DIE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ATLANTIC 
FOREST 234 (U. Calif. Press 1995) (1995) (referring to the differences between re-creating temperate and 
tropical/sub-tropical forests). 
248 Compare AES-Tiete AfforestationlReforestation Project Activity Around the Borders of Hydroeletric 
Plant Reservoirs, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, U.N. Doc FCCC/SBI20001XX, 
available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.intfmethodologies/ARmethodologies/publicview.html?meth reFARNM0034, with 
Reforestation as Renewable Source of Wood Supplies for Industrial Use in Brazil, Executive Board of 
the Clean Development Mechanism, U.N. DOC, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/ARmethodol ogies/pu blicview .htrn l?meth ref= ARNMOO 15-rev 
(illustrating the lower overall incentives of native subtropical forest projects in comparison to 
homogeneous reforestation forest projects). 
249 CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE(" 
UNFCCC"), BRAZIL'S INITIAL NATIONAL COMMUNICATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
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leads to another assumption: a substantial portion of the greenhouse gases emissions 
from land-use and forestry come from the most recent overexploited biomes: the 
Savanna and the Amazon. In fact, that is corroborated by a report from the Woods Hole 
Research Center?50 The figure below illustrates the country's emissions in percentage 
by sector in 1994 (the only inventory submitted by Brazil thus far): 
Source: Brazil's Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC 
Still, if vast portions of the Atlantic Rainforest biome were once cleared by 
slash-and-bum methods releasing large quantities of carbon dioxide, why those 
emissions are disregarded by the current climate change regime? The logical answer is 
that it was not until the post-Industrial Revolution that high concentrations of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere became a problem?5l Secondly, the scientific 
knowledge establishing causation between human induced land-use and forestry 
practices to increasing global temperatures is relatively new in comparison with the 
devastation history of the Atlantic Forest.252 
CONVENTlON ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Intro. (1994), available at 
http://unfccc. i nt/resource/ docs/natclbrazi Inc] e. pdf. 
250 DANlEL NEPSTAD, THE WOODS HOLE RESEARCH CENTER: REED - REDUClNG EMlSSlONS FROM 
DEFORESTATlON AND FOREST DEGRADATlON - THE COSTS AND BENEFlTS OF REDUClNG CARBON 
EMlSSlONS FROM DEFORESTATlON AND FOREST DEGRADATlON IN THEBRAZlLlAN AMAZON, 7 (2007), 
available at http://www.whrc.org/resources/published literature/pdf/WHRC REDD Amazon.pdf, (last 
visited Jun. 10,2008) ("Roughly two thirds of Brazil's annual carbon emissions come from deforestation, 
mostrly in the Amazon ... "). 
251 The first major international conference on climate change was in 1979. See World Climate 
Conference, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 12-23, 1979, Declaration a/the World Climate Conference, at 2, U.N. 
Doc IOC/SAB-IVIINF.3. 
252 See R6mulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 
634,634-635 (2008) (describing the history of the consolidation of the scientific knowledge liking 
human-induced forestry practices to global climate change). 
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Therefore, based on the aforementioned assumptions it is possible to conclude 
that current emissions from land-use change and forestry on the Atlantic Rainforest 
biome are insignificant compared to the Savanna and mainly the Amazon biomes.2s3 
That leads to a whole new assumption: the remaining sources of greenhouse gases 
emissions listed in the figure above (industrial processes, solvent and other product use, 
agriculture, energy and waste) come from the Atlantic Rainforest biome. That is 
assumed in light of the aforementioned industrial and agricultural concentration of the 
region?S4 But further analysis of this conclusion falls outside the scope set forth this 
paper and is mentioned in this section with the sole purpose of reinforcing the 
potentialities of market-based forest mechanisms for a region that was once covered 
with forest and has currently vast areas deforested. On the contrary, that is not the case 
for major portions of the Amazon and Savanna biomes, for instance, faced with heavily 
deforestation practices in the past two decades. For those areas, because in most cases 
they do not meettheCDM forestry 1990 non-forest baseline requirement, they have to 
rely inevitably on alternative market mechanisms that allow for avoided deforestation 
activities.255 
In sum, based on the data and assumptions raised in this section, the scenario for 
carbon forest market opportunities in the Atlantic Rainforest seems to be a favorable 
one. That is due to a combination offactors: first, because the data from the Brazilian 
National Inventory reveals that two thirds of the country's emissions come from land-
use change and forestry, but they are not from the Atlantic Rainforest biome; and, 
second, because most of the region was either deforested already on 31 December 1989 
or had not been forested for at least fifty years. Under the Kyoto regulated market, then, 
vast parts of the Atlantic Forest meet a priori the definition of afforestation and 
reforestation project-activities set forth by the CDM regulatory regime. Moreover, if not 
253 Stephan Schwartzman and Paulo Moutinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND 
MARKET OPPORTIlNITlES 227, 228 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson·Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("During the 1980s, deforestation in Latin America alone produced a net carbon 
flux into the atmosphere on the order of 0.3 Pg C a year. This amount rose to 0.4 Pg C a year through the 
19905 as a result of additional deforestation of more than 4 million hectares a year. Of this total, 0.2 Pg C 
resulted from deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia. Real emissions were certainly higher, because 
emissions from forest fires and logging were not included in the calculation." 
254 See above Chapter Chapter 2.d.iv. _ 
255 Eduard Merger & Alwyn Williams, Comparison a/Carbon Offset Standards/or Climate Forestation 
Projects Participating in the Vo/untGly Carbon Market, UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 1, 7 (2008); 
available at http://\vww.fore.canterburv.ac.nzlresearch/ ("As Climate Forestation Projects are still being 
developed, they have moved to the Voluntary Carbon Market. Here, stringent project management rules 
are absent."). 
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under the CDM forestry market, the stage of the Atlantic Forest degradation indicates 
opportunities under alternative carbon forest markets, considering their similar basic 
nature: provide credits for either conserving existing forested areas or transforming non-
forested to forested areas?56 Notwithstanding, at this stage of the study an optimistic 
view of carbon forest market opportunities for the Atlantic Forest is premature and still 
dependent upon a more thorough examination of different factors. 
3. The Evolution of Forest International Economic Policy Instruments in the 
Context of Climate Change 
The direct and formal relantionship between unsustainable forestry practices and 
global climate change goes back at least to the late 1970s. Since the Declaration of the 
World Climate Conference in 1979, the international community has acknowledged that 
deforestation and changes in land use, such as agricultural and pastoral practices, are 
contributing to the increased amount of CO2 in the atmosphere.257 In 1989, the 
Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change recognized a 
growing international preoccupation with the alteration of the composition of the 
Earth's atmosphere due to anthropogenic activities;258 stressed the importance of 
sustainable forestry, reforestation, afforestation, and conservation activities;259 and 
called for a global increase in net forest growth of 12,000,000 hectares per year in the 
256 See generally Charlotte Streck et aI., Climate Change and ForestlY: An introduction, in CLIMA IE 
CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 3, 7 (Charlotte Streck, Robert 
O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Assigning value to emission 
reductions or removals carbon storage) by creating tradable carbon credits is one of the most developed 
and promising approaches for tapping the forestry sector in the fight against climate change( ... ). ( ... ) In 
return for their payments, investors or carbon purchasers receive a right to the carbon credits generated by 
the project. "). 
257 See World Climate Conference, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 12-23, 1979, Declaration o/the World Climate 
Conference, at 2, U.N. Doc 10C/SAB-IV/INF.3 ("[W]e can say with some confidence that the burning of 
fossil fuels, deforestation, and changes of land use have increased the amount of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere by about 15 percent during the last century and it is at present increasing by about 0.4 percent 
per year. "). 
258 See The Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, Noordwijk, Neth., 
Nov. 7, 1989, The Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, ~~ 1-3, 
reprinted in Selected International Legal Materials on Global Warming and Climate Change, 5 AM. U. J. 
INT'L L. & POL'y 513, 592-601 (1990). 
259 See The Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, Noordwijk, Neth., 
Nov. 7, 1989, The Noordwijk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, ~ 9, reprinted 
in Selected International Legal Materials on Global Warming and Climate Change, 5 AM. U. J.lNT'L L. 
& POL'y 513,592-601 (1990). 
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beginning of the twenty-first century?60 Shortly after the first assessment report of the 
!PCC, the Second World Climate Conference, held in Geneva from October 29th to 
November 7th, 1990, called upon the international community to take measures to 
increase "sinks" of greenhouse gases.261 
This was the situation with respect to forests and forestry leading up to the 1992 
UNFCCC, which is the formal and fundamental pillar of the current climate change 
legal regime. In addition to general norms and principles, the UNFCCC laid the ground 
for the developed countries, based on the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility, to adopt in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, binding commitments envisioning 
quantified reductions and limitations on the emissions of greenhouse gases. 
a. The Introduction of Forest and Forestry Activities Into the Climate 
Change Legal Regime 
The UNFCCC, the formal and fundamental multilateral international agreement 
in the climate change legal regime, was adopted in New York on May 9th, 1992, and 
fully launched during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development ("UNCED") in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, often called "The Earth 
Summit.,,262 The UNFCCC expressly recognizes the role and importance of "sinks" and 
"reservoirs" of greenhouse gases in mitigating global warming?63 
According to the UNFCCC's handbook, "[a] sink is a process, activity or 
mechanism that removes [greenhouse gases] from the atmosphere; a reservoir is part of 
the climate system that enables a [greenhouse gas] to be stored.,,264 The characterization 
offorestry and forest activities as types of sinks and reservoirs of CO2 was established 
260 See The Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, Noordwijk, Neth., 
Nov. 7, 1989, The Noordwijk Decloration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, ~~ 21, 
reprinted in Selected International Legal Materials on Global Warming and Climate Change, 5 AM. U. J. 
INT'L L. & POL'V 513, 592-601 (1990). 
261 See Climate Change Fact Sheet 221, http://unfccc.intiresource/ccsites/senegal/fact/fs221.htrn (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2007). 
262 See CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
("UNFCCC"), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE HANDBOOK 19 (2006), 
available at http://unfccc.intiresource/docs/publications/handbook.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC 
HANDBOOK]. • 
263 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, pmbl., May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
264 See SEBASTIAN OBERTHDR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 
POLICY FOR THE 21 ST CENTIJRY 9, 131-32 (1999) (describing the science underpinning the relantioship 
between forests and CO2 in the atmosphere). 
by the above described scientific studies265 that, in tum, inspired the climate change 
legal regime.266 Although the UNFCCC makes some general references to promoting 
the enhancement of forests, sinks, and reservoirs of greenhouse gases,267 the term 
"forestry" appears only once in the UNFCCC, and no legal definition is provided?68 
b. The Legal Status of Forests and Forestry Activities Under the 
UNFCCC 
70 
The definitions relevant to the legal status of forests and forestry that gave legal 
support for a9tivities under the climate change legal regime experienced two distinct 
phases. The first phase was characterized by the generic concepts of sink, reservoir, and 
source provided by the UNFCCC. The second phase is characterized by the more 
precise and specific notions of these terms provided by the Kyoto Protocol and 
subsequent Conferences and Meetings of the Parties?69 
The UNFCCC' s broad definitions for the terms sink,270 reservoir,271 and 
source
272 
subsumed the concepts of forest and forestry; and as a result, they supported 
forestry project activities during the Activities Implemented Jointly ("AU") Pilot 
Phase.273 The primary concern during the negotiations at the first session of the 
265 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4(1)(d), May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] (setting forth biomass, forests, oceans, and other terrestrial, coastal, 
and marine ecosystems as examples of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases). 
266 See, e.g., id. 
267 See id art. 4(1) (c). 
268 See Imke Sagemilller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Riskfor Biodiversity?, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189,201 
(2006) (explaining that "[ a]s a framework convention, the UNFCCC includes only few broad references 
to the removal of [greenhouse gases] by sinks"). 
269 For a discussion of the importance of developing clear definitions for terms such as "forests", 
"afforestation," "reforestation," and "deforestation," see Robert T. Watson & David J. Verardo, Preface 
to INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC"), IPCC SPECIAL REPORT: LAND USE, 
LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY ("LULUCF")- SUMMARY FORPOLICYMAKERS4 (2000), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/srlulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter IPCC SPECIAL REpORT ON LULUCF]. 
270 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 1(8), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107 [hereinafter UNFCee] C'" Sink' means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor ofa greenhouse gas from the atmosphere."). 
271 See id. art. 1(7) ('''Reservoir' means a component or components of the climate system where a 
greenhouse gas or a precursor of greenhouse gas is stored."). 
272 See id. art 1(9) ('''Source' means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol 
or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere."). 
273 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Berlin, F.R.G., Mar. 28 - Apr. 7, 1995, Report a/the Conference a/the Parties on its First Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its First Session, Decision 5ICP.I, ~ I(b), U.N. 
DocFCCCICP/1995I71Add.1 (June 6, 1995) [hereinafter COP-J Report -Part Two] ("[A]ctivities 
implemented jointly should be compatible with and supportive of national environment and development 
priorities and strategies, contribute to cost-effectiveness in achieving global benefits and could be 
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Conference of the Parties ("COP-I") in 1995 and the two subsequent sessions of the 
Conference of the Parties in 1996 and 1997 ("COP-2" and "COP-3", respectively) was 
defining quantified emissions reductions and limitations for developed countries.274 
Forest and forestry activities were primarily a cost effective way to make emissions 
reductions and limitations commitments feasible in the short term;275 and as a result, 
they became an important negotiation tool for the imposition of cap commitments upon 
developed countries276 But, it was only during the fourth session of the Conference of 
the Parties ("COP-4"), which occurred almost seven years after the UNFCCC was 
promulgated, that a more specific legal regime for LULUCF began to emerge.277 
Legally, though, at least until the Kyoto Protocol, Article 4(l)(d) of the 
UNFCCC provided the formal connection between forests and forestry and sinks and 
reservoirs. This provision called upon all Parties to promote the enhancement of sinks 
and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, including forests. On the one hand, such broad 
definitions allowed the legal status of forestry and forests to be easily inferred. Forests 
could be equated to sinks and reservoirs. On the other hand, because forests can also 
emit CO2 when disturbed, they could also be deemed sources of greenhouse gases under 
the UNFCCc.278 
For practical purposes, this means that whenever the climate change legal 
regime refers to enhancement, promotion, and sustainable management of sinks and 
conducted in a comprehensive maner covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse 
gases .... "). 
274 See Dean Anderson, Rapporteur's Report a/Workshop Presentations and Discussions, in THE 
EMERGING INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: STRUCTURES AND OPTIONS AFTER BERLIN 7, 
7 (Michael Grubb & Dean Anderson eds., 1995) (stating that the Berlin Mandate, which refers to the 
outcome of the first session of the Conference of the Parties, "calls for a process to begin to strengthen 
commitments beyond 2000. This process should lead the industrialized world to 'elaborate policies and 
measures,' and to 'set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames, such as 
2005,2010 and 2020, for their anthropogenic emission.' Negotiations are to be completed by early 1997 
in order that the results can be adopted at 'COP-3' .... The expectation is that a protocol or other legal 
agreement will be negotiated at COP-3 defining emission constraints for Annex 1 Parties potentially up to 
the year 2020."). 
275 See Joel N. Swisher, Joint Implementation Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: Technical and Institutional Challenges, 2 MITIGA nON ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL 
CHANGE 57, 60 (1997) (noting that "there are low-cost opportunities for carbon storage in the forestry 
sector"). 
276 See id at 58 (stating that "to expect Annex I countries to implement too large a share of the emission 
reductions could by physically or technically infeasible and would likely be inefficient"). 
277 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Buenos Aires, Arg., Nov. 2-14,1998, Report of 
the Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its Fourth SeSSion, Decision 9/CP.4, U.N. Doc FCCC/CPII 99811 6/Add. 1 (Jan. 25,1999) 
(addressing LULUCF specifically). 
278 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 1(9), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Lavanya Rajamani, Re-Negotiating Kyoto: A Review of the Sixth Coriference 
of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, COLO. 1. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y, 
2000 Yearbook, at 201, 207 ("Forest can be sources, sinks, or reservoirs of [greenhouse gases]."). 
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reservoirs, and calls for action to address anthropogenic emissions by sources, it is 
including forests and forestry activities.279 This is important because the broadness of 
the definitions relating to forests and forestry in the period leading up to the Kyoto 
Protocol was conducive to there being no limitation on the activities that could be 
implemented under the AI] Pilot Phase?80 For this reason, forest and forestry activities 
during the AU Pilot Phase included afforestation, reforestation, conservation practices, 
and sustainable forest management.281 
c. The Legal Status of Forests and Forestry Activities under the Kyoto 
Protocol and Subsequent Sessions of the Conference and Meeting of 
the Parties 
After the Kyoto Protocol expressly embraced forest and forestry practices and 
narrowed the UNFCCC's broad definitions of sinks, reservoirs, and sources ofC02,282 
negotiators faced the need to create a specific legal regime that could reconcile the 
interests of parties supporting such activities with the interests of parties opposing 
them.283 With the scientific support provided by the IPCC284 and the F A0285 and the 
279 See generally SEBASTIAN OBERTHOR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9, 131-32 (1999) (discussing the term "sink" and highlighting 
that "[i]n general, forests have the highest sink potential, depending, however, on age and condition of the 
forest"). 
280 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Berlin, F.R.G., Mar. 28 ~ Apr. 7, 1995, Report of the Coiferenee of the Parties on its First Session ~ Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Coiferenee of the Parties at its First Session, Decision 5/CP.I, ~ I(b), U.N. 
DOC FCCCICP/1995I71Add.1 (June 6, 1995) [hereinafter COP-] Report ~ Part Two] (deciding that 
activities implemented jointly "could be conducted in a comprehensive manner covering all relevant 
sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases"). 
281 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Geneva, Switz., Jul. 8-19, 1996, Review of the Implementation of the Conventio-n and of Decisions of the 
First Session of the Conference of the Parties - Activities Implemented Jointly: Annual Review of 
Progress Under the Pilot Phase, ~ 13, U.N. DOC FCCCICPI1996114 (June 4, 1996) (reporting that there 
are five ongoing projects in forest preservation, restoration, or reforestation and four in afforestation). 
282 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3(3)-(4), 
Dec. 10, 1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
283 See F ARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME: A 
GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS ANDPROCDURES 123 (2004) ("The technical complexity, and high 
political stakes, of sinks issues contributed significantly to the breakdown of negotiations at The Hague at 
COP-6 part I."). 
284 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The 
Hague, Neth., Nov. 13-25,2000, Report of the Conference of the Parties on the First Part of its Sixth 
Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at the First Part of its Sixth Sssion, 
Decision lICP.6 Annex, Note by the President of the Conference of the Parties at its sixth session, dated 
23 November 2000, Box C, U.N. DOC FCCCICP/2000/51 Add.2 (Apr. 4, 200 I) ("Parties decide that for 
defining afforestation, reforestation and deforestation [forestry activities] the set ofIPCC defmitions shall 
be applied."). 
technical expertise of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
("SBSTA"),286 negotiators began shaping a more specific legal regime for addressing 
LULUCF.287 
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The idea behind the more specific legal regime was to make the UNFCCC's 
ultimate objective feasible by allowing developed countries to offset part oftheir 
emissions commitments through the joint implementation of project-based practices 
under flexibility mechanisms288 and the promotion and enhancement of sinks and 
reservoirs of greenhouse gases domestically.289 Articles 3(3) and 3(4) of the Kyoto 
Protocol mark the beginning of a specific regulatory regime aimed at dealing with 
LULUCF activities. The first decision to advance the mandate established by the 
aforementioned provisions was Decision 91CPA ofCOP-4 in 1999. At first, the Parties 
opted for limiting LULUCF activities to afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation 
practices290 while providing enough flexibility to allow for the inclusion of additional 
activities?91 Afforestation and reforestation are both defined as the human-induced 
285 See id. ("Parties agree that for the implementation of Article 3.3 [of the Kyoto Protocol], "forest" is 
defined in accordance with the Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAD") definition."). 
286 See Michael Grubb, The Outcome a/the Berlin Conference, in DIE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL 
REGIME FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: STRUCTURES AND OPTIONS AFTER BERLIN 2 (1995) (explaining that the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice ("SBSTA") is "the main interlocutor between 
the scientific world and the [UNFCCC] process" and noting that the SBSTA is different from the !PCC in 
that the SBSTA is restricted to translating scientific data and information into policy recommendations to 
the Conference/Meeting of the Parties). 
287 See SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR & HERMANN E. Orr, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 
POLICY FOR THE21ST CENTURY 9, 132 (1999) (suggesting that the issue of sinks was problematic in that 
there was little information available for the purposes of making a decision). 
288 See Anita M. Halvorssen, The Kyoto Protocol and Developing Countries - The Clean Development 
Mechanism. 16 COLO. 1. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 353, 363 (2005) ("The Kyoto Protocol introduced three 
market-based, flexible mechanisms that enable Annex I Parties to meet part of their emission reduction 
commitments in a more cost effective manner. These mechanisms, also referred to as Kyoto Mechanisms, 
include emissions trading, joint implementation, and ... clean development mechanism ("CDM"). The 
idea behind these mechanisms is that the cost of limiting emissions will differ from one region to another, 
yet the benefit for the atmosphere is the same, regardless of where the action is taken."). 
289 See Mathew Vespa, Climate Change 2001: Kyoto at Bonn and Marrakech. 29 ECOLOGyL.Q. 395, 409 
(2002) (distinguishing domestic application ofLULUCF from LULUCF in the CDM). 
290 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3(3), Dec. 
10,1997,37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] ("The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry 
activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation .... "). Deforestation, when 
characterized as a LULUCF activity, refers to the practice of preventing or reducing deforestation. It also 
means, for developed countries only, accountability for CO2 emissions as a result of deforestation 
practices domestically. See Pedro Moura-Costa & Marc D. Stuart, Forestly-Based Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation: A Short StOlY of Market Evolution, 77 COMMONWEALTH FORESTRY REV. 191, 192 (1998). 
291 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3(4), Dec. 
10,1997,37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] ("The Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide 
upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities related to 
changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the 
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conversion of non-forested areas into forested land,292 but they differ slightly: the 
definition of afforestation presupposes that the converted area has not been forested for 
at least fifty years,293 while reforestation is limited to the conversion of non-forested 
areas that were not forested on December 31, 1989.294 
Amidst intense political debate over conflicting interests/95 the Parties agreed 
upon additional activities at the seventh session of the Conference ofthe Parties ("COP-
T') in Marrakesh?96 Revegetation, forest management, cropland management, and 
grazing land management were added as domestically conducted activities but excluded 
as jointly implemented activities.297 The definitions of activities under the newly 
established LULUCF legal regime, although broad in nature,298 were useful operational 
guidance on handling this form of accountability under the UNFCCC. Decision 
161CMP.l of COP. MOP-l provided definitions for the terms "forest," "afforestation," 
"reforestation," "deforestation," "revegetation," "forest management," "cropland 
management," and "grazing land management.,,299 
land-use change and forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for 
Parties included in Annex I .... "). 
292 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, 
Report a/the Conference a/the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties (Volume J), Decision Il/CP.7 Annex, 1 J(b)-(c), U.N. Doc· 
FCCCICP/2001113/Add.l (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume J)]. 
293 See id. 1) 1 (b). 
294 See id.1) l(c). 
295 See Lavanya Rajamani, Re-Negotiating Kyoto: A Review of the Sixth Conference a/the Parties to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y, 2000 Yearbook, at 223 
("At COP-6, the Umbrella Group argued in favor of including additional activities in the first 
commitment period. However, the [Alliance of Small Island States ("AOSIS")] AND THE [European 
Union ("EU")] opposed it"). 
296 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh 
Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Coriference of the Parties (Volume 1), Decision Il1CP.7, U.N. 
Doc FCCCICP/2001113/Add. 1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COP-7 Report- Part Two (Volume J)]. 
297 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Coriference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First Session, Decision I6/CMP.1 Annex,,-r 6, U.N. 
DOC FCCCIKP/CMP/200S/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COPIMOP-l Report - Part Two]. 
298 See Imke SagemUller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Riskfor Biodiversity?, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189,201 
(2006) (describing the definition of deforestation in the Marrakesh Accords as broad). 
299 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Coriference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First Session, Decision I6/CMP.1 Annex, ~ 1, U.N. 
DOC FCCCIKP/CMP/200S/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COPIMOP-l Report - Part Two]. 
( 
d. The Two Different Approaches to Acconnting for Forests and 
Forestry Activities Under the Climate Change Legal Regime 
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Since developed countries were concerned that relying solely on domestic 
measures to comply with greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments could 
damage their national economies, the Kyoto Protocol envisioned accountability through 
market-based flexibility mechanism: emissions trading ("ET'), joint implementation 
("H"), and the CDM.300 As a result, countries could pursue two possible approaches. 
Countries could account for LULUCF domestically and/or participate in afforestation 
and reforestation activities abroad. 
i. Accouuting for LULUCF Domestically 
For some countries, accounting for LULUCF domestically could offset up to ten 
percent of national gross emissions. For others, due to demographics and land-use 
patterns, sequestration potentials from enhancement of sinks are limited.30 ! As a 
consequence, at the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, accounting for LULUCF activities 
was a contentious issue that divided the Parties considerably and impaired the Parties' 
progress towards a common and satisfactory agreement.302 
Through Decision 111CP.7 ofCOP-7, the Parties addressed some of their 
previous concerns and requested that the SBSTA and IPCC develop, and elaborate on, 
guidelines, monitoring, and reporting methodologies.303 Following the Parties' request, 
the IPCC issued the following reports: Good Practice Guidance for Land Use. Land-
300 See generally Tim Jackson et al., The Language of Flexibility: Operationaljol'n1s of Joint 
implementation, in FLEXIBILITY IN CLIMATE POLICY: MAKING THE KYOTO MECHANISMS WORK 16, 22-26 
(Tim Jackson et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol). 
30l See G. CORNELIS VAN KOOTEN, CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS: WHY INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS FAIL 
74 (2004)("Canada can claim 12 Mt C per year, the Russian Federation 33 Mt C, Japan I3 Mt C, and 
other countries much lesser amounts - Germany 1,24 Mt C, Ukraine 1.1 r Mt C, and remaining countries 
less than 1.0 Mt C. Japan expects to use forestry activities to meet a significant proportion of its [Kyoto 
Protocol] obligation, while Canada can use forest management alone to achieve about one-fifth of its 
emissions reduction targets. "). 
302 See MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., 11lE KyOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT 79 (1999). 
303 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties (Volume J), Decision I IICP.? Annex, ~~ 2-3, U.N. Doc 
FCCCICPI2001l13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report - Part Two (Volume J)]. 
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Use Change and Forestry304 and Definitions and Methodological Options to Inventory 
Emissions from Direct Human-Induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of 
Other Vegetation Types?05 The IPCC's work and the SBSTA's advice were based on 
the general principles governing accountability for LULUCF activities undertaken 
domestically by Annex I countries.306 
Under this framework regulatory regime, which governs LULUCF 
accountability for the first commitment period,307 a selected domestic forestry activity 
can result in the augmentation or the diminution of an Annex I Party's assigned 
amount.30g The result depends on whether the practice constitutes a net sink or a net 
source of greenhouse gases.309 Practices that are net sinks of greenhouse gases will 
increase the assigned amount, while practices that are net sources of greenhouse gases 
will decrease the assigned amount.310 Accountable forestry activities include 
afforestation, reforestation, deforestation, revegetation, forest, cropland, and grazing 
land management.311 
"Credits," which are awarded for any domestic improvement using one or more 
ofthe above-mentioned forestry activities, increase a Party's assigned amount for the 
first commitment period.312 This is only true, though, if the party makes a formal and 
timely identification of the activities in its annual report313 and the party demonstrates 
304 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE FOR LAND-USE, 
LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORES1RY (Jim Penman et a!. eds., 2003), available at http://www.picc-
nggjp.iges.or.jP/public/gpglulucf/gpglulucf.htm [hereinafter GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE FORLULUCF]. 
305 See INTERGOVERNMENTALP ANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL 
OPTIONS TO INVENTORY EMISSIONS FROM DIRECT HUMAN-INDUCED DEGRADATION OF FORESTS AND 
DEVEGETATION OF OTHER VEGETATION TYPES (Jim Penman et a!. eds., 2003, available at 
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or·jn/public/gpgluluef/degradation.htm. 
306 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session -Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference a/the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting a/the Parties at its First Session, Decision 16ICMP.l Annex, ,-r 17, U.N. 
DOC FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COPIMOP-! Report - Part Two]. 
307 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3(7), Dec. 
10,1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (establishing the first commitment period from 2008-
2012, within which Annex I Parties will have to meet their quantified limitation and reduction objectives 
set forth in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol). 
308 Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Can., 
Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties 
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First Session, Decision 161CMP.l Annex, ~ 17, U.N. Doc 
FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COPIMOP-l Report - Part Two]. 
309 See id 
310 See id 
311 See id ~ 6. 
312 See id ~ 17. 
313 See id ,-r 7. 
( 
( 
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that the chosen activities have occurred since 1990 and are human-induced.314 On the 
other hand, whenever verifiable human-induced changes in land use and forestry result 
in a net emission of greenhouse gas, an Annex I Party's assigned amount is 
decreased.315 
Greenhouse gas estimates of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks are based on the annual national inventories and communications mandated by 
the UNFCCC316 and the national estimation systems the Kyoto Protocol requires of 
Annex I Parties.317 The information provided is used to establish assigned amounts.318 
Limitations, measured in metric tons of CO2 per year, are imposed on the augmentation 
and diminution of each Annex I Party's assigned amount for domestic LULUCF 
activities.319 
ii. Accounting for Forestry Activities under Project-Based 
Flexibility Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 
Annex I Parties can claim credits against their assigned amounts for forestry 
project activities implemented jointly with another Annex I Party Goint 
implementation)320 or with a non-Annex I Party (CDM).321 The origin ofjoint projects 
314 See id '8. 
315 See id , 17; see also G. CORNELIS VANKOOTEN, CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS: WHY 
INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS FAIL 74 (2004) ("Afforestation and reforestation result in a credit, while 
deforestation (human-induced conversion of forestland to non-forest use) results in a debit. Since most 
countries have not embarked on large scale afforestation and/or reforestation projects in the past decade, 
harvesting trees during the five-year commitment period (2008-12) will cause them to have a debit on the 
ARD account .... If there is no ARD debit, then a country cannot claim the credit.") 
316 See Anita M. Halvorssen, The Kyoto Protocol and Developing Countries - The Clean Development 
Mechanism, 16 COLO. J.1NT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 353,360 (2005) ("[T]he UNFCCC required all Parties 
to develop inventories of anthropogenic emissions and measures to mitigate climate change. Furthermore, 
the UNFCCC also obligated all Parties to produce a report on action taken to implement the UNFCCC, 
called 'national communications.' To fulfill their reporting obligations, Annex I Parties were given six 
months from the entry into force of the UNFCCC to submit their reports, while nonRAnnex I Parties 
(developing countries) were given three years and the least developed States were not given a deadline."). 
317 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 5(1), Dec. 
10,1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
318 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting a/the Parties at its First Session, Decision 16/CMP.l Annex, ~ 20, U.N. 
Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COPIMOP-] Report - Part Two]. 
319 See id Decision 16/CMP.l Appendix. 
320 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 6, Dec. 10, 
1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
321 See id art. 12. 
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can be traced back to the text of the UNFCCC,322 which contemplates the possibility.of 
Annex I Parties implementing policies and measuresjointly.323 
On the road to Kyoto, and during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol at COP-
3, flexibility was a highly contentious issue among the Parties. The mSSCANNZ 
countries324 envisioned the opportunity to invest in projects abroad as a cheap way to 
mitigate their commitments (especially those related to forest and forestry activities)325 
and as the only feasible way to achieve them without hurting their economies. Part of 
the G_77326 (plus China) and the European Union ("EU") saw it as a loophole. Some 
developing countries referred to joint implementation as "eco-colonialism.,,327 
Opponents saw forest and forestry projects abroad as allowing Annex I countries to 
invest in developing countries without having to take stronger domestic mitigation 
measures.
328 
The controversy has become moot due to COP-Ts express embracement of 
forestry activities.329 The conflicts were partially resolved by the parties' agreement to 
322 See Mark C. Trexler & Laura H. Kosloff, The 1997 Kyoto Protocol: What Does it Mean For Project-
Based Climate Change Mitigation?, 3 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE I, 2·3 (1998). 
323 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4(2)(a), May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] ("These [Annex I Parties] may implement such policies and 
measures [limiting anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions] jointly with other Parties and may assist 
other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, that 
of this subparagraph."). 
324 The JUSSCANNZ parties - Japan, the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, and 
New Zealand - are a group of countries that tended to counterbalance the EU on the one hand and the 0-
77 on the other, although Norway, and Switzerland in particular, frequently stood somewhat apart from 
JUSSCANNZ positions. See MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND 
ASSESSMENT xxxi (1999). 
325 See XVIII Session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Wembley, U.K .. , Sept. 24-29, 
200 I, Summary for Policymakers to Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report of the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report, at 15 (Oct. 1,2001) [hereinafter Synthesis Report of the IPCC Third Assessment 
Report] ("Costs estimates reported to date for biological mitigation vary significantly from US$O.l to 
about US$20 per t C in several tropical countries and from US$20 to US$lOO-per t C in non-tropical 
countries. "). 
326 The 0-77 is a large coalition representing the interests of developing countries. See Michael Richards, 
A Review of the Effectiveness of Developing Country Participation in the Climate Change Convention 
Negotiations 15 (December 2001) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://www.odi.org.ukliedg/participation in negotiations/climate change.pdf. Since it is composed of 
countries that are also, in some cases, members of organizations such as Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries ("OPEC") and Alliance of Small Island States ("AOSIS"), the G-77 represents 
countries that have very different interests. See id. 
327 See Pedro Moura-Costa & Marc D. Stuart, Forestry-Based Greenhouse Gas Mitigation: A Short StOlY 
of Market Evolution, 77 COMMONWEALTH FORESTRY REV. 196-97 (1998). 
328 See MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT 87 (1999) ("The 
eligibility ofland use, land-use change and forestry project activities under Article 12 is limited to 
afforestation and reforestation. "). 
329 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Milan, Italy, Dec. 1-12,2003, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties 
limit forestry activities to afforestation and reforestation projects;330 exclude nuclear 
activities; and require that project-based activities be supplemental to domestic 
measures and policies.331 
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4. Forest and Forestry Activities Under the CDM: The Legal and Institutional 
Frameworks 
After since the controversy whether forestry project-activities should be included 
in the CDM was resolved by COP-7, a comprehensive legal and institutional framework 
was designed. This section examines this legal and institutional framework regarding 
forest and forestry activities under the CDM and considers how they were influenced by 
the conflicting interests surrounding them; the evolution of scientific and technological 
knowledge; and the experiences had during the AIJ Pilot Phase. 
a. The Evolution of the Legal Framework 
The legal framework for forest and forestry activities under the CDM is a 
product of a broader regulatory regime for joint implementation flexibility mechanisms. 
Articles 4(2)(a), 4(2)(b), 4(2)(d), and 3(3) of the UNFCCC are the main pillars ofthe 
joint implementation regulatory regime.332 The first action in this regard was taken in 
1995 at COP-I, when the parties agreed upon the AIJ Pilot Phase.333 Shortly after, the 
Kyoto Protocol not only embraced the concept ofjoint implementation among Annex I 
Parties,334 but extended it to non-Annex I countries through the CDM.335 
at its Ninth Session, Decision 19ICP.9, U.N. Doc FCCCICP/2003/6/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter 
COP-9Report-Part Two]. 
330 See Jason Schwartz, Note, "Whose Woods These Are I Think! Know": How Kyoto May Change Who 
Controls Biodiversity, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 421, 457 (2006) (suggesting that the EU accepted the 
inclusion of forestry in the CDM as a tradeoff for the exclusion of nuclear power projects). 
331 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Milan, Italy, Dec. 1-12,2003, Report of the 
Coriference a/the Parties on its Ninth Session - Fart Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties 
at its Ninth Session, Decision 19ICP.9, U.N. Doc FCCCICP/2003/6/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter 
COP-9 Report-Part Two]. 
332 See Naoki Matsuo, CDM in the Kyoto Negotiations: How CDM Has Worked as a Bridge Between 
Developed and Developing Worlds?, 8 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 191, 
192 (2003). 
333 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Berlin, F.R.G., Mar. 28 - Apr. 7, 1995, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its First Session, Decision 5/CP.I, 'if lea), U.N. 
DOC FCCCICPI1995I71Add.l (June 6,1995) [hereinafter COP-J Report-Part Two]. 
334 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 6, Dec. 10, 
1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
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i. The AIJ Pilot Phase 
The UNFCCC" s broad provisions authorizing joint implementation of policies 
and measures336 were made operational through the AU Pilot Phase. Decision 5/CP.1 of 
COP-1 in 1995 expressly recognized Article 4(2)(d)"s mandate, imposing upon the 
Conference of the Parties the duty to regulate joint implementation of policies and 
measures aimed at curbing anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases. To 
accommodate developing countries' concerns, activities undertaken pursuant to the AU 
Pilot Phase did not provide credits against developed countries' assigned amounts, 
which at that time had not yet been agreed upon. The AD Pilot Phase was voluntary in 
nature. 
Moreover, the AU Pilot Phase embraced non-Annex I countries' participation 
through the hosting of project-based activities. This experimental period also covered, at 
least generically, all relevant sources, sinks, and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, whicb 
allowed for the ample use offorest and forestry activities. The fact is that "[t]he 
importance of information, training, appropriate capacity and institutions for the 
development ofCDM projects is underlined by experience from the [AU Pilot 
Phase y337 The idea was to engage different stakeholder's participation in this then new 
concept of a market-base policy instrument and teach them through practical 
experience. 
The AU Pilot Phase yielded information regarding geographical trends and 
potential social and environmental benefits related to forest and forestry activities, 
which provided substantial background for future negotiations.338 These elements were 
all crucial during the discussions over flexibility mechanisms at COP-3 and beyond, 
335 See id art. 12. 
336 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, arts. 3(3), 4(2)(a), 4(2)(b), 4(2)(d), 
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
337 See Alex Michaelowa, CDM Host Country Institution Building, 8 MITIGATION ADAPTATION 
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 20 I, 202 (2003)'. 
338 See Eleventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 25-Nov. 5, 1999, Activities Implemented Jointly 
Under the Pilot Phase: Issues to be Addressed in the Review althe Pilot Phase, Including the Third 
Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented Jointly - Note by the Secretariat, ~~ 6-21, U.N. DOC 
FCCC/SB/199915 (Sept. IS, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report] (presenting data on 
geographical distribution of projects, environmental, and socio-economic impacts). 
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when negotiators faced conflicting pressures on the issue of whether to include forest 
and forestry activities in the CDM.339 
1. A Panorama of the Main Reports Regarding the AIJ 
Pilot Phase and its Positive Outcomes 
Through the reporting requirements ofthe AIJ Pilot Phase, the SBSTA was able 
to produce annual synthesis reports before recommending a comprehensive review of 
the All Pilot Phase, which was completed and sent to the fifth session of the Conference 
of the Parties ("COP-5") in 1999?40 Specifically, with regard to forest and forestry 
activities, those annual synthesis reports341 and the final review of the AIJ Pilot Phase342 
provided useful data on important geographical trends, teclmical challenges (monitoring 
and reporting); social and environmental benefits and impacts; possible global benefits 
(in comparison with other types of activities); and effects on national economies 
(helping developing countries achieve sustainable development and developed countries 
achieve their commitments under the climate change regime).343 The figures below, 
excerpted from the SBSTA synthesis reports on the All Pilot Phase, illustrate some of 
what was learned about the above-mentioned issues during this experimental period. 
339 See id 'i!'i! 17-19 (providing an "[a]ssessment of environmental benefits related to the mitigation of 
climate change that would not have occurred in the absence of [Activities Implemented Jointly ("AIJ")], 
covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and the methods used to measure, 
monitor and independently verify these emissions, including by type of project, and other environmental 
benefits."). 
340 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, 
F.R.G., Oct. 25-Nov. 5, 1999, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifth Session - Part Two: 
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Fifth Session, Decision 13/CP.5, pmbl., U.N. Doc 
FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.l (Feb. 2, 2000) (taking note of the SBSTA and SBI's comprehensive review of 
the AIJ pilot phase and third synthesis report on activities implemented jointly). 
341 See, e.g., See Eleventh Session ofthe Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 25-Nov. 5, 1999, Activities Implemented Jointly 
Under the Pilot Phase: Issues to be Addressed in the Review of the Pilot Phase, Including the Third 
Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented Jointly - Note by the Secretariat, 'ilen 36-39, U.N. DOC 
FCCC/SBI1999/5 (Sept. 15, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report]. 
342 See id. " 5-35. 
343 See id " 5-69. 
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Source: 1997 SBSTA Report344 
Source: 2001 SBSTA Report345 
344 Seventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Bonn, F.R.G., 
October 20-29, 1997, Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Synthesis Report on 
Activities Implemented JOintly - Note by the Secretariat, ~ 18 fig, I, U.N. DOC FCCC/SBSTA/1997/12 
(Oct. 7, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 SBSTA Report]. 
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345 Fifteenth Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Marrakesh, 
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 9, 2001, Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Fifth Synthesis 
Report on Activities Implemented JOintly Under the Pilot Phase - Note by the Secretariat, Annex fig. 4, 
U.N. Doc FCCC/SBSTAl200117 (Sept. 12,2001) [hereinafter 2001 SBSTA Report]. 
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Figure 1 shows that while forest conservation and forestry activities represented 
only six of the thirty-nine projects in 1997 (roughly fifteen percent of the total), they 
accounted for fifty-seven percent of the final mitigation impact. Figure 2 shows that 
although they represented fifteen of the 139 projects (roughly ten percent of the total), 
forest conservation and forestry activities accounted for thirty-five percent of the 
abatement impact in 200 I. The data demonstrates that although they represent a smaller 
portion of the total number of projects, the C02 storage and sequestration potentials of 
forest and forestry activities is significantly higher in comparison with other types of 
projects. 
In its first synthesis report, the SBSTA highlighted that "most data on the costs 
and the amount of [greenhouse gases 1 abated are only estimates and are, therefore, no a 
suitable basis for analysis.,,346 When the report was released, the Parties were in the 
final preparation for the Kyoto negotiation process. The IPCC had not yet published its 
special report on LULUCF, which occurred in 2000.347 The first specific decision on 
forestry activities in the CDM was only agreed upon in 2003, at COP_9,348 the same 
year in which the IPCC's report on good practice guidance for LULUCF was release.349 
This sequence of events explains the correlation between the growing consensus on the 
challenges of forest and forestry project activities and their decrease (with respect to 
other types of projects considered much simpler) in terms of quantity of projects and 
share of greenhouse gas abatement impact. 
As to the geographical distribution offorest conservation and forestry projects 
and their environmental and socio-economic impacts, the 1999 subsidiary bodies' report 
on the issues to be addressed in the review ofthe AlI Pilot Phase proved a useful source 
of information for a more comprehensive assessment of the AlI Pilot Phase. With 
regard to the socio-economic aspects of projects undertaken during the AlI Pilot Phase, 
346 See Seventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Bonn, F.R.G., 
October 20-29, 1997, Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Synthesis Report on 
Activities Implemented Jointly - Note by the Secretariat, ~ 6(c), U.N. Doc FCCC/SBSTAlI997112 (Oct. 
7,1997) [hereinafter 1997 SBSTA Report]. 
347 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC SPECIAL REpORT: LAND USE, 
LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY ("LULUCF") - SUMMARY FORPOLlCYMAKERS (2000), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/sriulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter!PCC SPECIAL REpORT ON LULUCFj 
348 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Milan, Italy, Dec. 1-12, 2003, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Coriference a/the Parties 
at its Ninth Session, Decision 19/CP.9, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter 
COP-9 Report - Part Two]. 
349 See lNTERGOVERNMENTALPANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE FOR LAND-USE, 
LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY (Jim Penman et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.picc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gpe:lulucf/gpglulucf.htm [hereinafter GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE FORLULUCF]. 
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the subsidiary bodies verified an increase in capacity-building through enhancement of 
procedural and institutional experience, and the Parties reported "active involvement of 
local communities, increased public awareness, and the maintenance of natural heritage 
and historical sites.,,35o Interestingly, recent debates on a post-20l2 market-based 
forestry instrument are around assuring equitable access to low-income and traditional 
communities to the benefits generated from carbon forest credits.35I 
The report also highlighted how host Parties, mostly developing countries, were 
able to attract financial resources and direct them towards national development goals. 
Despite the subsidiary bodies' statement that socio-economic and environmental 
factors were not sufficiently addressed, particularly with respect to forest and forestry 
activities, the parties reported" fostering biodiversity, improving water and air quality 
and reducing erosion of hydrological resources" as environmental benefits.352 
In the AD Pilot Phase review report, some Parties linked their development 
goals to forestry and land-use.353 Indeed, Figure 3 demonstrates that those Parties, 
although not identified in the report, are most likely developing countries in Latin 
America. Figure 3 shows that most ofthe forest preservation and reforestation projects 
- and roughly half of the afforestation activities - were taking place in Latin America 
and the Caribbean region. This is not surprising given that a large percentage of the 
remaining tropical forests in the word are concentrated in Latin America.354 
350 See Eleventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Bono, F.R.G., Oct. 25-Nov. 5, 1999, Activities Implemented Jointly 
Under the Pilot Phase: Issues to be Addressed in the Review of the Pilot Phase, Including the Third 
Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented Jointly - Note by the Secretariat,,-r 57, U.N. DOC 
FCCC/SBI1999/5 (Sept. 15, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report]. 
351 See Rosimeiry Portela et a1., The Idea a/Market-Based Mechanisms/or Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
11,25 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) (" 
The difficulties of ensuring equitable benefits in market transactions stem from the fact that many of the 
poorest lack property rights, and concern exists that as new economic opportunities are introduced for 
forest resources, the poor may be unable to retain access to or control over them. Another concern is that 
transaction costs will exclude the poorest of the poor from participating in emerging opportunities. Some 
project-based evidence shows that these factors can be an issue and that regulatory measures may be 
required to ensure equitable access to markets."). 
352 See'Eleventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation"Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 25-Nov. 5, 1999, Activities Implemented Jointly 
Under the Pilot Phase: Issues to be Addressed in the Review of the Pilot Phase, Including the Third 
Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented JOintly - Note by the Secretariat, ~ 57, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/SBII999/5 (Sept. 15, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report]. 
353 See id ~ 15. 
354 See Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005: 
Progress Towards Sustainable Forest Management, 15 (FAO Forestry Paper 147, 2006), available at 
ftp://fao.org.ldocrep/fao/008/A0400E/A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resources Assessment 
20051· 
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One can get a better sense of the region's potential for these types of projects by 
noting that the data presented does not include information regarding Brazil,355 which 
contains a considerable portion of the world's remaining tropical forests. 356 In addition 
to the resources availability element, the costs offorest and forestry greenhouse gas 
abatement practices are considerably lower in developing countries,357 which 
contributed to Latin America's share of the market in hosting preservation, 
reforestation, and afforestation project activities. 
Source: 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report (AFR: Africa; ASP: Asia and Pacific Region; EIT: 
Economies in Transition; LAC: Latin America and Caribbean).358 
355 See Eleventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 25-Nov. 5,1999, Activities ImplementedJointly 
Under the Pilot Phase: Issues to be Addressed in the Review a/the Pilot Phase, Including the Third 
Synthesis Report on Activities implemented Jointly - Note by the Secretariat, ~ 44 n.2l, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/SBI1999/5 (Sept. 15, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report] (listing Belize, Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, "Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama as hosting projects in Latin 
America). 
356 See Food and Agriculture Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005: 
Progress Towards Sustainable Forest Management, 15 (FAO Forestry Paper 147, 2006), available at 
ftp://fao.org.ldocrep/faoI008/A0400E/A0400EOO.pdf [hereinafter Global Forest Resources Assessment 
2005]. 
357 See XVIII Session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Wembley, U.K .. , Sept. 24-29, 
2001, SummOlY for Policymakers to Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report of the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report, at 15 (Oct. I, 2001) [hereinafter Synthesis Report o/the IPCC Third Assessment 
Report]. 
358 See Eleventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 25-Nov. 5, 1999, Activities Implemented Jointly 
2. The Main Challenges Encountered During the AIJ 
Pilot Phase 
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The AD Pilot Phase review report summarized the major problems encountered 
by the Parties during the implementation of activities. Highlighting common problems 
during the AD Pilot Phase was a useful tool for improving the flexibility mechanisms of 
the Kyoto Protocol, particularly with respect to the CDM.359 The following are some of 
the general obstacles encountered during all types of projects under the AD Pilot Phase: 
(a) Differences in the investment climate; (b) cultural differences; (c) 
insufficient infrastructure; (d) institutional capacity; (e) relative absence of 
investment companies; (f) lack of policy on AD and of a clear and transparent 
set of operational rules on the part of the host country; (g) lack of awareness in 
the private sector in host countries on opportunities represented by AIJ; 
(h)variations in the degree of knowledge and acceptance of AD by local 
stakeholders; (i) lack of capacity to produce comprehensive AD project 
proposals; G) existing preferences, driven by established business partnerships, 
strategic considerations and political priorities for investors for particular areas; 
(k) differences in [greenhouse gas] reduction costs and in transaction costs due 
to, inter alia, some of the above points; and (I) current exclusion of crediting for 
[greenhouse gas 1 reductions or removals by sinks.360 
Other general obstacles included" high transaction costs,,361 and "the 
uncertainty regarding two major interlinked methodological issues, the identification of 
the project baseline and additionality.,,362 Note worthy that these two obstacles remain 
Under the Pilot Phase: Issues to be Addressed in the Review of the Pilot Phase, Including the Third 
Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented Jointly - Note by the Secretariat, ~ 45 fig.3, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/SBI1999/5 (Sept. 15, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report]. 
359 See Alex Michaelowa, CDM Host Country Institution Building, 8 MITIGATION ADAPTATION 
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 20 1, 202 (2003). 
360 See Eleventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 25-Nov. 5, 1999, Activities Implemented Jointly 
Under the Pilot Phase: Issues to be Addressed in the Review of the Pilot Phase, Including the Third 
Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented Jointly -Note by the Secretariat, ~ 8, U.N. DOC 
FCCC/SBI1999/5 (Sept. 15, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 SBSTA & SBI Report]. 
361 See id ~ 22. 
362 See id 
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current in the debate for a post-2012 Kyoto legal regime. The regulatory forestry market 
was not able to learn with experiences learned during the AU Pilot Phase and high 
transaction costs and strict regulations are often cited as the downside of the regulatory 
market in comparison with voluntary markets.363 
Finally, the AU Pilot Phase was characterized by a lack of strong oversight, 
which can be traced to a weak regulatory regime. Therefore, even though the data 
presented were useful to negotiators in developing the regulatory framework for 
afforestation and reforestation practices in the CDM, and helpful in indicating trends 
and potentials, the results lacked accuracy. Nonetheless, the AU Pilot Phase was crucial 
in that it called attention to the technical, scientific, and socio-economic challenges 
related to forest and forestry activities, which inevitably represented one ofthe most 
important factors in the development of a stronger and tighter regulatory regime aimed 
at dealing with forest and forestry activities in the CDM.364 
ii. The CDM of the Kyoto Protocol 
After the COP-3 negotiations, project-based joint implementation under the 
UNFCCC ended up, via the Kyoto Protocol, divided into joint implementation and the 
CDM. The CDM's purpose was construed to serving as the means to assist on the 
UNFCCC's goal of "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.,,365 This market-based policy instrument was just one piece within a larger 
legal framework designed to meeting the aforementioned UNFCCC's main objective. 
It was then that the final language of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (which 
addressed the CDM) provided the CDM with a threefold objective:366 (I) assist non-
363 RICARDO BAVON, AMANDA HAWN AND KATHERINE HAMILTON, VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS - AN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSrNESS GUIDE TO WHAT THEy ARE AND How THEY WORK \3 (Earthscan 2007) 
(2007) ("The innovation, flexibility and lower transaction costs of the voluntary carbon market can 
benefit buyers as well as suppliers .... some sellers and buyers of carbon credits prefer the voluntary 
carbon market precisely because it does not depend on regulation." ). 
364 See generally Pedro Moura-Costa & Marc D. Stuart, ForestJy-Based Greenhouse Gas Mitigation: A 
Short Story of Market Evolution, 77 COMMONWEALTH FORESTRY REv. 5-7 (1998) (following the' 
development of All programs through the difficult early pahses to the eventual creation of the CDM). 
364 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change~ art. 3(4), Dec. 
10, 1997,37 LL.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] 
365 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 
[hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
366 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 12 (2), 
Dec. 10,1997,37 LL.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
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Annex I Parties in achieving sustainable development; (2) contribute to the UNFCCC' s 
overall objective; and (3) help developed countries achieve their quantified emissions 
limitation and reduction commitments.367 However, the negotiations resulting in such 
economic policy instrument was controversial and divided the international community 
up until the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and afterwards. How consensus was reached is further 
examined in the following sections. 
1. The Controversy Regarding Whether Forests and 
Forestry Activities Were Meant to be Inclnded in the 
CDM 
Prior to the negotiations at COP-3, the Parties had before them the 1997 SBSTA 
synthesis report on the AI] Pilot Phase?68 This report, which was noted in Decision 
10/CP.3 of COP-3, 369 indicated the existence of six ongoing forestry preservation and 
afforestation activities and the ample participation of developing countries as project 
hosts.37o It served to consolidate the learning phase prior to a final decision on economic 
policy incentives in the Kyoto Protocol 
Opponents of the inclusion of sinks in the CDM371 argued that Article 12 did not 
provide legal support for such inclusion. They argued that while Article 6 (regarding 
joint implementation) clearly mentions sinks, Article 12 does not. In addition, the 
opposition argued that because sink projects could not be accurately measured, they did 
367 See id. 
368 See Seventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Bonn, F.R.G., 
October 20-29, 1997, Activities If!1plemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Synthesis Report on 
Activities Implemented Jointly - Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc FCCCfSBSTAlI9971l2 (Oct. 7, 1997) 
[hereinafter 1997 SBSTA Report]. 
369 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Japan, Dec. 1-11, 1997, Report a/the Conference a/the Parties on its Third Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Third Session, Decision IOfCP.3, pmbl., U.N. Doc 
FCCCfCPfI997/7fAdd.1 (Mar. 25, 1998). 
370 See Seventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Bonn, F.R.G., 
October 20-29, 1997, Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Synthesis Report on 
Activities Implemented Jointly - Note by the Secretariat, ~ 6, U.N. DOC FCCCfSBSTA/1997fl2 (Oct. 7, 
1997) [hereinafter 1997 SBSTA Report]. 
371 The EU was the main opponent of the inclusion of forestry in the CDM, while the Umbrella Group 
(United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Iceland) was the main proponent. See Pedro 
Moura-Costa, Carbon Trading and Investment in Clean Energy Products 4 (2001) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at 
http://www.ecosecurities.com/Assets/3157IPubs Carbon%20trading%20and%20investiment%20in%20c1 
ean%~Oenergy%20proiects.pdf. 
l-
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not meet Article 12(5)(b)'s requirement that certification under the CDM be on the basis 
of"[r]eal, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate 
change .... ".372 Difficulties on effective measurement of carbon offset from forestry 
projects was thus claimed as not meeting the "real measurable" requirement set forth 
Article 12(5)(b) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Indeed, whereas Article 6 refers expressly to projects providing enhancement of 
removals by sinks, Article 12 addresses project activities generally and without further 
specification.373 However, a closer analysis shows that the climate change regime did 
not provide for the exclusion of sink projects in the CDM.374 First, the CDM originated 
in the UNFCCC'sjoint implementation provisions, and under the AIJ Pilot Phase, 
Annex I and non-Annex I Parties utilized forest and forestry activities amply. Second, 
Article 12 does not identify any specific type of project, such as renewable energy or 
energy efficiency.375 It is limited to setting forth the CDM's objectives376 and general 
information regarding the COM's operation.377 The omission, then, represents a mere 
inaccuracy in the Kyoto Protocol's written language. Moreover, contrary to the position 
of those subscribing to the impossibility of measuring and monitoring forestry projects, 
currently approved monitoring methodologies by the CDM's Executive Board 
demonstrate that forestry activities can be monitored and measured, albeit with more 
difficulty . 
Common ground was possible, at least in part, because of the leverage exerted 
by countries pushing for the inclusion of forestry activities (the Umbrella Group), 378 
particularly the United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia,379 and a portion of the G-
372 See MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT 241 (1999). 
373 Compare Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 6 (1), 
Dec. 10, 1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (referring specifically to enhancement of 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases), with Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Art. 12 (5), Dec. 10, 1997,37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] 
(referring to "emission reductions" generally). 
374 See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 645 (2d ed. 2002) 
("Both the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol clearly contemplate that sinks such as forests 
would be within the ambit of the climate regime."). 
375 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 12(5), Dec. 
10,1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (referring to "emission reductions" generally). 
376 See, e.g., id. art. 12(2) (stating that one of the CDM's purposes is to assist Parties not included in 
Annex I in achieving sustainable development). 
377 See, e.g., id. art. 12(4) (subjecting the CDM to the control of the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the Meeting of the Parties and the supervision of an executive board). 
378 See A Brief Analysis afCOP-6 Part 11, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., luI. 30, 2001, at 13, available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/downloadlpdf/enb 1217 6e. pdf 
379 See Jason Schwartz, Note, "Whose Woods These Are J Think] Know": How Kyoto May Change Who 
Controls Biodiversity, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.l. 421, 456 (2006). 
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77 and China.380 Considering that the United States and other Umbrella Group countries 
account for over half of the world's emissions, their engagement was crucial to the 
Kyoto Protocol's success. Another important aspect was the EU's refusal to accept the 
inclusion of nuclear projects in the CDM. In order to avoid any attempt by the United 
States, or China and India, to push the debate on the inclusion of nuclear energy projects 
forward, the EU showed some flexibility and ended up accepting forestry activities in 
the CDM?81 The controversy was finally settled at COP-7, where negotiators agreed to 
include forestry in the CDM but limited it to afforestation and reforestation activities.382 
2. The Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Sessions ofthe 
Conference of the Parties 
Although no consensus was reached at the sixth session of the Conference of the 
Parties ("COP-6") and COP-6 "bis" on the issue of LULUCF generally,383 progress 
made during those two meetings allowed for the inclusion of forestry activities in the 
CDM at COP-7 in Marrakesh in 2001. The outcome ofthis meeting was called the 
"Marrakesh Accords.,,384 Through the annex to the decision on LULUCF, the Parties 
finally agreed on the inclusion offorestry projects in the CDM. Their inclusion, 
however, was limited in the following ways: (1) forestry in the CDM was limited to 
afforestation and reforestation activities;385 (2) total additions to a Party's assigned 
380 Manuel Estrada Porrua and Andrea Garcia-Guerrero, A Latin American Perspective on Land Use, 
Land-Use Change, and Forestry Negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
209,211 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008). 
("The inclusion of sinks was also supported to some extent by Brazil, Peru, and Argentina, but many 
other G77 countries, such as those included in the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), China, and 
India, opposed it."). 
381 See id at 457. 
382 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report a/the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume 1), Decision IIICP.7 Annex, ~ 2(e), UN. 
Doc FCCCICP 120011131 Add.I (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP -7 Report - Part Two (Volume 1)]. 
383 See A Srief Analysis ofCOP-6 Part 11, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., Jul. 30, 2001, at 13, lIVai/able at 
http://www.iisd.ca/downloadlpd£.enbI2176e.pdf( .. The collapse of The Hague negotiations was attributed 
by many observers to disagreement over LULUCF issues: "It was sinks that sunk The Hague.' "). 
384 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report afthe Conference of the Parties on its Seventh 
Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference a/the Parties (Volume I), Decision ll1CP.7 Annex, 
~ 1, U.N. Doc FCCCICP/200 1 113/Add. 1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume 
I)]. 
385 See id. ~ 13(e). 
I' 
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amount were limited to one percent of base year emissions times five;386 and (3) a 
regulatory regime for future commitment periods would be decided upon during the 
negotiations on the second commitment period.387 
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Broadly speaking, the EU's main interests prevailed over the Umbrella Group's 
main interests, at least for the first commitment period. The EU succeeded in banning 
nuclear projects in the CDM;388 limiting forestry activities to afforestation and 
reforestation;389 and limiting the amount accountable against an Annex I Party's 
assigned amount.390 In practice, since the EU Emissions Trading Scheme ("ETS") 
excluded carbon credits originating from LULUCF activities,391 and European countries 
(and their private entities) represent the vast majority of Annex I buyers (taking into 
account that the United States has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol),392 the inclusion 
of forestry in the CDM did not significantly affect the EU's interests for the first 
commitment period. Still, the Umbrella Group did manage to insert sinks in the CDM 
and left open the debate for future commitment periods. 
Once forestry made it into the CDM and the Parties had established flexibility 
for the future and general eligibility and offsetting limitations, and operational 
regulatory regime was needed. Despite no progress at the eighth session of the 
Conference of the Parties ("COP-8") in 2002, the Parties would agree upon a thorough 
regulatory regime for forestry in the CDM at the ninth session of the Conference of the 
parties ("COP-9") in 2003.393 Decision 19/CP.9 set up modalities and procedures for 
afforestation and reforestation activities under the CDM.394 Decision 19/CP.9 was also 
important because it affirmed the principles of Decision Il1CP.7 ofCOP-7 on 
386 See id. Decision IIICP.7 Annex, ~ 14. 
387 See id ~ IS. 
388 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report a/the Conference a/the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume II), Decision 17/CP.7, pmbl., U.N. DOC 
FCCC/CP/20011l3/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume II)]. 
389 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, 
Report of the Conference a/the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties (Volume I), Decision IIICP.7 Annex, ~ 13, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/CP/2001l13/Add.I (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume J)]. 
390 See id. ~ II. 
391 See Council Directive No. 20041l0IIEC, art. 1,20040.1. L. 338, at 18, 21: 
392 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Annex I, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
393 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Milan, Italy, Dec. 1-12,2003, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session - Part Two: 
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Ninth Session, Decision 19/CP.9, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2003/6IAdd.2 (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter COP-9 Report - Part Two]. 
394 See id. 
LULUCF395 and enabled a more flexible regulatory regime for small-scale forestry 
projects in the CDM,396 which would follow a model that the Parties had already 
implemented at COP-8 for CDM activities such as renewable energy and energy 
efficiency.397 
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The legal framework for forestry under the CDM in the first commitment period 
was completed when the Parties, at the tenth session ofthe Conference of the Parties 
("COP-I0") in 2004, agreed upon Decision 14/CP.I0, which set forth simplified 
modalities and procedures for small-scale afforestation and reforestation activities under 
the CDM.'98 This regulatory regime was implemented at the first Meeting of the Parties 
in 2005, right after the Kyoto Protocol had entered into force. 399 Table 1 provides a 
chronological overview of general and specific legal provisions applicable to forestry 
project activities under the CDM. 
395 See id. pmbl. 
396 See id. ~~ 3-6. 
397 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New 
Delhi, India, Oct. 23-Nov. 1,2002, Report a/the Conference a/the Parties on its Eighth Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Eighth Session, Decision 211CP.8 Annex II, 
U.N. Doc FCCCICP/2002I71Add.3 (Mar. 28, 2003). 
398 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Buenos Aires, Arg., Dec. 6-18, 2004, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Tenth Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference a/the Parties at its Tenth SeSSion, Decision 14/CP.lO, U.N. Doc 
FCCCICP/2004/10/Add.2 (Apr. 19,2005): 
399 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part One: Proceedings, ~ 8, U.N. Doc 
FCCCIKP/CMP/200519 (Mar. 30, 2006) ("The President said that there had been many remarkable 
achievements on the path from Kyoto to Montreal, including the steadfast efforts by many countries to 
promote the ratification of the Protocol, the completion of the Marrakesh Accords, and the prompt start of 
the clean development mechanism. National efforts to implement the provisions of the Protocol were now 
well under way."). 
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iii. The Institutional Framework 
The UNFCCC launched a comprehensive institutional framework for 
implementing measures and policies; developing guidelines and methodologies; and 
coordinating and translating scientific work into norms and decisions4oo aimed at 
achieving the UNFCCC's ultimate objective of stabilizing greenhouse gases 
400 See CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
("UNFCCC"), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE HANDBOOK 27-43 
(2006), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/handbook.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC 
HANDBOOK]' 
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concentrations in the atmosphere.401 Accordingly, the institutions dealing with forestry 
in the CDM are the product of a broader framework, one that relies not only upon the 
supreme bodies of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, but also upon more specific 
institutions unique to the control and management of afforestation and reforestation 
projects in the CDM. The following two sections break down the CDM's institutional 
framework with respect to forestry. 
1. The Conference of the Parties and Meeting of the 
Parties 
With primary decision-making power, the Conference of the Parties is the 
highest body in the institutional hierarchy and the organ from which the regulatory 
scheme emerges.402 Therefore, the decisions on forestry in the CDM403 derive their legal 
force from the powers conferred to the Conference ofthe Parties by the UNFCCC. The 
Kyoto Protocol set forth the CDM's specific institutional framework404 and granted the 
Conference of the Parties the function of serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol.405 
2. The SBSTA and the CDM Executive Board 
The SBSTA is the advisory body that links available scientific information to the 
climate change regime's decision-making process.406 It is different from the IPCC and 
401 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, May 9,1992,1771 U.N.T.S. 
107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
402 See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONALENVlRONMENT ALLA W AND POLICY 233 (2d ed. 2002) 
("Much like a corporate body of directors, the conferences of the parties ("CoPs") are the primary policy-
making organs of most global environmental treaty regimes. The CoPs usually occur once every one or 
two years and conduct the major business of monitoring, updating, revising, and enforcing the 
conventions."). 
403 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 7, May 9, 1992, 1771 V.N.T.S. 
107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
404 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 12, Dec. 
10,1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocoll. 
405 See id. art 13( I). 
406 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Berlin, F.R.G., Mar. 28 - Apr. 7, 1995, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conftrence of the Parties at its First Session, Decision 6/CP.l, U.N. DOC 
FCCCICPI1995171 Add.1 (June 6, 1995) [hereinafter COP-] Report - Part Two 1 (characterizing the 
SBSTA as "the link between the scientific, technical and technological assessments and the information 
provided by competent international bodies, and the policy-oriented needs of the Conference of the 
Parties."). 
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was not designed to replace it.407 Article IS of the Kyoto Protocol states that the 
subsidiary bodies created under the UNFCCC remain in charge of providing scientific 
and technological advice and assistance to the Conference ofthe Parties and the 
Meeting of the Parties408 The SBSTA takes into account the work of other international 
institutions, such as the IPCC; provides guidance on scientific, technical, and 
technological matters, and recommends decisions to the Conference of the Parties and 
the Meeting of the Parties.409 
Another important organ in the COM forestry institutional framework is the 
CDM Executive Board. Featured in Article 12(4) of the Kyoto Protocol, the Executive 
Board was created to oversee CDM activities under the guidance and authority of the 
Conference of the Parties and the Meeting of the Parties.4lo Through Decision 17/CP.7, 
the Conference of the Parties expanded the Executive Board's supervisory role by 
granting it decision-making power over the approval of designated operational entities 
("DOEs,,);411 the final work on new methodologies;412 baseline and monitoring 
407 See Michael Grubb, The Outcome a/the Berlin Conference, in 1HE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL 
REGIME FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: SJRUCTURES AND OPTIONS AFTER BERLIN 2. 
408 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 15(1), Dec. 
10,1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
409 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report a/the Conference a/the Parties on its Seventh 
Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume I), Decision ll1CP.7 Annex, 
~ 2, U.N. DOC FCCC/CPl2001l13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report- Part Two (Volume 
I)] The SBSTA's eighth session report is good example ofits work. In this report, the SBSTA offered an 
interpretation of Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol; requested that the IPCC prepare a report regarding 
LULUCF; invited the Parties to submit data relating to the implementation of Article 3.3 of the Kyoto 
Protocol and modalities, rules, and guidelines regarding additional human-induced activities under Article 
3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol; called for a workshop of experts; and requested that the secretariat liaise with 
the secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the secretariat of the Convention to Combat 
Desertification, the International Forum on Forests, the F AO, and any other international organizations 
that might have relevant infonnation. See Eighth Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice, Bonn, F.R.G., .Tune 2-12, 1998, Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice on its Eighth SeSSion, ~ 45, U.N. Doc FCCC/SBSTAI1998/6 (Aug. 12, 1998), 
available at htto://unfccc.intiresource/docs/1998/sbsta/06.pdf. 
410 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Marrakesh, 
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report o/the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume II). Decision 17/CP.7 Annex, ~ 5, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/CP /2001113/ Add.2 (.Tan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP -7 Report - Part Two (Volume II)]. 
411 See id. ,-r 5(t); Wolfram Kagi & Dieter Schone, Forest,y Projects Under the CDM: Procedures, 
Experiences and Lessons Learned 9 (U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, Forests and Climate 
Change Working Paper No.3, 2005) ("DOEs are accredited by the Executive Board and perform two 
functions: validating CDM projects, and verifying and certifying emissions reductions from projects. A 
designated operational entity shall not perfonn validation or verification and certification on the same 
CDM [afforestation/reforestation] project activity."). 
412 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Marrakesh, 
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report o/the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume II). Decision 17/CP.7 Annex, ~ 5(d), U.N. 
Doc FCCC/CP/2001113/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report - Part Two (Volume II)]. 
methodologies;413 and issuance of certified emission reductions ("CERs,,).414 In sum, 
the Executive Board is the administrative body in charge of handling projects 
undertaken pursuant to the CDM and all related matters.415 
3. DOEs and the Afforestation and Reforestation 
Working Group 
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The CDM Executive Board can accredit DOEs and recommend them to the 
Conference of the Parties and Meeting of the Parties for final designation.416 The idea 
behind DOEs is to preserve the Executive Board's oversight and decision-making role 
over proposed new methodologies while delegating validation, verification, and 
certification processes to a specialized outside corporation that is presumably more 
efficient at accomplishing the tasks.4!7 If the Executive Board had to operate the 
technical field work associated with validation, verification, and certification for each 
proposed project, the financial and human resources necessary would make the process 
unfeasible.418 
In addition, by working with different and independent DOEs in the validation, 
verification, and certification stages, the Executive Board's institutional framework is 
constantly being crosschecked, diminishing the likelihood of imprecise certified 
emissions reductions ("CERs") which translates into carbon credits. This third-party 
audit scheme is particularly important in light of how non-Annex I countries do not 
have emissions limitation commitments.419 The downside is that such a comprehensive 
process adds bureaucracy and complexity, requiring a high level ofmuitidisciplinary 
expertise. This, in turn, reduces participation by developing countries' stakeholders, 
413 See id. 
414 See id. ~~ 64-66. 
415 See Alex Michaelowa, CDM Host Country Institution Building, 8 MITIGATION ADAPTATION 
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 20 1, 203 (2003). 
416 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Marrakesh, 
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report a/the Conference afthe Parties on its Seventh Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume II). Decision 17/CP.7 Annex, ~ 5(f), U.N. 
Doc FCCCICP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume 1m. 
417 See CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, UNITED 
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CUMA TE CHANGE: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 87 (2004), available at 
http/lunfccc.intiresource/docs/publications/first_te113ears _en. pdf. 
41S See Pedro Moura-Costa & Marc D. Stuart, Forestry-Based Greenhouse Gas Mitigation: A Short StOlY 
of Market Evolution, 77 COMMONWEALTH FORESTRY REV. 191, 199 (1998) ("It became obvious that 
third-party certification was instrumental in the validation and credibility of these new transactions. "). 
419 See id. at 196 (noting the danger that developing countries would transfer their inexpensive greenhouse 
gas reduction opportunities to industrialized countries because, in light of the fact that developing 
countries did not have emission commitments, the commodity was valueless). 
( 
despite the thorough capacity-building scheme envisioned by the climate change 
regime.42o 
Finally, since there is a wide range of scientific, technical, and technological 
expertise needed for different projects under the CDM, the Conference of the Parties 
conferred upon the Executive Board the authority to "establish committees, panels, or 
working groups to assist it in the performance of its functions.,,421 The 
afforestation/reforestation working group was constituted under such authority. 
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At its fourteenth meeting, the Executive Board agreed to establish an 
Afforestation and Reforestation Working Group ("A&R WG") for forestry-related 
projects.422 The A&R WG is responsible for commenting on proposed baseline and 
monitoring methodologies for forestry projects, preparing draft reformatted versions of 
those approved by the Executive Board, and recommending available options for 
expanding the applicability of approved afforestation and reforestation 
methodologies.423 In this sense, the A&R WG works closely and in consonance with the 
Methodologies Panel, which, as agreed upon at the Executive Board's third meeting,424 
is designed to provide the Executive Board with recommendations on proposed new 
methodologies and baseline and monitoring plans, including those designed for 
afforestation and reforestation projects.425 
iv. Provisions for Domestic Legal and Institutional Framework 
420 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh 
Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Coriference a/the Parties (Volume 1), Decision 2/CP.7, U.N. 
Doc FCCCICP/20011I3/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume 1)] 
(addressing capacity-building in developing countries). 
421 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Marrakesh, 
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report a/the Conference a/the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference olthe Parties (Volume II). Decision 17/CP.7 Annex, 118, U.N. 
Doc FCCCICP 12001/131 Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report - Part Two (Volume 11)]. 
422 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., June 12-14, 
2004, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Fourteenth Meeting Report, 'i! 13, U.N. 
Doc CDM-EB-14 (June 14,2004). 
423 See Wolfram Kagi & Dieter Schone, ForestJY Projects Under the CDM· Procedures, Experiences and 
Lessons Learned 9-10 (U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, Forests and Climate Change Working 
Paper No.3, 2005). 
424 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Apr. 9-10, 
2002, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Third Meeting Report, 'i! 48, U.N. Doc 
CDM-EB-03 (Apr. 17,2002). 
425 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., June 9-10, 
2002, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Fourth Meeting Report, 'i! 11, U.N. DOC 
CDM-EB-04 (June 10, 2002). 
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One of the core principles of the CDM is that participation is voluntary and 
dependent upon prior approval.426 Furthermore, in accomplishing one ofthe CDM's 
objectives - assisting developing countries in achieving sustainable development - the 
Conference of the Parties requires project developers to obtain confirmation from the 
host country that a proposed project activity meets its sustainable development goals.427 
The procedural participation requirement imposed on non-Annex I Parties wishing to 
participate in the CDM and, therefore, externalize to project developers voluntariness 
and compliance with sustainable development goals, is the establishment of a 
designated national authority ("DNA,,).428 This provision allows for the development of 
national legal and institutional frameworks by non-Annex I countries desiring to 
participate in the CDM. 
For the purpose of this study, this was the case of Brazil. The country assigned 
the task of serving as the Designated National Authority to a commission entitled 
Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change by a Decree dated of 7 July 
1999 and further amended by a Decree of 10 July 2006. According to these regulations, 
the Commission's role is to articulate "governmental actions resulting from the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its subsidiary instruments in 
which Brazil takes part.,,429 The Commission was conferred with decision-making 
power over additional eligibility criteria to those already established by CDM 
regulations and over project approvals, dependent upon whether it finds relevant to the 
country's sustainable development strategies and whenever deemed appropriate, 
respectively.430 Through Resolution 2 of 10 August 2005, the Brazilian DNA reinforced 
the procedural requirements set forth afforestation/reforestation CDM project-activities 
under Decisions 19/CP.9 and 14/CP.IO; provided definitions for forest for the purpose 
426 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 12(5)(a), 
Dec. 10, 1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
427 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Marrakesh, 
Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report afthe Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume II). Decision 17/CP.7 Annex, ~ 40(a), U.N. 
DOC FCCCICP 120011131 Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter J COP -7 Report - Part Two (Volume II)]. 
428 See id ~ 29. 
429 THE BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Decree of July 7, 1999, amended by Decree 
of January 10. 2006, available at 
http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/17026.html?toPrint+=ves, (last visited Feb. 10, 2009). 
430 See THE BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Decree of July 7. 1999. amended by 
Decree of January 10. 2006, art. 3 (III) (IV). available at 
http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/contentlviewI17026.html?toPrint+~yes, (last visited Feb. 10,2009). 
( 
( 
of project qualification; and presented outlines for project submission building upon 
existing versions provided by the CDM Executive Board.431 
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Forest market-based policy incentives under these overall and general domestic 
and institutional legal framework launched by the climate change international regime is 
thus examined in light of the Atlantic Rainforest biome. Having analyzed the Atlantic 
forest's main environmental and socio-economical features, the following chapter turns 
to indentifYing some of the main political and technical challenges currently facing the 
CDM forest carbon market. Whether or not these challenges can be overcome against 
the Atlantic forest's main features is instrumental to drawing a conclusion with respect 
to its efficacy. 
5. Curreut Obstacles To, And Impacts Of, Forestry Activities Under the CDM 
Due to its controversial nature, forestry activities under the CDM have been 
conducive to many assessments (both positive and negative) regarding the impacts 
resulting from their implementation. Moreover, the expansion of permitted forestry 
activities beyond afforestation and reforestation projects is facing political, legal, and 
technical obstacles. This section is dedicated to examining political, legal and technical 
challenges capable of influencing the negotiation process for a post-2012 deal that can 
impact how the CDM forest market is used in light of existing domestic rules and 
regulations designed and applicable to the Brazilian Atlantic forest. 
a. Political and Legal Obstacles 
G.J.H. van Hoof has pointed out that "[ilf dealy in, or failure of ratification are 
the result of unwillingness on the part of the States concerned, the problem, of course, is 
first of all of a political nature.,,432 The United States's refusal to ratifY the Kyoto 
Protocol, the EU's decision to reject CDM forestry projects, and the limitation of 
forestry to afforestation and reforestation activities, form the core obstacles currently 
facing the CDM forest market. The reasons underpinning each ofthese obstacles and 
how they are of significance for the Brazilian Atlantic forest is examined in this section. 
431 See THE BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Resolution 2 (Aug. 10, 2005), 
available at http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/contentlviewIl4779.html. (last visited Feb. 10,2009). 
432 G.J .H. v AN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (1983). 
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i. The United States' Resistance to Ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
In 1998, the U.S. Senate passed Senate Resolution 98, which "urged the 
President no to agree to a treaty that did not include binding commitments for 
developing countries, or that cause harm to the U.S. economy.,,433 In March of2001, the 
Bush Administration announced the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol,434 shortly after the 
United States experienced the tragedies of September 11, 2001. Although it is not clear 
whether the terrorist attacks influenced U.S. policies with regard to the climate change 
legal regime, some have suggested that the lack of stronger involvement in the Kyoto 
Protocol over the past years indicates that the tragedy may have shifted the United 
States' focus.435 
For what it represents economically and politically, the United States is major 
player in any international negotiation. Therefore, U.S. resistance to accepting the 
Kyoto Protocol constitutes a significant political obstacle to the development of forestry 
activities within the climate change regime. Moreover, because the country was among 
those pushing forward the ample use offorestry activities in the CDM legal framework 
during the Kyoto Protocol negotiation process.436 By ratifYing the Protocol, the United 
States could playa much greater role in pushing negotiations towards. expanding 
eligible activities for future commitment periods and augmenting the demand for 
forestry credits. 
ii. The EU's Refnsal to Accept Carbon Forest Credits in its 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
4)3 See JOHN R. JUSTUS & SUSAN R. FLETCHER, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR 
CONGRESS: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 10(2004). 
434 See id. at 11. 
435 See Todd M. Lopez, Note, A Look at Climate Change and the Evolution of the Kyoto Protocol, 43 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 285, 306 (2003). 
436 See SEBASTIAN OBERTHDR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 
POLICY FOR THE21ST CENTURY 9, 131-32 (1999) ("[G]iven the absence of the US and the weakening of 
industrial country emission targets through higher allowances for sinks, the demand for emission 
reductions abroad will be much lower than originalIy anticipated."). 
( 
( 
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On January 1, 2005, the EU's ETS became the world's largest regional 
greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme.437 The market for CERs created by the ETS 
significantly increased the demand for activities undertaken pursuant to the CDM. This 
was not the case for afforestation and reforestation activities, as the EU's provision 
authorizing the use of CERs expressly excluded their use with regard to LULUCF 
activities.438 Since most ofthe countries with established commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol are members of the EU,439 the policy of excluding CERs from forestry project 
activities is a major obstacle for the enhancement of a stronger market in this area, 
which inevitably hampers the development of new forestry-based greenhouse mitigation 
projects under the CDM.44o 
iii. The CDM's Limitation to AfforestationlReforestation 
Activities and the Proposal for the Inclusion of Reduce 
Emissions From Deforestatiou and Degradation ("REDD") 
One of the major obstacles to the expansion ofLULUCF projects in the CDM 
for the first commitment period is the limitation of activities to anthropogenic 
afforestation and reforestation practices. Preoccupation with ensuring the effectiveness 
of such a limitation compelled climate change negotiators to include it in at least three 
different decisions prior to the first Meeting of the Parties.441 Moreover, "[t]he literature 
437 See Marjan Peeters, The Enforcement of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in Europe - Reliability 
Ensured? 3 (Oct. 16, 2006) (paper presented at the Fourth World Conservation Union ("IUCN") 
Colloquium on Environment Enforcement and Compliance, on file with the author). 
438 See Council Directive No. 2004/1011EC, art. 1,2004 O.J. L 338, at 18,21 ("All [Certified Emission 
Reductions ("CERs")] and [Emission Reduction Units ("ERU")] that are issued and may be used in 
accordance with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent decisions adopted thereunder may 
be used in the Community scheme ... except for CERs and ERUs from land use, land use change and 
forestry activities."), 
439 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Annex I~ May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
440 See Pedro Moura-Costa & Marc D. Stuart~ Forestly-Based Greenhouse Gas Mitigation: A Short St01Y 
of Market Evolution, 77 COMMONWEALTII FORESTRY REv. 191, 197 (I 998)(observing that uncertainty 
regarding the potential value of forestry projects greatly reduces the level of investment in these projects). 
441 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report a/the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh 
Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume J), Decision I IICP.7 Annex, 
'\113, UN. Doc FCCCICP/2001l13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report - Part Two 
(Volume J)]; See Conference ofthe Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session 
- Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume 11), Decision 17/CP.7, '\I7(a), U.N. 
Doc FCCCICP/ZOOIl13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COP-7 Report- Part Two (Volume II)]; See 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Milan, Italy, Dec. 1-12, 
2003, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
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regarding forestry as a climate change mitigation strategy suggests that efforts to 
constrain project-based forestry interventions to reforestation and afforestation projects 
is technically inappropriate.,,442 As a result international pressure over crediting REDD 
activities was successful on including it in the debates for the post-2012 commitment 
. d 443 peno. 
During the SBSTA's twenty-seven session in 2007, members agreed upon a 
draft decision on REDD to be sent for the COP-13 in Bali, Indonesia.444 Decision 
IICP.13 adopted the Bali Action Plan and in its article I(b)(iii) expressly embraced 
"[p Jolicy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries.,,445 That resulted in the adoption by COP-13 of Decision 
2/CP.13 specifically dealing with REDD approaches to stimulate action in developing 
countries.446 Therefore, if for the first commitment period forestry activities were 
restricted to afforestation/reforestation practices under the CDM, at least for post-20l2, 
the Bali Action Plan sent a clear message that the Parties to the UNFCCC are 
considering seriously broadening the scope of permitted forestry project-based 
activities. 
The terms used in Decision 2/CP.13 are broad in nature and constitute a first step 
toward more specific regulations aimed at broadening the scope of the forest carbon 
Conference a/the Parties at its Ninth Session, Decision 19/CP.9, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
FCCCICP/2003/6/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter COP-9 Report - Part Two]. 
442 Mark C. Trexler & Laura H. Kosloff, The 1997 Kyoto Protocol: What Does it Mean For Project-
Based Climate Change Mitigation?, 3 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE I, 29 (1998). 
443 See SummGlY a/the Thirteenth Conference a/Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and Third Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL.. Dec. 18, 2007, 
at 7, ",-,aUable at http://www.iisd.caldownload/pdf/enbI2354e.pdf(explaining how REDD activities were 
included in the negotiations for a post-20l2 commitment period under the climate change regime). 
444 See Twenty-Seventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Bali, 
F .R.G., December 3-11, 2007, RedUCing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: 
Approaches to Stimulate Action - Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc 
FCCCISBSTAl2007/L.23/Add.lIRev.1 (Dec. 12,2007) [hereinafter2007 SBSTA Report]. 
445 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference afthe Parties at its Thirteenth Session,Decision lICP.l3. ~ l(b)(iii), U.N. Doc. 
FCCCICP/2007/6/Add.l (Mar. 14,2008) [hereinafter COP-13 Report - Part Two]. 
446 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15,2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session, Decision 2/CP.l3, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter COP-13 Report - Part Two]. 
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market under the CDM.447 The importance of Decision 2/CP.13 is manifold. Like the 
inclusion offorestry activities in the CDM for the first commitment period, the debate 
over REDD is surrounded by methodological challenges and diversity among national 
circumstances.448 But overcoming these obstacles brings about positive impacts of all 
sorts; from climate change mitigation to the promotion of ecosystem services and socio-
economic benefits.449 Because of that, the parties agreed through Decision 2/CP.B to 
request the SBSTA to undertake further studies to present a detailed and operational 
proposal for the post-2012 negotiation phase.45o Considering REDD shares most ofthe 
technical methodological challenges offorestry activities under the CDM, they are 
further examined in the following section. 
b. Technical Methodological Challenges 
According to the F AO, the forestry sector is "technically especially challenging 
in terms of the CDM project formulation .... ,,451 And with regards to REDD, the Parties 
to the UNCCC at COP-B recognized "the complexity of the problem, different national 
circumstances and the multiple drivers of deforestation and forest degradation .... ,,452 
447 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report a/the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference afthe Parties at its Thirteenth Session, Decision 2/CP.13, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
FCCCICP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14,2008) [hereinafter cap-J3 Report-Port Two]. ("Recognizing that 
efforts and actions to reduce deforestation and to maintain and conserve forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries are already being taken, "). 
448 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15,2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session-Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session, Decision 2/CP.13, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
FCCCICP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14,2008) [hereinafter cap-J3 Report-Part Two]. 
449 See Danilo Mollicone et al., An Accounting Mechanismfor Reducing Emissions fi"om Deforestation 
and Degradation of Forests in Developing Countries, in CUMA TE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING 
POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 191, 191 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, 
and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Reducing emissions from deforestation is therefore crucial in any 
effort to combat climate change. Reducing deforestation has many other positive aspects, such as 
preserving biodiversity, maintaining indigenous rights, and potentially bringing resources to local 
populations."). 
450 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session, Decision 2/CP.I3, 1 7, U.N. DOC. 
FCCCICP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14,2008) [hereinafter Cap-J3 Report-Part Two]. 
451 See Wolfram Kagi & Dieter Schone, Forest,y Projects Under the CDM' Procedures, Experiences and 
Lessons Learned 1 (U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, Forests and Climate Change Working Paper 
No. 3,2005). 
452 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session, Decision 2/CP.13, pmbl., U.N. DOC. 
FCCCICP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14,2008) [hereinafter Cap-J3 Report - Part Two]. 
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The fIrst substantial decision addressing accountability for domestic action on LULUCF 
came during COP-7. The Parties requested that the SBSTA develop defmitions and 
modalities for including afforestation and reforestation while taking into account the 
issues of non-permanence, additionality, and leakage.453 These technical concerns 
stemmed from problems the IPCC reported in its 2000 special report on LULUCF.454 
Furthermore, Decision 19/CP.9's requirement that non-Annex I countries opt for a 
definition of forest based on pre-established parameters455 represented an additional 
technical challenge.456 
If technical methodological issues are challenging under the CDM 
afforestation/reforestation scheme, they are just as complex under REDD initiatives.457 
Some attribute that as one ofthe reasons why REDD was left out from the CDM 
forestry regime.458 While under the CDM these methodological issues are addressed by 
specifIc regulation, which are further detailed below, the debates for the inclusion of 
REDD on a post-2012 deal have just began.459 Accountability is a major issue also 
453 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, Report a/the Conference a/the Parties on its Seventh 
Session - Part Two; Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume I), Decision IIICP.7, ~ 2(e), 
U.N. Doc FCCCICP/2001l13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume JJ]. 
454 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC SPECIAL REpORT: LAND USE, 
LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY ("LULUCF") - SUMMARY FORPOLICYMAKERS 5 (2000), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/srlulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter IPCC SPECIAL REpORT ON LULUCF] (bringing 
technical challenges related to LULUCF to the attention of policy makers). 
455See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Milan, 
Italy, Dec. 1-12,2003, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session - Part Two; Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Ninth Session, Decision 19/CP.9, ~~ 7-9 U.N. DOC. 
FCCCICPI2003/6IAdd.2 (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter COP-9 Report -Part Two]. 
456 See Till Neeff et aL, Choosing a Forest Definition/or the Clean Development Mechanism 1 (FAO, 
Forests and Climate Change, Working Paper No.4, 2006), available at 
http://www.fao.org!forestrv/webview/media?mediaId~11280&langld~1 (suggesting that choosing a 
definition for forest can be a difficult process). 
457 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsfi"om Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 
181 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("The 
focus on monitoring and accounting for emissions from forests creates significant complexity for this 
sector that does not arise in other sectors."). 
458 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsfrom Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 
181 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson·Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("The 
increased complexity is the main reason addressing emissions from deforestation has been, and continues 
to be, a difficult, complex and often controversial issue."). 
459 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference o/the Parties at its Thirteenth Session, Decision 2/CP.13, ~ 7, U.N. DOC. 
FCCCICP/2007/6IAdd.1 (Mar. 14,2008) [hereinafter COP-l3 Report - Pa)'t Two] ("Requests the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to undertake a pogramme of work on 
methodological issues related to a range of policy approaches and positive incentives that aim to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries noting relevant 
documents;"). 
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raising concerns over leakage, non-pennanence, monitoring and on defining a baseline 
scenario. As science evolves to more accurate monitoring techniques over REDD 
activities, the more likely technical challenges can be overcome and, therefore, allowing 
for a definite regulatory framework for the post-2012 commitment period.'6o 
i. Domestic Definition of Forest 
In its 2000 special report on LULUCF, the IPCC highlighted that a successful 
forestry carbon offset program would necessarily depend on clear definitions of forest 
and forestry activities. Countries have defined the tenn forest in varying ways using 
different criteria, such as legal, administrative, or cultural considerations.461 
Nonetheless, for the successful implementation of LULUCF activities it is crucial to 
hannonize the definitions for the purposes of the climate change legal regime462 
In an attempt to hannonize domestic definitions, the armex to Decision 191CP.9 
imposed the requirement that countries define forests prior to participating in the CDM. 
This provision allowed the Parties some flexibility in defining forests. The Parties could 
opt for minimums: tree cover, land area, and tree height in values varying from 10-30%, 
0.05-1 hectare and from 2-5 meters, respectively.463 The Brazilian DNA through Article 
3 of Resolution 2 of 10 August 2005, defined that to qualify for afforestation or 
reforestation project, a forest must not meet the following minimums: crown cover of 
30%, land area of 1 hectare and height at maturity of 5 meters.464 
460 See Conference ofthe Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15,2007, Report of the Conference a/the Parties on its Thirteenth Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session, Decision 2/CP.13, "if 7, U.N. Doc, 
FCCCICPI2007/6IAdd: 1 (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter COP-13 Report - Part Two] (calling for concrete 
action towards more accurate methodological challenges). 
461 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC SPECIAL REpORT: LAND USE, 
LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY ("LULUCF")- SUMMARY FORPOLICYMAKERS ~ 16 (2000), 
available at http://www.ipcc.chlpub/srlulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON LULUCF]. 
462 See Robert T. Watson & David J. Verardo, Preface to INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE ("IPCC"), !pec SPECIAL REPORT: LAND USE, LAND·USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY ("LULUCF") 
- SUMMARY FORPOLICYMAKERS (2000), available at http://www.ipcc.chlpub/srlulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter 
IPCC SPECIAL REpORT ON LULUCF]. 
463 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Milan, Italy, Dec. 1-12,2003, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session-Part Two: 
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Ninth Session, Decision 19/CP.9,,-r 8 U.N. Doc. 
FCCCICP/2003/6IAdd.2 (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter COP-9 Report - Part Two]. 
464 See THE BRAZILIAN MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Decree of July 7. 1999, amended by 
Decree of JanualY 10, 2006, available at . 
http://www.mct.2:ov.br/index.php/contentlview/17026.html?toPrint+=ves, (last visited Feb. 16,2009). 
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The idea behind establishing a definition for forest as an eligibility criterion for 
CDM project participation was to provide the Parties with the ability to adjust their 
domestic definition according to their individual natural and geographic realities. An 
international uniform definition would not be able to encompass the enormous variety 
of ecosystems around the world, and would inevitably end up favoring some countries 
to the detriment of others.465 Depending how dense is a forest ecosystem in a specific 
country that can either include or exclude it from participating in the CDM forestry 
scheme if a uniform defmition was adopted. Only areas that do not meet the above 
stated minimum criteria set forth in the defmition of forests are eligible for participating 
in CDM afforestation/reforestation project scheme.'66 
Soon after it was enacted, though, the definition requirement became another 
technical methodological challenge to forestry activities in the CDM. In 2006, the FAO 
issued a working paper aimed at serving as a guideline to assist countries on choosing 
the best forest definition for the purpose of maximizing participation in the CDM.'67 
Based on criteria that would better serve the interests of a non-Annex I Party, the report 
set forth a ten-step procedure. The proper selection of parameters directly affects which 
areas are eligible for afforestation and reforestation projects and, therefore, is an 
important technical challenge that must be overcome. 
ii. Selection of a Baseline Scenario and Assessment of 
Additionality 
For the purpose of this study, the most critical technical methodological 
challenge facing CDM forestry activities is the selection of a baseline scenario from 
which additionality can be measured. To the extent the Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest 
biome can benefit from the CDM market-based incentive is dependent upon the 
effectiveness of the command-and-control regime in place and existing socio-economic 
465 See Till Neeff et aI., Choosing a Forest Definition/or the Clean Development Mechanism 5-6 (FAO, 
Forests and Climate Change, Working Paper No.4, 2006), available at 
http://www.fao.org/forestrv/webview!niedia?mediaTd=11280&langld=l (discussing the array of 
definitions countries use for forests). 
466 See Sebastian M. Scholz and Martina lung, Forestry Projects under the Clea,? Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Rules and Regulations, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS-
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 71, 74 (Charlotte Streck, Robert 0' Sullivan, Toby 
lanson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Because LULUCF-related CDM projects deal solely 
with afforestation and reforestation, only areas that do not fall under the forest definition are eligible for 
such activities."). 
467 See id 6-7. 
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barriers that can be overcome with the implementation of a CDM forestry project. 
Therefore, understanding the concepts underlying the selection of a baseline scenario 
and assessment of additionality is a helpful methodological tool. 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes that emissions reductions from 
CDM projects must be "additional to any that would occur in the absence of the 
certified project activity.,,468 That is additionality. And "what would occur in the 
absence" ofthe proposed activity is the baseline scenario.469 However, selecting a 
credible and feasible baseline scenario and determining additionality thereof is rather 
complex and a challenging methodological issue.470 The rationale behind additionality 
lies in the fact that "if the developing nation would have undertaken the same emissions 
reduction project even in the absence of Annex I investment, the world could have 
enjoyed the same emissions reductions without the CDM and without giving Annex I 
countries credits that let them emit more.,,471 Without the additionality requirement, a 
project-based market incentive loses its subsidiary nature and, instead, ends up 
contributing even further to the problem of global warming.472 
To determine whether a CDM forestry activity is additional, a project developer 
must choose the proper baseline scenario from which additionality is to be measured. 
For both selection of baseline scenario and determining additionality, the CDM 
Executive Board provides specific non-binding guidelines.473 Project developers 
468 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 12 (5) (c)~ 
Dec. 10, 1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
469 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report a/the Conference a/the Parties Serving as the Meeting aftlre 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference a/the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting a/the Parties at its First Session, Decision 51eMP.1 Annex, "if 19, U.N. 
Doc FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-] Report - Part Two] ("The 
baseline for a proposed afforestation or reforestation project activity under the CDM is the scenario that 
reasonably represents the sum of the changes in carbon stocks in the carbon pools within the project 
boundary that would have occurred in the absence of the proposed forest activity"). 
470 See MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., 1HE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT 192 (J 999) ("[T]he 
question of 'additionality' under the CDM - and possibly sinks - is so complex that it cannot be assumed 
that all emission reductions under these mechanism will be real and additional."). 
471 laso'n Schwartz, Note, "Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know": How Kyoto May Change Who 
Controls Biodiversity, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 421, 426 (2006). 
472 See Sebastian M. Scholz and Martina lung, ForestlY Projects under the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Rules and Regulations, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS-
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 71,76 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby 
Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Additionality is particularly important in excluding 
businessRasRusual scenarios from the CDM. Given that the CDM is designed as a carbon-neutral process, 
it would be counterproductive if the additionality of a project could not be guaranteed."). 
473 See Meeting of the Executive Board of -the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15R19, 
2007, Executive Board o/the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 19: 
Combined Tool to IdentifY the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate Additionality in AIR CDM Project 
Activities, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007); see Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean 
although not bound by the regulations therein are strongly recommended to follow 
them.474 
In selecting a baseline scenario, the general rule is found in Decision 
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SICMP .1.475 According to this framework rule, the determination of a baseline shall be 
based on three general criteria: 1) a baseline scenario is likely to be the one based on 
existing or historical land use practices, or simply the business-as-usual, presupposing 
continuation ofthe activity pre-CDM forestry project; 2) a scenario on which an 
economic factor is likely to alter the existing or historical business-as-usual practice; or 
3) a change on current practices influenced by mandatory laws or regulations.476 
Under this general framework, the A&R WG revised a tool for demonstration 
and assessment of additionality.477 More recently, the CDM Executive Board, at its 
thirty-fifth meeting, updated and revised the first version of the aforementioned 
guidelines and adopted its second version478 along with a "combined tool to identify the 
baseline scenario and demonstrate additionality in AIR CDM project activities".479 
Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19,2007, Executive Board a/the Clean Development 
Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Too! for the Demonstration and Assessment of 
Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), U.N. Doc CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
474 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board a/the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 19: 
Combined Tool to IdentifY the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate Additionality in AIR CDM Project 
Activities, ~ 3, U.N. DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
475 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First Session, Decision SleMP. 1 Annex, ~ 22, U.N. 
DOC FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-] Report - Part Two]. 
476 See Sebastian M. Scholz and Martina Jung, Forestry Projects under the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Rules and Regulations, in CLlMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS-
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNlTIES 71, 76 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby 
Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Option I establishes a business-as-usual baseline 
approach for AR projects. It describes a continuation of current land use and should therefore be chosen if 
the "without-project" scenario is most likely a continuation of current land-use practices. Option 2 
describes a change in land-use patterns due to economic factors. The difference between options 2 and 3 
is not self-evident at first view. Under economic considerations, 'the most likely land use at the time the 
project starts' (option 3) is actually the on 'that represents an economically attractive course of action' 
(option 2). By presenting these two alternatives, the negotiators distinguished between a more 
economically motive land-use baseline scenario (2) and a more mandatory change in prevailing land use 
due to regulations and laws (3)."). 
477 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Sept. 28-
30, 2005, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty First Meeting Report Annex 16: 
Tool for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities, at 8, U.N. 
Doc CDM-EB-21 (Sept. 30, 2005); 
478 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), U.N. 
DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007); 
479 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 19: 
l 
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These more specific guidelines provide a stepwise approach for project developers in 
properly selecting a baseline scenario and assessing additionality. The main purpose of 
such guidelines is to demonstrate that "without finances derived from the trading of 
carbon credits, disadvantageous economics or other barriers would not have been 
overcome and the project would not have proceeded.,,480 Consequently, identifYing the 
existence or non-existence of financial and/or other legal or socio-economic barriers is 
an integral part of the stepwise approach provided by the baseline and additionality 
guidelines. 
Of importance to this study are legal and socio-economic issues influencing the 
selection of a baseline scenario and assessment of additionality. In that regard, for 
instance, the guidelines indicate that national and/or sectoral policies must be 
considered in the selection of a baseline scenario. That means project developers must 
assess whether legal requirements imposing forestation of at least part of the area within 
the project boundary are in place.4S ! If the selected baseline scenario is not in 
compliance with mandatory laws and regulations, it cannot be used as an altemative to 
the CDM project and, therefore, the chances of approving the proposed CDM forestry 
activity are null. 
An accurate analysis of whether Atlantic forest compliance and enforcement 
command-and-control mechanisms corresponds with the actual practice, a thorough 
examination of the legal framework is provided in the following Chapter. But as an 
example, the Brazilian Forest Code determines that at least part of the public and private 
areas within the Atlantic Forest must be set aside for preservation or regeneration.4S2 If a 
landowner is faced with the legal requirement of regenerating part of her/his land, this 
area is not suitable, in principle, to host a CDM forestry project. And that is because in 
selecting a baseline from which additionality is measured, a land use scenario that did 
not encompassed the Forest Code's legal reforestation mandatory rules cannot be used 
Combined Tool to Identify the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate Additionality in AIR CDM Project 
Activities, U.N. DocCDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007); 
480 Timothy Pearson et aI., Project-Based Mechanisms: Methodological Approaches for Measuring and 
Monitoring Carbon Credits, in CUMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET 
OPPORTUNITIES 135, 141 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
481 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board althe Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Addifionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), ~ 9, 
U.N. DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
482 See Law 4,77111965, art. 1.11 and 1.111, available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03/Leis/L4771.htm. 
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according to the rules of the guidelines.483 Moreover, when a project developer does· 
identifY a land use scenario upon which mandatory laws and regulations impose 
afforestationlreforestation activities, the CDM forestry project is not additional to what 
would have happened if it was not proposed. 
The exception to this general rule is twofold: 1) whenever the mandatory laws or 
regulations "are systematically not enforced and non-compliance with those 
requirements is widespread"; and 2) if they were enacted after the adoption of Decision 
17/CP.7 OF 11 November 2001.484 The idea is that for the prior, if a law or regulation 
imposing forestation activities are not enforced or complied with in practice, than the 
proposed project is additional to the baseline scenario without it. That is extremely 
important, because even though most Latin American countries have developed 
protective forest legal frameworks, including Brazil, there is still a gap between written 
law and effective compliance and enforcement mechanisms thereof.485 
For the second exception, the rationale lies on the fact that market-based forestry 
incentive may not constitute perverse incentive against developing countries developing 
mandatory set of rules of regulations aimed at protecting and regenerating forests.486 If 
such exception was not included, many countries could opt for not developing 
protective legal frameworks fearing that could influence the selection of the land use 
baseline scenario and, consequently, the CDM project would no longer be additional. In 
balancing afforestation/reforestation activities with foreign capital versus bearing the 
costs of a domestic forestation command-and-control regime, developing countries 
483 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board a/the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), 'i\12, 
U.N. DocCDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
484 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board a/the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), ~~ 11-
12, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
485 See Manuel Estrada Porrua and Andrea Garcia-Guerrero, A Latin American Perspective on Land Use, 
Land-Use Change, and Forestry Negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
209,214 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby lanson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Overall, more than 10 percent of the territory of the region [Latin America] (213.54 million hal is 
currently protected .... [h]owever, the indicator for protected areas reflects their legal status, not their 
degree of effective protection."). 
486 See Meeting ofthe Executive Board of the Clean DevelopmenfMechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Feb. 22-24, 
2006, Executive Board o/the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty Third Meeting Report Annex 19: 
National and/or Sectoral Policies and Circumstances in the Baseline Scenari%r Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities, at 1, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-23 (Feb. 24, 2006) ("2. As a general principle, 
national andlor sectoral policies and circumstances are to be taken into account on the establishment of a 
baseline scenario, without creating perverse incentives that may impact host Parties' contributions to the 
ultimate objective of the Convention."). 
\. 
( 
could choose the prior jeopardizing the subsidiary nature of a market-based policy 
incentive. 
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But not the entire region of a forested biome may be protected by laws or 
regulations. Indeed, as the following chapter demonstrates, that is the reality for most of 
the Brazilian Atlantic forest. In that case, other socio-economic barriers preventing 
forestation487 of the land may influence the selection ofa baseline scenario. They 
include investment, institutional, technological, local tradition, prevailing practices, 
social and land tenure related barriers.488 The purpose is to demonstrate that any socio-
economical barrier or any combination thereof can only be overcome if the proposed 
activity is registered as a COM forestry activity, in which case, the COM project is 
deemed additional.489 
Selection of a credible baseline scenario and assessment of additionality is 
ultimately conducted in a case-by-case basis. Therefore, many of the socio-economical 
barriers may vary within a single region. Even more so, if this region is a biome with an 
extensive territory and large socio-economic differences, like the Atlantic forest. 
Nonetheless, having examined the main environmental and socio-economical features 
of the Atlantic Rainforest biome,49o some of those barriers become clearer and, 
therefore, can be identified as preventing forestation practices. As a result, a more 
accurate analysis is possible of how they can be overcome with assistance provided 
from the COM forestry market incentive. 
iii. Monitoring (Verification) and Acconnting 
487 For the purpose of the baseline and additionality tests, "forestation is used for the identification of 
possible land use scenarios that go beyond afforestation and reforestation as defined in the Marrakech 
Accords and includes the any establishment of forest through natural or artificial means." See Meeting of 
the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19,2007, Executive 
Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 19: Combined Tool to 
Identify the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities, U.N. DOC 
CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
488 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2). ,-r 28, 
U.N. DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007) (providing a detailed list of the possible socia-economical 
barriers). 
489 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), ,-r 29, 
U.N. Doc CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007) ("The identified barriers are only sufficient grounds for 
demonstration of additionality if they would prevent potential project participants from carrying out the 
proposed project activity ifit was not expected to be registered as an AIR CDM project activity."). 
490 See above Chapter 2. 
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Monitoring and accounting are additional technical methodological challenges 
unique to CDM forestry project mechanisms due to the susceptibility of anthropogenic 
and natural disturbances of forest ecosystems. 491 Because of that, risks associated to 
non-permanence/reversibility, leakage and impacts on different ecosystem goods and 
services are higher. In different greenhouse gases offset projects other than forestry (i.e. 
renewable energy, fuel switching, energy efficiency, etc), the switch for a less carbon 
intensive activity represents a permanent greenhouse gas removal as long as the new 
technology remains in place.492 
Consequently, because of a forest's susceptibility to disturbances, the credibility 
of carbon credits issued for afforestation/reforestation projects is constantly 
threatened.493 That required the climate change regime to develop specific and detailed 
set of rules addressing the peculiarities of CDM forestry projects494, adding complexity 
to the monitoring and accounting methodologies. The numbers of approved 
afforestation/reforestation baseline and monitoring methodologies are illustrative of 
such complexity. As of the writing of this study, there are ten approved methodologies 
for afforestation/reforestation projects, whereas there are more than sixty for energy 
efficiency and renewable energy activities.'95 The following subsections examine in 
deeper details the challenges of non-permanence and leakage inherent to monitoring and 
accounting under CDM forestry project activities. 
491 See Joel N. Swisher, Joint Implementation Under the UN. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: Technical and Institutional Challenges, 2 MITIGATION ADAPTATION S1RATEGIES FOR GLOBAL 
CHANGES7, 72 (1997) (noting the complexity of long term monitoring of LULUCF project activities). 
492 See Sebastian M. Scholz and Martina lung, Forestry Projects under the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint implementation: Rules and Regulations, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS-
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 71, 75 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby 
lanson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Projects based on activities in the LULUCF sector 
differ in one crucial aspect from projects based on activities in other sectors, such as energy projects. In 
the latter, a tone of emission reductions, once achieved, remains a benefit to the atmosphere, whereas in 
the fonner, a tone of sequestered carbon is of benefit to the atmosphere only for as long as it remains in 
fact sequestered.") 
493 See Joel N. Swisher, Joint Implementation Under the UN. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: Technical and Institutional Challenges, 2 MITIGATION ADAPTATION S1RATEGIES FOR GLOBAL 
CHANGE 57, 63 (1997) ("In the case of power supply projects, the baseline can be relatively clearly 
determined from the carbon content of the fossil fuel replaced."). 
494 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC SPECIAL REpORT: LAND USE, 
LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRV ("LULUCF") - SUMMARY FORPOLICYMAKERS 10 (2000), available 
at http;llwww.ipcc.chlpub/srlulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter IPCC SPECIAL REpORT ON LULUCFl. 
495 Compare CDM: AfforestationlReforestation Methodologies, 
http://cdm.unfccc.intimethodologies/ARmethodologies/approved ar.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2007) with 
Methodologies for CDM Project Activities, http://cdm.unfccc.intlmethodologiesIPAmethodologies 
lapproved.html (last visited Dec. II, 2007). 
( 
( 
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1. Non-permanence I Reversibility 
According to the 2000 IPCC's Special Report on LULUCF, (non)pennanence 
refers to "[tJhe longevity of a carbon pool".496 Because forests either in their mature or 
early stages of regeneration are subject to natural occurring phenomena such as 
windstonns, pests, fires, or to anthropogenic interference such as conversion to 
agricultural use, the risks of non-pennanence are high.497 To address the non-
pennanence risks ofCDM forestry projects, the Parties adopted at COP-9 the IPCC's 
recommendation of limiting the validity of carbon credits issued by a forestry project.498 
Accordantly, after a detennined period of time, the carbon forest credit expires 
and must be replaced by a different one.499 Hence, the crediting period was defined as 
being a minimum of twenty years (with the possibility of being renewed twice, for a 
maximum of sixty years) and a maximum of thirty years (without the option to 
renew).500 Thus, contrary to carbon credits from non-forestry project activities, forestry 
credits expire and when used by an Annex I Party during a commitment period to meet 
its quantified emission reductions targets, the Party has to replace the forestry credit by 
a different one.50l 
496 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC SPECIAL REpORT: LAND USE, 
LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY ("LULUCF") - SUMMARY FORPOLICYMAKERS 9 (2000): available at 
http://www.ipcc.chlpub/srlulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter IPCC SPECIAL REpORT ON LULUCF]. 
497 See Franck Lecocq and Stephane Couture, The Permanence Challenge: An Economic Analysis of 
TemporQ1y Credits, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET 
OPPORTUNlTlES 125, 125 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Carbon sequestered in biomass or soils may be released accidentally because of 
fire, windstorms, or other natural hazards or because of conversion of the land to agriculture or pasture. "). 
49& See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Milan, Italy, Dec. 1-12,2003, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session - Part Two: 
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Ninth Session, Decision 19/CP.9, Annex ~ 23, U.N. 
Doc. FCCCICP/2003/6IAdd.2 (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter COP-9 Report - Part Two]. 
499 See Franck Lecocq and Stephane Couture, The Permanence Challenge: An Economic Analysis of 
Temporary Credits, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET 
OPPORTUNITIES 125, 125 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("To deal with the risk of non permanence, carbon sequestration through land use, 
land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
gener?-tes credits with finite lifetimes. "). 
500 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First Session, Decision 5ICMP.l Annex, ~ 23 (a) (b), 
U.N. DOC FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-] Report - Part Two]. 
501 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First Session, Decision 51eMP.l Annex, ~~ 44-47, 
U.N. DOC FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-] Report-Part Two]. 
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Differently from other types of activities, credits from afforestation/reforestation 
projects (Certified Emission Reductions - "CERs") are divided into "temporary" 
("tCER") and "long-term" ("ICER"). A tCER "expires at the end of the commitment 
period following the one during which it was issued" and a ICER "expires at the end of 
crediting period of the afforestation or reforestation project under the CDM for which it 
was issued."s02 Project developers must opt up front whether they intend to use ICERs 
or tCERs and this decision is binding an unchangeable.503 In practical terms, assuming a 
twenty-year nonrenewable forestry project started on January 2005 and a project 
developer opted for tCER, an Annex I Party may use the tCERs generated by this 
project to meet its emission reductions targets during the first commitment period 
(2008-12). But because tCERs expire "at the end of the commitment period subsequent 
to the commitment period for which it was issued", for the next commitment period, 
this Annex I Party must replace them with new CERs. For ICERs, an Annex I Party 
does not have to replace the tCERs until the end of the selected crediting period. 
Depending on the length ofthe project, that gives this Annex I Party more time before 
the expiration date upon which ICERs must be replaced. 
In either case the burdens and liabilities from ensuring that an expired tCERs 
and ICERs is replaced and guaranteeing that net greenhouse removals underlying the 
credits are still positive lay with the buyers. S04 Because of that, forestry credits enjoy a 
lower market price than those of different nature.505 And considering they can be 
502 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting a/the Parties at its First Session, Decision 5/eW.1 Annex, ~ 1 (g) (h), 
U.N. DOC FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-l Report -Part Two]. 
503 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Sessio.n - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference a/the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting a/the Parties at its First Session, Decision SICMP.l Annex, ~ 39, U.N. 
Doc FCCCIKPICMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-l Report - Part Two]. 
504 See Franck Lecocq and Stephane Couture, The Permanence Challenge: An Economic Analysis of 
TemporGlY Credits, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET 
OPPORTUNITIES 125, 125-6 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby lanson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("The current rules thus create a double liability for the carbon buyer. First, if the 
carbon stock underlying the credit is no longer sequestered or is not reverified, then the holder of the 
credit suffers a debit that must be compensated for by the acquisition of a permanent credit or of another 
temporary credit based on a different carbon stock. The second liability arises at the end of the project's 
crediting periqd when a replacement has to be found whether or not the underlying carbon stock is being 
maintained."): 
505 See Sebastian M. Scholz and Martina lung, Forestry Projects under the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Rules and Regulations, in CLIMATE CHANGEANDFORESTS'-
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 71, 76 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby 
I. 
( 
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acquired at a lower price, it creates a market for non-Annex I Parties wishing to buy 
some time before they can meet its emission reductions targets by different means. S06 
The decision over temporary or long-term CERs is equally market driven. Often sellers 
are likely to prefer tCERs because they can be sold every commitment period as long as 
project's net greenhouse gas removals remain positive.s07 In tum, buyers tend to prefer 
ICERs in light of the higher transaction costs of having to replace tCERs every 
commitment period.508 
2. Leakage 
Leakage is defined by the climate change regime as "the increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions by sources which occurs outside the boundary of an afforestation or 
reforestation project activity under the CDM which is measurable and attributable to the 
afforestation or reforestation project activity."so9 In practical terms, consider the 
hypothetical where a reforestation project is undertaken in a degraded piece of pasture 
land. Ifthe conversion of the pasture land into forested area leads to the deforestation 
elsewhere to meeting the demand for new grazing land, the forestry project is 
experiencing leakage. 
In order for leakage to be linked to a project activity, it has to be properly 
measured and causation with the project must be assessed. Leakage has to be part of a 
Janson·Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 200S) ("Because tCERs and ICERs are temporary, their 
prices are lower than the prices of (permanent) CERs from other CDM project categories."). 
506 See Franck Lecocq and Stephane Couture, The Permanence Challenge: An Economic Analysis of 
TemporGlY Credits, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET 
OPPORTUNITIES 125,126 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("[T]he fact that tCERs and leERs have finite durations may also provide an 
opportunity for buyers seeking to gain time until carbon is less expensive - for example, because they 
anticipate that their emissions will fall in the future. "). 
507 See Sebastian M. Scholz and Martina Jung, Forestry Projects under the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Rules and Regulations, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS-
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 71, 76 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby 
lanson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("From the seller's perspective, the regulation means 
that tCERs can be sold every five years, which is an economically interesting feature oftCERs."). 
508 See Franck Lecocq and Stephane Couture, The Permanence Challenge: An Economic Analysis of 
Tempormy Credits, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET 
OPPORTUNITIES 125, 126 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("We suggest that few buyers are likely to be interested in temporary credits per se 
and that most will in fact demand quasi-permanent credits even from LULUCF projects."). 
509 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First Session, Decision 5/CMP.l Annex, ~ 1 (e), U.N. 
DOC FCCCIKP/CMPI2005/S/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COPIMOP-] Report - Part Two]. 
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monitoring and accounting process and thus has the potential to alter significantly the 
amount of carbon credits attributed to a project.510 A project can also render "positive" 
leakage, when it leads to forestation outside of the project's boundary. However, that is 
not accountable under the climate change regime.511 Finally, leakage is not only limited 
to afforestation/reforestation project activities, for conservation activities under REDD, 
proper monitoring and accountability also constitutes technical methodological 
challenges.512 
c. Challenges under REDD Activities 
If for CDM afforestation/reforestation activities the regulatory framework is 
already negotiated and the main technical methodological challenges resolved, under 
REDD projects the debate remains open. Basically, the same challenges facing CDM 
afforestation/reforestation projects are of concern to negotiators dealing with a proposal 
to include REDD for future commitment periods.513 Issues like including accountability 
for forest degradation in addition to deforestation, defining proper criteria for the 
selection of a baseline scenario, monitoring and accounting including leakage and non-
permanence, and other policy challenges such as the risks of market flooding are 
currently included in the negotiations over REDD activities. Through Decision 2/CP.13 
510 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report a/the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting a/the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference afthe 
Parties Serving as the Meeting a/the Parties at its First Session, Decision 5/eMP.l Annex,,-r 25 (c), U.N. 
DOC FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-] Report - Part Two]. 
511 See Sebastian M. Scholz and Martina Jung, Forestry Projects under the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Rules and Regulations, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS-
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 71, 78 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby 
Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("[O]nly leakage that increases emissions is to be 
taken into account, thereby precluding any claims for 'positive leakage' or 'spillover effects,' as when a 
project leads to additional forest planting or growth outside the project boundaries. "). 
512 See Sebastian M. Scholz and Martina lung, Forestry Projects under the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Rules and Regulations, in Cl-IMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS-
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 71, 78 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby 
Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("In the case of avoided deforestation, usage 
restrictions might force people to clear forests elsewhere, which would counter the carbon reservoir 
protection."). 
5\3 See Stephan Schwartzman and Paulo Moutinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND 
MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 227, 231 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("The issues of ad diti anality, base period, leakage, and nonpermanence arise 
frequently in discussions about reducing deforestation in the UNFcce context."). 
negotiators invited the Parties to submit considerations on how to overcome these 
methodological challenges.514 
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First of all, whether allowing for deforestation only, or also including 
degradation is particularly challenging. While deforestation is the total forest loss, 
degradation has to be measured against the definition of forests provided by each 
country according to the minimums provided by the climate change regime.515 Thus, if a 
country defines forest with a minimum tree crown cover of ten percent, anything below 
that - but excluding total forest loss - is considered degradation." 6 Although scientific 
knowledge evolved considerably since the 1992 UNFCCC,517 monitoring degradation is 
still quite challenging due to differences in forested ecosystems, difficulties in 
verification techniques and the potential high costs involved. 518 Notwithstanding, 
because Decision 2/CP.13 expressly incorporated forest degradation, it indicates that 
this will be a forestry practice included for the post-2012 commitment period.5J9 
Secondly, selecting reference emissions levels from which deforestation and 
degradation are measured is also of concern. Rates of deforestation and degradation 
514 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report a/the Conference a/the Parties on its Thirteenth Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Coiferenee of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session. Decision IICP. \3, ~ 7(a), U.N. Doc. 
FCCCICP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14,2008) [hereinafter COP-13 Report - Part Two]. 
515 See Chapter 5.b.i. above. 
516 See Danilo Mollicone et al., An Accounting Mechanism/or Reducing Emissions/l"om Deforestation 
and Degradation of Forests in Developing Countries, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING 
POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 191, 193-4 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-
Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) (proposing a definition offorest degradation "as the 
conversion ofa forest from one of two subcategories to the other, with a different carbon content. Both 
subcategories remain within the framework of the UNFCCC forest definition. The first subcategory is that 
of intact forest. These are fully stocked, in that tree cover can range from 10 to 100 percent but must be 
undisturbed ~ for example, no timber extraction has taken place. The second subcategory, non-intact 
forest, is not fully stocked. That is, even though tree cover is greater than 10 percent, qualifying as a 
forest under existing UNFCCC rules, the forest may have undergone some timber exploitation. "). 
517 See Stephan Schwartzman and Paulo Moutinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS ~ EMERGING POLICY AND 
MARKETOPPORTUNlTIES 227, 229 (Chariotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) (noting that verification technologies such as remote sense technologies are 
improving rapidly). 
518 See Danilo Mollicone et al., An Accounting Mechanismfor Reducing Emissionsfi"om Deforestation 
and Degradation of Forests in Developing Countries, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS ~ EMERGING 
POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 191, 193 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, 
and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Policymakers have tried to reach agreement on a common 
definition offorest degradation, but no consensus yet exists, and some proposed definitions, such as 
temporary loss of biomass or canopy cover, could tum out to· be impossible to measure or to track over 
time."). 
519 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session, Decision IICP.13, pmbl., U.N. DOc. 
FCCCICP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14,2008) [hereinafter COP-13 Report - Part Two]. 
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differ significantly among countries.52o Depending on how high or Iowa country's 
reference emissions level is set; crediting could benefit some countries in detriment of 
others based on national high or low rates of deforestation and degradation accordantly. 
Even when establishing a national reference level, in countries of continental size like 
Brazil, deforestation and degradation patterns vary among different forested biomes. For 
example, the Amazon forest preserves approximately 80% of its original cover and 
presents high rates of deforestation.521 On the other hand, within the Atlantic Rainforest 
merely 7.26% remain preserved. Therefore, a national reference level for REDD is 
likely to benefit the Amazon in detriment of the Atlantic Rainforest. 
To address unfairness among countries with different forest conversion patterns, 
a global baseline rate is proposed in which countries are grouped into different 
categories based upon individual rates of deforestation and degradation (Lg. high or 
low).522 Moreover, the basis for defining reference emissions levels is also challenging. 
Historic deforestation and degradation rates are favored by many countries.523 But the 
520 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsfrom Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITlES 179, 
185 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson·Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Countries have different rates of deforestation that change over time. This makes deciding when to 
measure baseline or reference emissions in order to calculate any emission reductions important."). 
521 See Stephan Schwartzman and Paulo Moutinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND 
MARKET OPPORTUNITlES 227, 232 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("The procedure for selecting historical base periods (or reductions goals) must 
take into account the different regional dynamics of deforestation in the tropics. In Amazonia, for 
example, with approximately 80 percent of its original forest cover and high current deforestation rates, a 
base period for average annual deforestation rates set in the 1980s (since 1990 is the reference year for the 
Kyoto goals) would be adequate. Countries with substantial tropical forests and relatively little 
deforestation to date (for example, Peru and Bolivia) should be able to adopt higher baselines than their 
recent deforestation rates to provide an incentive to participate and to avoid future increases. Regions, that 
have been heavily degraded, such as Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Sulawesi, where 70 to 80 percent of the 
lowland Dipterocalpaceae forest cover has been removed in areas deforested and where conversion to 
oil-producing palm species is under way, would have to be handled differently. In such cases, a baseline 
could be expressed in terms of carbon stocks at some time in the past, with credit for any increase above 
this between, for example, 2008 and 2012, making reforestation or regeneration an alternative to palm 
plantations."). 
522 See Danilo Mollicone et a1., An Accounting Mechanism for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Degradation of Forests in Developing Countries, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING 
POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 191,195 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, 
and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) (proposing a global baseline rate cable of discriminating countries 
with high and low deforestation and degradation rates. "If a hypothetical remuneration mechanism were 
based only on national baselines, then countries with low forest conversion rates would see little or no 
benefit in making further reductions - if indeed such reductions were possible. A country with no forest 
conversion under way could not gain credits from reduced forest conversion, because there is no 
conversion to avoid. In these kinds of countries, deforestation could easily start, and the mechanism 
would fail in reducing deforestation worldwide."). 
523 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsfrom Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITlES 179, 
185 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
( 
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problems of relying solely on historic reference levels is that current and future trends 
capable of influencing the baseline scenario are left out. Therefore, in this case, 
periodical methodological adjustments must be designed.524 
Thirdly, leakage under avoided deforestation depends on whether the Parties 
decide for a national or a subnational approach in which to monitor and account for 
REDD activities.525 A subnational approach is used for project-based market incentives, 
such as the current CDM forestry regime in which monitoring and accounting are 
restricted to a defined region within a country where the project takes place. In that 
sense, leakage must be measurable and attributable to the project activity. Strict rules 
are necessary because they are the only viable way to properly assess whether the 
forestry activity is not leading to deforestation elsewhere. The exception though is 
project-based market policy incentives within a closed cap-and-trade program. That is 
the case of the II program under the Kyoto Protocol. Addressing leakage at the project-
level under JI is not a major concern because even if a project developer omits any 
deforestation elsewhere, whenever the country submits its mandatory emissions 
inventory, deforestation practices appear and the Party is accountable for it.526 
The national approach defines domestic deforestation and degradation reference 
levels from which accountability is measured. It is incumbent upon the national 
government then to ensure that deforestation and degradation remains below the 
domestic reference level. Whenever reductions are verified, REDD credits are 
conferred. On the flip side, failure to meeting the national target generates debits that 
("Most countries argue that historic rates of emission should be used, because these can be accurately 
assessed, whereas future rates are difficult to quantify. "). 
524 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissions/rom Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 
185 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Looking at purely historical rates will also make it harder for countries with low levels of historical 
deforestation to participate in an incentive mechanism designed to reduce rates of deforestation. To 
address this, it is expected that any (national) reference level will be based on historic emissions but will 
inevitably be adjusted through negotiation to take into account countries' individual circumstances and 
development objectives. "). 
525 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsfrom Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 
183 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
(differentiating leakage within the national from the subnational approach). 
526 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsji'om Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 
182 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Domestic leakage under the CDM (for all projects) is accounted for on the project level through strict 
rules and regulations. Concern over how to address project-level leakage was one of the prominent 
reasons for originally excluding RED fTom the CDM. Joint Implementation, on the other hand, does not 
require the same strict project-level accounting, because domestic leakage will be reflected in a country's 
national inventory and overall emissions accounting."}. 
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must be accounted for. Leakage in the national approach is dealt by each government 
according to the preferred set of policies chosen for compliance with the reference 
level.527 Leakage would only be of concern to other Parties to the climate change regime 
if it was to be considered internationally. That means an avoided deforestation project in 
on country leading to deforestation in another.528 But because cross-border leakage is 
currently not part ofthe climate change legal framework, a case is made in favor of 
leaving it aside for REDD activities as well.529 
National approach is preferred because it is viewed as an attempt to establishing 
some sort of commitments upon developing country Parties.530 In addition, most 
countries support a centralized system of forest governance that favors coordinated 
enforcement and compliance actions and policies.531 Such approach also enables 
national governments to centralize and manage incomes from REDD credits. 
Disadvantages "include the reduced accuracy and increased uncertainty associated with 
national monitoring, increased sovereign responsibilities and potential for associated 
corruption, and uncertainty over how the private sector might participate in this type of 
527 See Charlotte Streck et a1., Creating Incentives for Avoiding Further Deforestation: The Nested 
Approach, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLlCY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 237, 
240 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Reducing emissions from deforestation at a national level implies that countries are able to successfully 
implement effective policy, legal, and institutiona) reforms nationwide and are in the position to 
formulate and enforce appropriate social and economic safeguards."). 
528 See Stephan Schwartzman and Paulo Moutinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND 
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 227, 233 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Leakage of deforestation per se from one country to another (for example, 
Brazilian soy planters who move to Bolivia) might occur, although participation by several countries in a 
geographical region (Amazonian countries, for example) in a compensated reductions mechanism would 
help address this problem. Furthermore, economic modeling of international timber trade might be able to 
identify international export leakage."). 
529 See Stephan Schwartzman and Paulo Moutinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND 
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 227,233 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) (proposing that "international leakage - in all sectors, not just forestry --:- will be 
resolved only when all major emitters participate in an international emissions control regime. "). 
530 See Stephan Schwartzman and Paulo Moutinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND 
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 227, 234 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("More hazardous to the global climate system than any issue of leakage or 
permanence in carbon offsets from reducing deforestation is the prospect of failing to sustain and increase 
developing-country participation in a mandatory international emission reduction system."). 
531 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsft'om Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 
183 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("It is 
argued that a top-down approach in which the central government is responsible for reforming land and 
forest policy and laws, corruption, and law enforcement is the most appropriate approach to reducing 
deforestation. "). 
( 
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system."S32 Additionally, the national approach faces opposition among the private 
sector due to the existing distrust on developing countries' governance performance.533 
On the flip side, the subnational approach is favored by the private sector in light 
of the uncertainties surrounding the national approach.s34 Moreover, a project-based, 
subnational type of approach could benefit from the current regulatory framework in 
place for afforestation and reforestation activities under the CDM. The advantage is 
that the current baseline-credit CDM scheme already reflects more consolidated 
scientific knowledge on technical methodological challenges.535 Relying on one unified 
international regulatory framework creates a more predictable environment than relying 
on a variety of different national set ofpoJicies and rules. Finally, a project-based 
approach is seen more beneficial to local and traditional communities on that it has the 
potential to attract direct participation and share incomes.536 
Fourthly, considering REDD is one of the most cost-effective ways to mitigate 
climate change537 and has the potential for considerable amounts of emission 
reductions, it can cause an oversupply of credits lowering overall abatement costS.538 
532 Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissions/rom Deforestation in Developing Countries: An Introduction, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 183 
(Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008). 
533 See Charlotte Streck et aI., Creating Incentives for Avoiding Further Deforestation: The Nested 
Approach, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 237, 
242 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("[T]he private sector has expressed reluctance to invest directly in developing country governments or in 
projects for which perfonnance is linked to government performance in reducing emissions from 
deforestation and degradation nationally. In a system in which the allocation of funds and potential 
carbon credits takes place through host country governments, the political and legal risk of the 
mechanism is considered too high to attract private finance."). 
534 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 
183 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("A 
number of private sector investors have indicated a preference for project-based accounting and crediting 
because it allows private sector investment in individual projects without exposure to sovereign 
performance risks. "). 
535 See Charlotte Streck et a1., Creating Incentives for Avoiding Further Deforestation: The Nested 
Approach, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 237, 
246 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Issuance ofREDD credits for project activities would require that the activities be subject to a 
validation, verification, and certification procedure by an independent, accredited body."). 
536 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsfrom Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 
184 (Charlotte StreCk, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Project-based accounting may also enable funding to flow more readily to local communities and 
landowners, because it promotes the direct participation of these stakeholders."). 
537 See N. Stern et aI., Stern Review on the Economics a/Climate Change, 217 (2006), available at 
http://\vww.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stemreviewreport.htm (detailing the costs of reducing emissions by 
avoiding deforestation). 
538 See Stephan Schwartzman and Paulo Moutinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND 
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That is a major technical challenge that must be resolved prior to including REDD 
activities in a post-20l2 commitment period. The undesirable consequence of the so-
called carbon credits market-flood, lowering overall abatement costs, is that REDD 
could undermine technological innovation as part of domestic efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gases emissions. Solutions to this problem range from proposals to cap the 
amount ofREDD credits, to a specific and parallel market exclusively designed for 
avoided deforestation and degradation types of activities. 539 
Lastly, the non-permanence issue depends on the design and implementation 
rules agreed upon for REDD activities. If subnational, project-based, a new regime on 
REDD could benefit from the regulatory experience and expert knowledge developed 
for afforestation and reforestation projects under the CDM. Basically, credits would be 
issued temporarily and upon expiration would have to be replaced by new ones.540 
Liability lies with the buyer who is responsible for ensuring carbon sequestration is 
underlying the forestry credits. Under a national approach, credits would be permanent 
and conditional to whether a country succeeds on staying below its reference Ievel.54 ! If 
above the baseline scenario, a seller liability rules would then apply and possibilities 
range from a country having to acquire credits elsewhere to meet its reduce 
deforestation/degradation commitments,542 to taking stronger reduction obligations in 
subsequent commitment periods.543 
MARKET OPPORTIJNlTlES 227,231 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Fears of flooding the market with cheap carbon from avoided deforestation are 
often voiced. Obviously some limit could be placed on allowable offsets, but even in the absence of a cap, 
flooding is unlikely to occur."). 
539 See Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsfi"om Deforestation in Developing Countries: An 
Introduction, in CUMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICV AND MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 179, 
186 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
(listing available solutions to address market flooding). 
540 See Charlotte Streck et ~I., Creating Incentives for AVOiding Further Deforestation: The Nested 
Approach, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLlCY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 237, 
247 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("To 
further enhance the contribution of developing countries to global emission reductions, credits issued 
rewarding emission reductions from specific activities could be either temporary, with no project and no 
host-country liability (similar to tCERs), or pennanent, with a mandatory reserve of credits to be 
transferred to the national reserve aacount."). 
541 See Stephan Schwartzman and Paulo Moutinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGIN'G POLICY AND 
MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 227, 229 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby]anson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("The risk that countries having received compensation for reducing their 
emissions might subsequently increase them could be addressed in several ways. Disallowing access to 
the market for countries that had received compensation and subsequently exceeded their baseline 
deforestation rate until net deforestation was reduced below the baseline would limit crediting of 
impennanent reductions while maintaining the voluntary character of the mechanism."). 
542 See Stephan Schwartzman and Paulo Moutiriho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND 
l. 
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All in all, regardless of the outcome ofthe negotiations for REDD to be included 
in a second commitment period under the climate change regime, political and technical 
methodological challenges remain. Just like in the regulated CDM forestry market 
currently in place, understanding existing challenges and obstacles is critical to a 
successful national policy formulation process. The potential for additional ecosystem 
goods and services under an international REDD scheme must push forward domestic 
instrumental action in areas such as effective protective and taxation laws and 
regulations, local and traditional community involvement and a clear and stable 
property and land tenure regime. Additionality, regional socio-economical barriers must 
be identified and national development goals clearly stated to maximizing the potentials 
of a REDD scheme.544 
d. Ecological and Socio-Economical Hurdles 
According to the IPCC's 2000 special report on LULUCF, forestry projects in 
the CDM "aiming to mitigate climate change may provide socio-economic and 
environmental benefits primarily within project boundaries, although they may also 
pose risks of negative impacts.,,545 Even within the voluntary market, with promising 
additional ecosystem services for avoided deforestation activities, proper environmental 
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 227, 233 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Pennanence can be assured in a compensated reduction mechanism by requiring 
participating countries that increase deforestation (emissions) above the levels of their base periods 
subsequently to assume the surplus emitted as an obligatory reduction goa1."). 
543 See Charlotte Streck et aI., Creating Incentives for Avoiding Further Deforestation: The Nested 
Approach, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 237, 
245 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("[I]n 
case of future emissions above the target emission level, the implementing country could choose to (1) 
offset the excess emissions by canceling REDD credits from its reserve account or by acquiring REDD 
credits from other implementing countries' reserve accounts (2) overcomply in the subsequent 
verification period by a quantity of emission reductions equivalent to the excess deforestation emissions 
of the previous verification period; or (3) request an adjustment of its target emission level for the 
subsequent verification period, arguing justifiable reasons of force majeure (such as large-scale forest 
destruction due to extreme climatic events and their consequences, war, terrorism, and so forth) or 
improvements in the availability of data and methods."). 
544 See Stephan. Schwartzman and Paulo Moutinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding Developing 
Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND 
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 227, 231 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("[I]n all large remaining or future tropical forest frontiers, governments must 
substantially invest in long-term governance frameworks (monitoring and enforcement capability, 
organization ofland tenure, and allocation of property rights) before carbon compensation can become a 
direct economic alternative for individuals and companies. "). 
545 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC SPECIAL REpORT: LAND USE, 
LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY ("LULUCF") - SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 15 (2000), available 
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/srlulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter IPCC SPECIAL REpORT ON LULUCF]. 
124 
impact analyses can reveal adverse obstacles obstructing a proposed project. Within the 
Kyoto regulated forest market, environmental and socio-economic impacts were 
expressly embraced by the CDM Executive Board's baseline and additionality 
guidelines. They include investment, institutional, technological and local tradition 
related barriers, obstacles due to prevailing practices, local ecological and social 
conditions and challenges relating to property rights.546 Moreover, the climate change 
legal regime required a socio-economic analysis whenever deemed relevant by the 
country hosting the project or the project participants.547 
In light of the Atlantic Rainforest historical, environmental and socio-
economical background described above,548 some of these obstacles are of particular 
relevance. According to the CDM Executive Board's guideline for the selection of a 
baseline and demonstration of additionality, any environmental and socio-economical 
barriers preventing a projected baseline scenario must be identified. Once they have 
been identified, additionality is confirmed if those barriers can be overcome by the 
implementation of a CDM afforestation/reforestation project.549 Albeit not regulated 
and not always mandatory, the same concept is carried over to the voluntary market 
upon which lies the expectation that the implementation of a forestry project is able to 
raise business-as-usual socio-economical standards. Below, this study identifies 
specific socio-economical challenges recurrent to the Atlantic Rainforest biome in 
general that can be overcome by forest market initiatives. 
i. Conversion of Old-Established Matnre Forests Into Fast-
Growing Commercial Tree Plantations 
546 See Meeting ofthe Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board a/the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities, ~ 29 U.N. Doc 
CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
547 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference a/the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First Session, Decision SleMP. 1 Annex, , 12(c), U.N. 
DOC FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.l (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-] Report - Part Twol. 
548 See above Chapter 2.d. 
549 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanz'sm Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities,' 29 U.N. Doc 
CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
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One ofthe major concerns during the negotiations over allowable forestry 
activities under the Kyoto market-based approach was that a vast array of practices 
could encourage the replacement of mature forests by fast-growing commercial tree 
plantations with higher rates of carbon sequestration550 Commercial tree plantations 
are recurrent within the Atlantic Rainforest biome to feed the demands of the country's 
most industrialized areas.55 ] However, that was addressed by Decision II/CP.7 
imposing a historical baseline to the definitions of afforestation and reforestation 
practices.552 For qualifYing as a forestry project under the CDM, the proponent has to 
demonstrate that the land had not been forest for at least fifty years and on areas that 
were not forest on 31 December 1989.553 That enjoined project developers from 
deforesting an area for further reforestation seeking the revenues of carbon credits 
thereof. 
Two additional approaches to avoid harmful conversions are: 1) allowing for 
REDD types of projects; 2) including accountability requirements for carbon emissions 
associated with deforestation/degradation practices prior to any forested land is replaced 
with and/or converted into fast-growing commercial tree plantations.554 Even though 
mature forests do not enjoy the same carbon sequestration rates than fast-growing' 
forests, they have carbon storage potentials that can be equally credited in the form of 
"avoided emissions.,,555 Within the Kyoto regulated market, though, some degree of 
flexibility with respect to the requirement that forest activities must be "human-
550 See Janine Bloomfield & Holly L. Person, Land use, Land-use Change, Forestly, and Agricultural 
Activities in the Clean Development Mechanism: Estimates a/Greenhouse Gas Offiet Potential, 5 
MmGA TION ADAPTATION STRA TEGlES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 9, 12 (2000) (expressing a concern prior to 
the regulation ofCDM forestry activities that afforestation/reforestation practices could incentivize the 
replacement of old-growth mature forest by fast-growing tree plantations). 
551 See Andre Giacini de Freitas, Manejo [Forest Management], in ALMANAQUEBRASIL 
SOCIOAMBIENTAL285, 287 (Beta Ricardo and Maura Campanili eds., 2008) (noting the high occurrence 
of tree plantations on the Atlantic Rainforest biome). 
552 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties (Volume 1), Decision ll/CP.7 Annex, U.N. DOC FCCCICP/2001113/Add.1 
(Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume 1)]. 
553 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties (Volume JJ. Decision IIICP. 7 Annex, U.N. DOC FCCCICP/2001113/Add.1 
(Jan. 21,2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report - Part Two (Volume JJ]. 
554 See Janine Bloomfield & Holly L. Person, Land use, Land-use Change, Forestry, and Agricultural 
Activities in the Clean Development Mechanism: Estimates of Greenhouse Gas Offset Potential, 5 
MmGATION ADAPTAT]ONSTRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 9, 12 (2000) ("[A]s long as carbon dioxide 
emissions associated with deforestation are taken into account (i.e., a full carbon accounting), replacing 
mature forests with plantations will generally not yield a net carbon benefit. "). 
555 See Mark C. Trexler & Laura H. Kosloff, The 1997 Kyoto Protocol: TiVhat does it Mean For Project-
Based Climate Change Mitigation?, 3 MITIGATION ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 1, 29 
(1998) (arguing agains~ limiting forestry projects to afforestation and reforestation activities). 
induced" would have to be provided in order to allow for avoided 
deforestation! degradation activities.556 
ii. Impacts on Ecosystem Services 
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A proper assessment of perverse incentives in the forestry market-based scheme, 
such as the above described conversion of mature forests on fast growing commercial 
tree plantations, is critical for a variety of potential additional ecosystem services other 
than just climate change mitigation. In that sense, forest market-based schemes allowing 
for avoided deforestation practices, biodiversity and all related ecosystem services stand 
to benefit considerably. Considering the potential irreversibility of some the adverse 
impacts, environmental analyses are of crucial importance. 
On the one hand, introduction of alien species,557 increases in erosion 
processes558 and the impairment of hydrological cycles and water resources are among 
the potential threats posed by afforestation!reforestation project activities.559 On the 
other hand, if well designed and planned, any forestry activity can generate some 
positive environmental impacts and raise sustainability standards of a host country or 
region hosting the project.560 An SBSTA synthesis report on projects conducted during 
the AIJ Pilot Phase identified some of those positive impacts on natural ecosystems, 
such as improvements in water quality and reductions in the erosion of hydrological 
resources.561 
556 See MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT 79 (1999) (noting 
that some Parties at the Kyoto Protocol negotiations did not want to confer credits for activities that were 
naturally occurring). 
557 See Jason Schwartz, Note, "Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know": How Kyoto May Change Who 
Controls Biodiversity, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 421, 423 n.6 (2006) (noting the fierce debate over allowing 
invasive species (also known as alien, exotic, or non-indigenous species) to be used in CDM reforestation 
projects). 
558 See Robert 1. Zomer et al., Carbon, Land and Water: A Global Analysis of the Hydrologic Dimensions 
a/Climate Change Mitigation through AfJorestationiReforestation 3 (International Water Management 
Institute, Research Report No. 101,2006). 
559 See id at 3-5. 
560 It is worth noting that the same provisions in the climate change regime designed to protect 
biodiversity are extended to the protection of natural ecosystems. See Conference of the Parties Serving 
as the M.eeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session 
- Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference a/the Parties Serving as the Meeting afthe Parties at its 
First SeSSion, Decision 5/CMP.!, Annex, ~ 12 (c), U.N. Doc FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/81 Add.! (Mar. 30, 
2006) [hereinafter COPIMOP-J Report-Part Two]. 
561 See above Chapter 4. 
( 
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In selecting a baseline scenario under the CDM Executive Board's guidelines, 
project developers identified ecological barriers impeding the natural regeneration of an 
area within the Atlantic Forest. Because legally protective provisions do not require 
human-induced regeneration practices, project developers were successful in 
demonstrating au "[ u]nfavourable course of ecological succession" due to the 
occurrence of"[p]ervasive species preventing regeneration oftrees.,,562 Interestingly, 
this ecological barrier was contrary to the spirit of the law mandating the laudowner to 
set the area aside for the purpose of natural regeneration. But what legislators did not 
take into account was ecological barriers are often present and can prevent natural 
regeneration. Thus, within the Atlautic Rainforest, this is a clear example of an 
environmental hurdle overcome by the implementation ofa forestry project activity. In 
any event, the guidelines for the selection of a baseline scenario and assessment of 
additionality provide a list of possible barriers due to ecological conditions that include: 
degraded soil, catastrophic natural and/or human-induced events, unfavourable 
meteorological conditions and biotic pressure in terms of grazing aud fodder 
collection.563 
Considering the size of the region encompassed by the Atlantic forest and its 
different climatic patterns, those are all potential ecological barriers standing on the way 
of conservation aud regeneration poliCies that can be overcome with the implementation 
of a well designed and planned forestry project activity. Ultimately, because ecological 
barriers must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, only at the project level a more 
accurate assessment can disclose their occurrence. The bright side, as demonstrated by 
the above mentioned Atlantic Rainforest project, is that market-based forestry 
incentives once implemented have the potential to increase ecological staudards 
throughout the region and, with that, benefit the entire Atlantic Rainforest biome. 
iii. Socio-Economical Challenges 
562 See Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document for Reforestation and Afforestation 
Project-Activities, AES-Tiete Afforestation/Reforestation Project Activity Around the Borders of 
Hydroelectric Plant Reservoirs, ARNM0034, 2007, at 3, U.N. DOC FCCC/SB/2000IXX, Version 3, (Mar. 
5,2007). 
563 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board a/the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 19: 
Combined Tool to IdentifY the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate Additionality in AIR CDM Project 
Activities, U.N. DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. J 9,2007). 
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Another set of barriers listed by the CDM Executive Board of relevance to the 
Atlantic Rainforest region are those due to social conditions. As described above, the 
region faces major demographic pressure, but also widespread illegal practices and 
social conflicts between landless movements and landowners.564 These, in addition to 
the lack of skilled and trained labor force, are all social barriers listed by the CDM 
Executive Board's guidelines and that potentially face any forestry project activity 
undertaken on Atlantic Rainforest biome.565 
In practical terms, the region suffers from over exploitation of non-timber 
product extraction such as heart-of-palms and capture of exotic wildlife and flora for 
illegal trading.566 Social land conflicts between landless organized groups and farmers 
and ranchers are recurrent throughout many parts of the Atlantic Rainforest region.567 
These are serious problems that public policies have not yet managed to resolve.568 In 
that sense, forestry project activities in a case-by-case basis might be able to include and 
benefit low-income communities living from the illegal exploitation of the forest, 
assisting on promoting capacity-building and serving as an additional source of income 
constituting an additional instrument available to policy-makers.569 
564 See Mirian Prochnow, Mata Atlantica [Atlantic Forest], in ALMANAQUEBRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL 
144,153 (Beto Ricardo and Maura Campanili eds., 2008) (highlighting the threats facing the Atlantic 
Forest); see also Carlos Eduardo Frickmann Young, Socioeconomic Causes of Deforestation in the 
Atlantic Forest of Erozil, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 103, 104 (Carlos Galindo-Leal 
and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) (highlighting that within the period of contracting economic 
and demographic pressure, "the emergence of a class of workers who have lost their jobs or have become 
impoverished fanners, the "new poor", leads to exhaustion of remaining natural resources, further 
invasion afforest reserves, use of less suitable land for agricultural, and, ultimately perpetuation of cycles 
of poverty. "). 
565 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board o/the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 19: 
Combined Tool to IdentifY the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate Additionality in AIR CDM Project 
Activities, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
566 See Mirian Prochnow, Mata Atlantica [Atlantic Forest], in ALMANAQUEBRASIL SOCIOAMBIENTAL 
144,153 (Beto Ricardo and Maura Campanili eds., 2008). 
567 See Brazil's Landless Workers Movement official website, available at 
http://www.mstbraziI.org/?g-about(describingthe movement's work and activities within Brazil). 
568 See Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Atlantic Forest Hotspot Status: An Overview, 
in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 3, 10 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara 
eds., 2003) ("Despite the many legal instruments that have been devised to protect the Atlantic Forest 
hotspot, inhabitants continue to engage in many illegal activities. Logging, poaching of flora and fauna, 
and illegal settlements all contribute to the loss and deterioration of remaining forests. In addition, lack of 
coordination between government agencies, both federal and state, has resulted in contradictory policies, 
which in turn have had severe environmental consequences. "), 
569 See Janine Bloomfield et aI., Land-Use Change and FOl'estJY in the Kyoto Protocol, 5 MITIGATION 
ADAPTA nON STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 3, 6 (2000) ("[Flor projects to be conceived of, designed, 
and successfully implemented, stakeholder support, both by project funders and by the host countries and 
local communities is crucia1."), 
( 
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Once again, based on the experiences gained during forest project activities 
within the AU Pilot Phase570 and reported from the voluntary market practice,571 
LULUCF projects can significantly increase capacity-building and employment 
opportunities in developing countries. Moreover, forestry activities have the potential 
to benefit local communities through the transfer of new sound technologies and 
generate additional source of income to low-income populations.572 A social-economic 
analysis at the project level is capable of identifYing the existence of any social 
challenge and, therefore, serving as the means to meet the additionality requirement 
upon the selection ofa baseline scenario within a regulatory market,573 or just simply 
aimed at raising the region's social indicators within the voluntary market.574 
iv. Institutional and Legal Barriers 
TheCDM Executive Board's guidelines list a variety of different institutional 
and legal barriers ranging from land tenure, ownership, inheritance and property rights 
to risks related to the stability of the legal order and lack of environmental law 
compliance and enforcement instruments.575 Even though not enjoying outstanding 
510 See Seventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Bonn, F.R.G., 
October 20-29, 1997, Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Synthesis Report on 
Activities Implemented JOintly - Note by the Secretariat, 1 6(e), U.N. Doc FCCC/SBSTAlI997112 (Oct. 
7, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 SBSTA Report]. 
571 See The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance ("CCB"), The Monte Pascoal- Pau Brasil 
Ecological Corridor: Carbon, Community and Biodiversity Initiative - Monte Pascoal Farm - CPA#i, 7, 
available at http://wwVoi.climate-standards.onzlproiects/files/cpa dd caraiva.pdf (last visited 31 Mar., 
2009) (describing the socia-economic benefits upon project implementation). 
572 Even before tighter regulations on modalities and procedures for forestry projects in the CDM were 
promulgated at COP-9 in 2004, the !PCC had indicated that enabling local stakeholders to share the 
financial benefits of CDM forestry activities was a necessary social condition. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC" ), IPCC SPECIAL REpORT: LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE, AND 
FORESTRY ("LULUCF") - SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 1 90 (2000), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/srlulucf-e.pdf[hereinafter IPCC SPECIAL REpORT ON LULUCFj. 
573 See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10,2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties at its First Session, Decision 5ICMP.I Annex, ~ I2{c), U.N. 
Doc FCCCIKP/CMP/200518/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COP/MOP-1 Report - Part Two] 
(providing for a socio-economic impact assessment in case a preliminary analysis indicates the potential 
for adverse socio-economic impacts). 
574 See Katherine Hamilton et al., Carving a Niche for Forests in the Voluntary Carbon Markets, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 292, 294 (Charlotte 
Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) (highlighting the 
potential of forestry project activities in the voluntary m-arkets to "foster sustainable rural development 
and directly affect the lives of the poorest people."). 
575 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board afthe Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 19: 
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governance indicators, Brazil has a quite stable set of policies and laws and political 
stability.576 Consequently, that does not constitute a barrier worthy of further analysis 
for forestry projects within the Atlantic Rainforest region. With respect to lack of 
compliance and enforcement with protective laws and regulations, Chapter 6 below is 
entirely dedicated to this analysis. 
Even considering that over 70% of the Atlantic Rainforest biome falls within 
private property domain,577 Brazil still has an inefficient property rights legal and 
regulatory framework. 578 Information over property titles in Brazil is scattered and the 
country still lacks a uniform computerized consultation system.579 Illegal settlements 
and the lack of governmental action along with slow judicial response in addressing 
private property usurpation is an additional element inherit to Brazil.58o Under the 
examples provided by the CDM Executive Board's guidelines illustrative of barriers 
related to property rights, these aforementioned circumstances are likely to constitute an 
obstacle preventing the implementation of a forestry project in the Atlantic Rainforest 
region. Again, successful implementation of a forestry project can prove to be the 
overarching instrument capable of overcoming such barriers.58 ! Because 
implementation, monitoring and accounting rules require a clear set of ownership and 
property rights framework, carbon forest activities have the potential to influence 
positively the baseline scenario and, thus, be additional to what would otherwise happen 
without the proposed forestry project. 
Combined Tool to IdentifY the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate Additionality in AIR CDM Project 
Activities, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
576 See World Bank, The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project (2007), available at 
http://info.worldbank.of2/governance/wgi/index.asp (providing governance indicators for 212 countries 
and territories for six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence 
of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule oflaw and control of corruption). 
577 See above Chapter 2.d. 
578 See Doing Business, Measuring Business Regulations (2009), available at www.doingbusiness.org 
(listing Brazil in III th place in a rank of 181 countries on measuring the efficiency of registering 
property). 
579 See Doing Business, Measuring Business Regulations (2009), available at www.doingbusiness.org 
(describing the methodology and research for measuring registering property efficiency in 181 countries). 
580 See Ngai Pindell, Finding a Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in Brazil and in the 
United States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435, 448-49 (2006) ("Brazil has continually struggled with the 
tension between laws declaring strong protections for private property rights and other laws recognizing 
extra-legal claims to property possession and similar. characteristics of property ownership. It is possible 
that this tension merely exacerbates some state of chronic confusion and chaos within Brazilian property 
laws. New property laws, through quantity and contradiction, may effectively add more layers of 
confusion to existing property relationships and contribute to an increasing normalizing of extralegal 
solutions to most property disputes."). 
581 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), ,-r 29 
U.N. DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
( 
( 
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Other obstacles such as barriers related to markets, transport and storage; 
unregulated timber markets, remoteness and price risks while might be of applicability 
to few projects in the region, are not relevant for the development of a general policy 
analysis. Because the Atlantic Rainforest region is the most developed in the country, 
infrastructure, more efficient States and municipal institutions and higher community 
involvement constitute sufficient grounds for ruling out these aforementioned social 
barriers from which a general policy could be drawn. Ultimately, only a prior socio-
economic analysis on a project-by-project basis is able to effectively identifY and assess 
whether social barriers can be overcome by a forestry project-activity either in the 
regulated or voluntary forest carbon market. 
v. Other Socio-Economical Barriers 
The COM Executive Board's guidelines on the selection ofa baseline and 
assessment of additionality list a whole set of additional socio-economical barriers that 
may prevent the implementation of a forestry project activity. They include investment, 
economiclfinancial, technological obstacles and barriers due to prevailing practices and 
those related to local tradition.582 Once again, while these barriers might apply to a 
proposed project within the Atlantic Rainforest region, they must be addressed in a 
case-by-case basis rather than being part of a broader policy analysis proposed by this 
study. First, because the region by now has hosted several forestry project activities 
from the voluntary and regulatory markets which rules out the example listed for 
barriers due to prevailing practices as the project activity being "the first of its kind." 
Second, the Atlantic Rainforest is the most developed biome in Brazil and any 
traditional knowledge or the lack thereof, along with traditional equipment and lack of 
technology, while can be a problem for a few projects, are not likely to constitute a 
barrier due to the proximity and involvement of well developed research and scientific 
centers and organizations. Ultimately, investment, economic and financial barriers can 
only be detected on a case-by-case basis demonstrating that they can be overcome with 
582 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board a/the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), ~ 28 
U.N. DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
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the profits from the commercialization of the carbon credits arising from forestry project 
activities.583 
6. An Analysis of The Atlantic Rainforest Legal Framework and Relevant 
Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms in Light ofthe Regnlatory and 
Voluutary Carbon Forest Markets 
IdentifYing the legal and regulatory framework applicable to the Atlantic 
Rainforest and the available compliance and enforcement mechanisms is a required 
component in assessing whether the CDM forestry carbon market can assist on 
promoting forestry practices. If, for instance, an afforestation or reforestation activity is 
mandatory under an existing statute, it constitutes strong evidence the activity would 
have happened even in the absence of the market incentive.584 Consequently, unless the 
project developer is able to demonstrate that the mandatory statute is not enforced nor 
complied with in practice, the proposed forestry project-activity would fail the 
additionality test. 585 The reason of such a requirement was to avoid crediting of an 
activity that would have happen even without the market incentive, in which case the 
economic incentive loses its subsidiary nature upon which it was conceived in the first 
place.586 
583 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board a/the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), ~ 29 
U.N. DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
584 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Feb. 22-24, 
2006, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty Third Meeting Report Annex 19: 
National and/or Sectoral Policies and Circumstances in the Baseline Scenari%r Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities, at 1, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-23 (Feb. 24, 2006) ("2. As a general principle, 
national and/or sectoral policies and circumstances are to be taken into account on the establishment of a 
baseline scenario, without creating perverse incentives that may impact host Parties' contributions to the 
ultimate objective of the Convention."). 
585 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Feb. 22-24, 
2006, Executive Board a/the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty Third Meeting Report Annex 19: 
National and/or Sectoral Policies and Circumstances in the Baseline Scenari%r Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities, at 1, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-23 (Feb. 24, 2006) ("3. National and/or 
sectoral land-use policies or regulations, which give comparative advantages to afforestation/reforestation 
activities and that have been implemented since the adoption by the COP of the CDM M&P [decision 
17/CP.7, 11 November 2001], need not be taken into account in developing a baseline scenario [i.e. the 
baseline scenario could refer to a hypothetical situation without the national and/or sectoral policies or 
regulations being in place]."). 
586 The subsidiary nature of the carbon market under the CDM is clear under the additionality requirement 
of Article 12.5(c) of the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Art. 12 (5) (c), Dec. 10, 1997, 371.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; 
( 
( 
( 
133 
On the flip side, that creates a perverse incentive for countries not to develop 
forestry legislation, concerned with the concrete possibility of missing carbon market 
opportunities and the inflow offoreign capital associated to it. The reason is simple: 
why would legislators impose upon their own or upon domestic agricultural and 
industrial sectors the burden of reforestation and afforestation policies if they can count 
on foreign capital to do so? As noted above, enacting legislation on that end could 
jeopardize the promising inflow of external capital. But to avoid that from happening, 
the CDM Executive Board established that only national forestry legislation enacted 
before Decision 171CP. 7 of 200 1 would be considered in the development of a baseline 
scenario.587 In other words, countries hosting CDM forestry projects could then enact 
forestry legislation without fearing that those statutes would impair the additionality 
test. 
Moreover, the 200 1 onwards baseline for domestic forestry legislation has an 
exception to accommodate cases in which pre-200l policies mandating 
reforestation/afforestation practices are not enforced nor complied with in practice. In 
that sense, if a project developer can demonstrate that even though enacted, pre-200l 
forestry policies are not being put into place, then the proposed activity can be 
additional to what would have happened without it.588 That translates into using the 
carbon forest market as an enforcement and compliance tool additional to a pure 
command-and-control system. Such permission goes beyond the subsidiary nature of 
carbon markets limited to cases for which no mandatory policy is in place. It is a 
formal recognition that economic instruments can play an important function in the 
See R6mulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Biofuels and International Carbon Markets, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE CONFERENCE THE ENVlRONMENTALLA W PROGRAM AT PACE LAW SCHOOL- CELEBRATING 30 
YEARS OF ENVlRONMENTALLAW 38,40 (Virginia A. Curry & C. Nicole Simmons eds., 2007) ("The 
benefits of carbon credits generation from any innovative clean energy initiative must always be analyzed 
in light of its subsidiary nature and in comparison with the environmental benefits. In other words, due to 
the fact that international carbon markets have become extremely attractive to corporations and 
individuals interested in the great sums of money potentially involved in this type of transaction, many 
tend to view emissions trading programs as an end in themselves, as opposed to a means of achieving a 
higher environmental benefit."). 
587 Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Feb. 22-24, 
2006, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty- Third Meeting Report Annex 19: 
National and/or Sectoral Policies and Circumstances in the Baseline Scenario for Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities, at 1, U.N. Doc CDM-EB·23 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
588 Meeting of the Executiv€? Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Feb. 22-24, 
2006, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty Third Meeting Report Annex 19: 
National and/or Sectoral Policies and Circumstances in the Baseline Scenari%r Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities, at 1, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-23 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
State's traditional role based upon a command-and-control system of promoting 
compliance with and enforcement of domestic environmentallaws.589 
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In either of the above stated carbon market roles, identifying the Atlantic 
Rainforest regulatory framework and relevant compliance and enforcement provisions 
is essential to understanding whether carbon forest markets are effective in promoting 
environmentally sound forestry practices in the region. Obviously, the detailed 
examination of the domestic forest legal framework below is only relevant for those 
regulated areas within the Atlantic biome. For areas being put into a productive use 
upon which no regulatory conservation and preservation easement exist likewise upon 
which there is no afforestation, reforestation or regeneration mandatory requirement, no 
legal analysis is necessary to assess whether a proposed-forestry activity is additional to 
a business-as-usual scenario or to understand how carbon markets can maximize 
compliance with existing regulations. Rather, for areas upon which no forestry 
restriction or regeneration mandatory requirement is in place, the decision is market 
driven, meaning that if the productive use in place renders more profits than the 
revenues from carbon markets, the business-as-usual scenario tends to remain 
unchanged and vice-versa.590 In such a case, the above stated socio-economic barriers 
listed by the CDM Executive Board's guidelines on the selection of a baseline and 
assessment of additionality must be examined.59 ! 
i. The Brazilian Forest Constitutional Framework 
SS9 See Rodrigo Sales & Bruno Kerlakian Sabbag, Environmental Requirements and Additionality Under 
the Clean Development Mechanism - A Legal Review Under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Brazilian Legal Framework on Climate Change, in 2005 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF OSLO UNIVERSITY 235,244 (Oxford Press, 2005) ("[Wle are convinced that 
the CDM must be understood as a compliance promotion tool for the objectives of the convention as well 
as for domestic policies and legal requirements towards GHG mitigation. "). 
590 See Rosimeiry Portela et al., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTIJNlTIES 
11,13 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson·Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
("Whereas the private benefits of forest exploitation are valued through the market, social benefits are not 
valued in the market without some type of policy intervention. Because landowners do not face the full 
costs of their actions in terms of foregone ecosystem services, they often use resources unsustainably, 
leading to inefficient allocation of forest resources and the services they provide for greater human well-
being. Private landowners behave in these ways because the marginal private henefits of their cleared 
land (for example, the monetary return from crop cultivation) are not balanced against the marginal costs 
to society cfforest loss (for example, losses of important forest services)."). 
591 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 19: 
Combined Tool to Identify the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate Additionality in AIR CDM Project 
Activities, U.N. DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
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Since declaring independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil has enacted seven 
constitntions.592 The last and most recent one was enacted in 1988 right after the re-
democratization following the military dictatorship that ran from 1964 to 1985.593 The 
term "forest" and/or "flora" were used in previous constitutional texts, although, not 
within the environmental protection context 594 Forests, like environmental protection in 
general, were indirectly treated by previous constitutions within the health protection 
and legislative jurisdictions' contexts.595 
With the advent of the 1988 Constitution, the Brazilian "flora" and "forests", 
along with a whole Chapter solely dedicated to environmental protection, gained 
constitntional statns and protection. This Chapter VI of the Brazilian Constitntion 
explicitly states a Government duty to protect forests and regenerate deforested areas. It 
recognizes their direct and indirect environmental benefits, properties and featnres for 
present and future generations.596 Article 225 states that "[a]ll have the right to an 
ecologically balanced environment, which is an asset of common use and essential to a 
healthy quality of life, and both the Government and the community shall have the duty 
to defend and preserve it for present and futnre generations.".597 This article serves as 
the lens through which all the natnral resources' constitutional protective provisions 
shall be read. 
592 The Brazilian Constitutions were enacted in chronological order as follow: March 25, 1824; February 
24,1891; July 16, 1934; November 10, 1937; September 18, 1946; January 1, 1967 and October 5,1988. 
See generally JosE AFONSO DA SILVA, CURSO DEDIREITO CONSTITUCIONALPOSITIVO [POSITfVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LA W COURSE] 69-90 (Malheiros Editores 2008) (1976) (BRAZ.) (detailing the political 
and constitutional history and evolution in Brazil). 
593 See generally Marcus Faro de Castro and Maria Izabel Valladao de Carvalho, Globalization and 
Recent Political Transitions in Brazil, 24 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 465, 467-468 (2003), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stableIJ601633 (detailing the different political cycles in Brazil, including the 1964-
85 military dictatorship government, during the 1900s) 
594 See TERESA CRISTINA DE DEUS, TUTELA DA FLORA EM FACE DO DIRElTO AMBIENTAL BRASILEIRO 
[PROTECTION OF THE FLORA IN LIGHT OF THE BRAZILIAN ENVTRONMENTALLA w] 94-96 (Editora Juarez de 
Oliveira 2003) (2003) (BRAZ.) (providing a historical constitutional overview of the terms "forest" and 
"flora" in the Brazilian constitutions). 
595 See JOSE AFONSO DA SILVA, DIREITO AMBIENTAL CONSTITUCIONAL [ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 46 (Malheiros Editores 2007) (1994) (BRAZ.) (stating that out of the most recent 
constitutions, only the 1946 one contained health protection and legislative jurisdiction provisions which, 
in turn, inspired a whole set of infra-constitutional environmental protection laws, such as the Forest, 
Public Health and Water Codes). 
596 See JOSE AFONSO DA SILVA, DrREITO AMBIENTAL CONSTITUCIONAL [ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 46 (Malheiros Editores 2007) (1994) (BRAZ.) (affirming that the 1988 Brazilian 
Constitution is an Environmental Constitution, one that deals with environmental matters in a vast and 
modern way). 
597 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil ("Constituic;ao da Republica Federativa do Brazil") 
[C.F.] art. 225 (1988). See also The Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University, available 
at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/ConstitutionslBrazillbrazil.html (providing an English version of the 
Brazilian 1988 Constitution). 
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This innovative environmental chapter made its way into the 1988 Constitution 
after a long history of evolving institutional and regulatory framework launched after 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment.598 Following this 
landmark international agreement, Brazilian environmental law evolved consistently up 
until the 1988 Constitution and afterwards599• Some paramount pillars ofthis evolution 
include the creation ofa Special National Secretariat on the Environment in 1973, the 
1981 National Environmental Policy Act and the Civil Action Act of 1985 along with 
other sectoral protective statutes in areas such as liability for damages from nuclear 
activities and an industrial pollution control act.600 
Regulatory action in Brazil generated the momentum for the post-military period 
in 1986 when the then new established democratic government launched the debate over 
the 1988 Constitution. But the insertion of environmental law into a whole chapter in 
the Constitution was only effective because of the civil society's pressure upon 
legislators. This lobby was led by important non-governmental organizations 
influencing the constitutional decision-making process allowing for the reception of a 
chapter on environmental law under a title dealing with the Social Order.601 
With a new constitutional order in place, legislators, public administrators and 
the civil society as a whole was confronted with the implementation challenge of those 
general environmental principles broadly stated in the Constitution.602 In order to 
promote compliance and enforcement with these provisions, specifically those regarding 
forest protection and conservation, Chapter VI imposes upon the Government the duty 
to "defme, in all units of the Federation, territorial spaces and their components which 
are to receive special protection. Any alterations and suppressions being allowed only 
598 See generally PAULO AFFONSO LEME MACHADO, DIREITO AMBIENTAL BRASILEIRO [BRAZILIAN 
ENVIRONMENTALLAwj58-59 (Malheiros Editores 2008) (1982) (BRAZ.) (explaining that the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment influenced the evolution of Brazilian environmental 
law). 
599 See generally Luiz Fernando Henry Sant'Anna, General Overview a/Brazilian Environmental Law, 
15-SPG INT'L L. PRACTlCUM22, 22-23 (2002) (detailing in chronological order the regulatory and 
institutional framework of Brazilian environmental law). 
600 See generally Ems MILARE, DIREITO DO AMBIENTE [DIE LAW OF THEENVIRONMENTjI40-142 
(Malheiros Editores 2005) (2000) (BRAZ.) (detailing the history of environmental law in Brazil since the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment). 
601 See PAULO AFFONSO LEME MACHADO, DIREITO AMBIENTAL BRASILEIRO [BRAZILIAN 
ENVIRONMENTALLAWj122 (Malheiros Editores 2008) (1982) (BRAZ.) (describing how after the indirect 
election of a civilian president in 1985 and through the lobbying of non-governmental organizations a 
proposal of an environmental chapter was presented to legislators in charge of the constitutional reform). 
602 See Colin Crowford & Guilherme Pignataro, The Insistent (And Unrelenting) Challenges OJ 
Protecting Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding "The Law That Sticks", 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1,6 
(2007) (describing the overall feeling of the Brazilian society "that there is a difference between writing a 
law and enforcing it. The challenge, Brazilians say, is to write a 'a lei que pega' - 'a law that sticks. "'.). 
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by means of law, and any use which may harm the integrity of the attributes which 
justity their protection being forbidden:,,603. Even more specifically, article 225, 
paragraph I. VII mandates the govermnent to protect "the fauna and the flora, with 
prohibition, in the manner prescribed by law, of all practices which represent a risk to 
their ecological function, cause the extinction of species or subject animals to 
cruelty.,,604. Together with the aforementioned constitutional protection declaring the 
Atlantic Rainforest a national patrimony,605 these provisions form the core basis for the 
Brazilian forest constitutional framework. 
However, worthy of noticing is that many constitutional provisions are not self-
executing provisions.606 In article 225, paragraph LVII stated above, the provision is 
clear when it uses the term: "in the manner prescribed by law". Therefore, the 
Constitution often provides general guidance upon the legislature to prescribe more 
specific commands aiming at implementing the general principles and provisions 
therein, the so-called, in constitutional law, not self-executing provisions.607 In this 
sense, in spite of the Brazilian constitutional forest protection provisions, including 
those of the Atlantic Rainforest, and considering their dependence upon more specific 
603 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil ("Constituiyao da Republica Federativa do Brazil") 
[C.F.] art. 225, par. 4.III (1988). See also The Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown 
University, available at http://pdba.e:eorgetown.eduiConstitutions/Brazilibrazil.html (providing an 
English version of the Brazilian 1988 Constitution), 
604 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil ("Constituiyao da Republica Federativa do Brazil") 
[C.F.] art. 225, par. 4.VII (1988). See also The Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown 
University, available at http://pdba.georgetowTI.eduIConstitutions/Brazilibrazil.html(providing an 
English version of the Brazilian 1988 Constitution). 
605 See Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil ("Constituiyao da Republica Federativa do 
Brazil") [C.F.] art. 225, par. 4 (1988) ("The Brazilian Amazonian Forest, the Atlantic Forest, the Serra do 
Mar, the Pantanal Mato-Grossense and the coastal zone are part of the national patrimony, and they shall 
be used, as provided by law, under conditions which ensure the preservation of the environment, therein 
included the use of mineral resources."). See also The Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown 
University, available at http://pdba.f!eorgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/brazil.html(providing an 
English version of the Brazilian 1988 Constitution). 
606 On this topic, an analogy can be drawn with the American distinction between "mandatory" and 
"directory" constitutional provisions. See generally Walter F. Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforcible Provisions 
a/Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 54, 82 (1931) ("If the people in framing a constitution or a 
constitutional amendment desire to make sure that a provision will be effective without reliance upon 
action within the uncontrolled discretion of the legislature, they must put the matter into the constitution 
in such detail and in such form that it becomes self-executing."). 
607 See JOSE AFONSO DA SILVA, APLICABILIDADE DAS NORMAS CONSTITUCIONAIS [CONSTITUTIONAL 
NORMS ApPLICABILITV] 73 (Malheiros Editores 2007) (2008) (BRAZ.) (categorizing Brazilian 
constitutional norms into self-executing provisions and not self-executing provisions). For an analogy 
with self-executing and non-self executing provisions in American constitutional law, see also Walter F. 
Dodd, Judicially Non-Eriforcible Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 54, 83 (1931) ("Self-
executing provisions are, of course, also limitations [and mandatory limitations] upon the legislature, in 
that they occupy a field previously occupied by the legislature, and in that the legislature may not run 
counier to them. Implications against legislative power are easily drawn from such provisions. When the 
constitution directly legislates it reduces legislative power often to as great an extent as when it directly 
prohibits or restrict legislative action. "). 
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laws and regulations,60s they cannot be deemed as national and/or sectoral set of policies 
capable of influencing the selection of a baseline scenario under the Kyoto Protocol 
rules.609 Once again, that is worthy reiterating in light of the CDM Executive Board 
special requirement oftaking into consideration pre-200l national andlor sectoral 
policies and circumstances in the establishment of a baseline scenario.610 On tbe 
contrary, assuming those constitutional protective provisions were not dependent upon 
more specific set oflaws and regulations (self-executing provisions), the 1988 
Constitution itself could theoretically enjoin a proposed project to pass the 
aforementioned additionality test imposed for CDM reforestation/afforestation activities 
by the CDM Executive Board. 
But the most important legal analysis of carbon forest markets in light of the 
Brazilian forest constitutional framework is whether the usage of economic instruments 
is allowed under the general prohibition to pollute. Antonio Benjamin, a prominent 
environmental scholar in Brazil and Justice oftbe Superior Court of Appeals, has noted 
that "Brazilian legal scholars and judges have stressed the nonexistence of a 'right-to-
pollute'. The doctrine consistently rejects the idea that envirornnentallaw, through its 
instruments, can allow the polluter to state 'I pollute, but I pay.",.611 The rationale is 
that the constitution features the envirornnent as a diffuse right, meaning that while the 
right of a healthy envirornnent is one of every Brazilian inhabitant, it also belongs to the 
collectivity as a whole and that, therefore, cannot be individualized. This makes it a 
transindividual right impossible to individualize it for every citizen. In tum, this notion 
converts the right to a healthy environment into an inalienable set of values that cannot 
608 See Jose Carlos Carvalho, Policy Initiatives/or the Conservation of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest, in 
THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUrnAMERICA 133, 133 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmilo Camara 
eds., 2003) ("The chapter in the constitution devoted to the environment specifically refers to the national 
heritage of the Atlantic Forest and states that its use, including the use of its natural resources, shall be 
governed by law under conditions that ensure its preservation."). 
609 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Feb. 22-24, 
2006, Executive Board a/the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty Third Meeting Report Annex 19: 
National and/or Sectoral Policies and Circumstances in the Baseline Scenari%r Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities, at I, U.N. DOC CDM-EB-23 (Feb. 24, 2006) (establishing as a general 
principle the requirement to take into consideration existing national and/or sectoral policies and 
circumstances in the definition of a baseline scenario aiming at avoiding perverse negative legislation 
incentives). 
610 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Feb. 22-24, 
2006, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty Third Meeting Report Annex 19: 
National and/or Sectoral Policies and Circumstances in the Baseline Scenario for Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities, at I, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-23 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
611 Antonio Herman Benjamin & Charles Weiss, Jr., Economic and Market Incentives as Instruments of 
Environmental Policy in Brazil and the United States, 32 TEX.lNT'LL. 1. 67, 72 (1997). 
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be measured economically nor can it be tradable by its trustee: the government. 612 With 
that, a fair interpretation of the Brazilian Constitution would be that an emissions 
trading scheme could result in a "right-to-pollute" for the buyer of the carbon credit and, 
hence, be deemed unconstitutional. 613 
Nonetheless, that is not valid for the CDM forestry carbon market or any other 
emissions trading scheme that is project-based and that generate credits to industrial 
facilities outside Brazil. Project-based programs, like the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol, 
is also categorized as baseline-credit system, meaning that polluters with emissions 
reduction targets to meet, like the ones imposed upon developed countries by the Kyoto 
Protocol, are allowed to acquire offsetting credits through investment in project-based 
activities elsewhere. Once a baseline is established for the project and additionality is 
verified, the difference between emissions without the project and those with the 
implemented project-activity can be used as emissions credits for compliance with the 
quantified emissions reduction caps imposed upon developed countries.614 
Thus, the above described dynamics of the CDM forestry carbon market is not 
unconstitutional in Brazil, first, because emissions would take place outside the 
jurisdiction of the Brazilian Constitution and, as a consequence, the constitutionality test 
of project-based market mechanisms would be void. Second, negotiators at COP-7 
carefully inserted the language under "Principles, nature and scope of the mechanisms 
pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol" clearly stating "that the Kyoto 
Protocol has not created or bestowed any right, title or entitlement to emissions of any 
kind on Parties included in Annex 1".615 It is reasonable, therefore, to construe that no 
612 See Antonio Gidi, Class Action in Brazi/- A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMPo L. 311, 
351 (2003) ("The concept of a 'transindividual right' [or 'supra-individual right'] merely means that the 
right is not individual, but exists as an entity distinct from any individual or group of individuals. It 
transcends the individual and yet it is not a mere collection of individual rights. Therefore, it is legally 
irrelevant to determine which individuals belong to the group and are, ultimately, the holders of the 
transindividual right. A 'transindividual' right, such as the purity of the air, the cleanliness of the a river, 
the truthfulness of advertisements, or the safety of products, belongs to the community as a whole, not to 
specific individuals, or associations, nor to the government. In economic terms, it consists of a 'public 
good.' Therefore, this right is situated halfway between public and private law."). 
613 See Lurz GUILHERME MARIN ON!, TUTELA INIBITORIA (INDIVIDUAL E COLETIVA) 94 (Editora Revista 
dos Tribunais 2006) (1998) (BRAZ.) (writing about the how the possibility of damage recovery within 
environmental law as opposed to preventive measures could legitimize a right-to-pollute and, therefore, 
be contrary to the Brazilian constitutional framework). 
614 See generally Dennis Hirsch, Andrew Bergman & Michael Heintz, Emissions Trading - Practical 
Aspects, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 627, 629-630 (2007) (distinguishing in deeper 
details the conceptual differences between a baseline-credit and a cap-and-trade market system). 
615 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, 
Report o/the Conferenc'e o/the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties (Volume II), Decision 15/CP.7 pmb!., U.N. Doc FCCCICP/2001113/Add.2 (Jan. 
21,2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report-Part Two (Volume II)]. 
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pollution right was conferred or will be bestowed upon developing countries as well. 
Third, and most importantly, since the Brazilian signature and ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, Brazil incorporated the treaty and its regulations thereof into the country's 
national legal framework.616 In other words, by accepting to serve as a hosting country 
for CDM forestry project-activities under Kyoto regulations, emissions in a developed 
country thereof is legal under Brazilian law and, therefore, valid under the Brazilian 
Constitution. And finally, according to Principle 16 ofUNCED economic instruments 
shall be used by national authorities.617 
On the other hand, with respect to alternative carbon forestry markets taking 
place solely within Brazil, the constitutional framework also poses no obstacle. First, 
because in the absence of a domestic mandatory cap on greenhouse gases emissions, 
there is no constitutional limitation to a company's will to offset its activities by 
voluntarily deciding to reforest a degraded area, for instance.618 Second, because no 
limitation whatsoever can be found in the language of article 225 of the Brazilian 
Constitution to the use of market-based economic incentives.619 In the absence ofa 
constitutional prohibition, reference to article 90fthe 1981 National Environmental 
616 See Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil ("Constitui9ao da Republica Federativa do 
Brazil") [C.F.] art. 5,12" (1988). See also The Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown 
University, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/ConstitutionslBrazillbrazil.html ("The rights and 
guarantees expressed in this Constitution do not exclude others deriving from the regime and from the 
principles adopted by it, or from the international treaties in which the Federative Republic of Brazil is a 
party."). 
617 See Rio Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED"), 
Principle 16, June 14, 1992, 311.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). 
618 Indeed, art. 170. VI of the Brazilian Constitution brings about the concept of sustainable development, 
conditioning economic development upon the protection of the environment. Additionally, article 186 
states that the social function of a property is fulfilled whenever it is inspired by environmental 
preservation and sustainable natural resources management. Voluntary reforestation/afforestation, 
preservation and/or conservation measures are aligned with the constitution. See Constitution of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil ("Constitui,ao da Republica Federativa do Brazil") [C.F.] art. 170, VlI 
(1988). See also The Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University, available at 
http://pd ba. georgetown. ed ulConstituti onslBrazilibrtitl e 7.html. 
619 See Antonio Herman Benjamin & Charles Weiss, Jr., Economic and Market Incentives as Instruments 
of Environmental Policy in Brazil and the United States, 32 TEx.1NT·LL. J. 67, 72·73 (1997) ("As we 
have already mentioned, in its chapter on the environment, the 1988 Federal Constitution of Brazil makes 
no mention of the EMIEP ['Economic and Market Incentives as Instruments of Environmental Policies']' 
On the contrary, a reading of its detailed text seems to indicate the option of a CAC ['Command-and-
Control] system. Expressions such as 'prohibition', 'control', 'punitive and administrative sanctions,' and 
'obligation to repair damages' are used liberally. Despite this typical CAC language, no prohibition or 
general limitation can be drawn on the use ofEMIEP. In our opinion, possible restrictions on these 
instruments would arise more from political, economic, and institutional conditions than from the text of 
the constitution."). 
Policy Act guarantees that economic mechanisms shall be used as instruments of 
environmental policy in Brazil.620 
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Having concluded that carbon forest markets are both constitutional and legal 
under the Brazilian legal regime, this study turns in the following sections to the 
analysis of the forest laws and regulations applicable to the Atlantic Rainforest. 
Whether there are mandatory reforestation/afforestation provisions in place, the date 
they were enacted and, most importantly, if they are being complied with or enforced, is 
crucial for determining ifthe CDM forestry market can be used at all in light of the 
CDM forestry baseline and additionality guidelines. Finally, a comprehensive 
regulatory assessment is essential to drawing a definite conclusion over the 
effectiveness of carbon forest markets in general for conservation and preservation 
practices in the Atlantic Rainforest biome. 
ii. Federal Forest Legal Framework and Compliance and 
Enforcement Mechanisms 
In a well designed command-and-control system with strong compliance and 
enforcement tools and institutions, subsidiary economic instruments are, in theory, 
restricted to a much smaller role, if any at all.621 Albeit not designed to replace an 
environmental regulatory regime, market mechanisms can act improving the scope of 
substantive laws maximizing efficiency of an existing command-and-control system.622 
But for that to happen in the context of the Atlantic forest, identification offlaws and 
bottlenecks of the existing legal framework is crucial. Within the CDM forestry carbon 
market context, whether there are laws prior to 2001 imposing mandatory regeneration 
620 National Environmental Policy Act 6.938/1981 ("Lei da Politica Nacional do Meio Ambiente") 
[PNMA] art. 9°.XIII (1981). 
621 See Jiirgen Lefevere, The EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS 75, 81 (Farhana Yamin ed., 2005) ("Typical command and control 
legislation functions through a permitting regime, under which a regulated activity is prohibited unless the 
operator of the activity has a permit. The permit determines the conditions under which the activity is 
allowed to take place and includes, in particular, limit values for emissions into various aspects of the 
environment, as well as monitoring and reporting provisions."). 
622 See T. H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 1 (2006) ("[T]raditional 
command-and-control regulatory measures, which depend upon government agencies to define not only 
the goals but also the means for reaching them, are in many cases insufficiently protective of those 
resources or economically inefficient."). 
of degraded areas and whether they were being complied with or enforced, are of 
particular importance for the analysis thereof.623 
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Despite historically and unsustainable natural resources exploitation and land 
use patterns, it was not until recently (late 80's and 90'S)624 that strong and more 
effective protective constitutional provisions, laws and regulations regarding the 
Atlantic Rainforest came into force.625 Currently, many laws and regulations are part of 
a comprehensive framework designed to protect the last remaining 7.26% of the forest 
and, to a certain extent, regenerate deforested areas.626 With the enactment of Law 
11.428 in 2006 and Decree.6.660 in 2008, after over five hundred years since the first 
wave of Europeans settlers, Brazil has put into place a legal framework specifically 
designed to protect and regulate the sustainable use and exploitation ofthe Atlantic 
Rainforest biome. 
Along with protective and sustainable development provisions, this Atlantic 
forest legal regime innovates when takes into consideration the biome's complex socio-
economic characteristics due to its vast area and diversity. Consequently, issues 
regarding traditional communities, small landowners, demographical differences, 
geographical nuances, population diversity, colonial history and development 
requirements were all taken into consideration by Law 11.428/2006 and Decree 
6.660/2008.627 Above all, the importance of this Atlantic forest legal framework has 
direct relationship to whether forest carbon markets can improve the existing command-
623 See above Chapter S.b.!!. 
624 See Ibsen de Gusmao Camara, Brie/History a/Conservation in the Atlantic Forest, in THE ATLANTIC 
FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 31,39 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) ("The 
first specific mention of the Atlantic Forest in Brazilian legislation appears in the Federal Constitution of 
1988."). 
625 See Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Mala Atlantica: Avan90s Legais 
e lnstitucionais Para sua Conservar;f1o Doc. 4 [Atlantic Rainforest: Legal and Institutional Evolution 
Towards Its Protection], Intro. (Andre R. Lima & Joao Paulo R. Capobianco orgs., 1997) (1997) available 
at http://www.socioambiental.org/banco imagens/pdfsll 0103.pdf (last visited Jul. 21, 2008) (stressing 
out that until very recently the only environmental protection law applicable to the Atlantic Rainforest 
was the general Forest Code from 1965). 
626 See Joao Paulo R. Capobianco, Situat;iio da Mata Altantica e a importancia de sua ConservOl;iio 
[Atlantic Rainforest Situation and the Importance of Conserving it], in ASPECTOS JURimcos DA 
PROTE<;:AO DA MATA ATLANTICA [JURlDICALASPECTS OF THE ATLANTIC RAINFOREST PRESERVATION] 9, 
13 (Andre R. Lima org., 2001) available at http://www.socioambiental.or.lbanco imagens/pdfs/44.pdf 
(last visited Jul. 22, 2008) (stating that for the first time the Brazilian legislation went beyond merely 
forest conservation to embrace forest regeneration). 
627 See Marga Barth Tessller, Reflexoes Sobre a Tutela Juridica da Mata Atlantica [Reflexions About the 
Atlantic Rainforest Legal Protection], in ASPECTOS JURiDICOS DA PROTE<;:AO DA MA TA ATLANTICA 
[JURIDICAL ASPECTS OF THE ATLANTIC RAINFOREST PRESERVATION] 25,26 (Andre R. Lima org., 200 I) 
available at http://www.socioambiental.orglbanco imagens/pdfs/44.pdf (last visited Jul. 22, 2008) 
(pointing out that one interesting feature of the Decree 750/93 was the fact that it stated what could be 
done in the Atlantic Rainforest bio.me, instead of what could not be done. That included the requirements 
of environmental preservation, but also the needs for economic development). 
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and-control system. IdentifYing and understanding the historical evolution of such 
provisions within the forest's legal framework is a condition to examining degrees of 
compliance and enforceability of the system capable of influencing the selection of a 
baseline scenario. 
1. The 1965 Forest Code 
The 1965 Forest Code628 is the first law specifically designed and built on the 
1934 previous Code629 to regulate forests in general. This law created two types of 
protected forest areas, which are of national applicability as long as those areas fit the 
description prescribed by the norm. The first one is the "Area of Permanent 
Preservation", described as those areas defined by articles two and three of the Forest 
Code, covered or not by native vegetation with the environmental role of preserving 
water resources, aesthetics, geological stability, biodiversity, natural migration and flow 
of fauna and flora, protect the soil and gnarantee the well-being of human 
populations.63o Those areas include, for instance, riparian forests, top of mountains, 
hillsides, dunes, mangroves and other areas declared permanently protect by the 
government that are of particular environmental importance.631 
The second type of protected area in the 1965 Forest Code is the "Legal 
Reserve". This provision translates into an environmental limitation upon private 
property, imposing the requirement that a portion of the land shall be set uncultivated 
for the purpose of sustainable use of natural resources, conservation and rehabilitation 
of ecological processes, biodiversity conservation, habitat and fauna and flora 
protection.632 The limitation percentages vary according to the biome where the land is 
located. In the Atlantic Rainforest biome, a minimum of twenty percent shall remain 
untouched by landowners. For the purpose of the law, legal reserves cannot count as 
area of permanent preservation.633 That means, if a proprietor, for instance, has twenty 
percent of herihis property falling within the legal description set forth to be an area of 
628 See Law 4,77111965, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03ILeis/L477l.htm. 
629 See Decree 23.793 enacted on January 23rd, 1934 was the first Forest Code in force in Brazil, available 
at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/decretoIl930-1949/D23793.htm. 
630 See Law 4,77111965. art. I ~ 2.1I, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03/LeisIL477l.htm. 
631 See Law 4,77111965, arts. 2-3, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03ILeisIL477l.htrn. 
632 See Law 4,77111965, art. 1 ~ 2.111, available at http://\\lww.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03/Leis/L4771.htm. 
633 See Law 4,77111965, art. 16, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03/Leis/L477l.htm. 
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permanent preservation, necessarily an additional twenty percent of the land will have 
to be set aside to fulfill the requirement of a legal reserve.634 
Since the 1965 Forest Code was enacted, different laws and regulations changed 
and added to the original language ofthose protective provisions. The main changes 
were introduced by Law 7,803 of 1989635 and Executive Provisory Decree 2.166-67 of 
24 August 2001.636 The first altering the riparian limits set forth areas of permanent 
preservation, mainly, and the later, imposing different percentages of legal reserves per 
biome and not per region. Within the Atlantic forest's physical and geographical 
contexts and recalling that over 70% of the Atlantic Rainforest biome is private 
property,637 large areas of the region fit the definition of being either areas of permanent 
preservation or legal reserves. 
According to the baseline and additionality guidelines issued by the CDM 
Executive Board, existing national laws and regulations shall be taken into 
consideration.638 Therefore, a preliminary assessment would be enough to assess that 
those legally protected areas in the Atlantic forest are impeded to benefit from the CDM 
forestry carbon market, because the Forest Code provisions, including the legal changes 
thereafter, all predate November 2001. And that is the year from which domestic 
legislation need not to be taken into account for the selection of a baseline from which 
additionality is measured.639 
Assuming that the Forest Code command-and-control regime benefiting vast 
portions of the Atlantic forest is being consistently enforced and complied with, carbon 
forest markets, such as the CDM, are needless.64o But reality is rather a different one.641 
634 See Law 4,77111965, art. 16, available athttp://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/LeisIL477l.htm. 
635 See Law 7,803/1989, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/cciviI03/LEIS/L7803.htm#art2. 
636 See Executive Provisory Decree 2,166-67, (2001), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03IMPV/2166-67.htm#art. 
637 See Marga Barth Tessller, Reflexoes Sabre a Tutela Jurfdica da Mata Atlantica [Reflexions About the 
Atlantic Rainforest Legal Protection], in ASPECTOS JUIUDICOS DAPROTEc;AO DAMATA ATLANTICA 
[JURIDICAL ASPECTS OF TIIEATLANTIC RAINFOREST PRESERVATIONI25, 25 (Andre R. Lima org., 2001) 
available at http://www.socioambientaLorg/banco imagens/pdfs/44.pdf (last visited Jul. 22, 2008) 
(stating that approximately 73% of the Atlantic Rainforest fall within private property domain). 
638 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board o/the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool 
for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), U.N. 
DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
639 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Feb. 22-24, 
2006, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty Third Meeting Report Annex 19: 
National and/or Sectoral Policies and Circumstances in the Baseline Scenariofor Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-23 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
640 See Carlos Eduardo Frickmann Young, Socioeconomic Causes of Deforestation in the Atlantic Forest 
of Brazil, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 103, 113-114 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de 
Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) (suggesting that although novel protective legislation came into force in the 
( 
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Moreover, because those protective provisions are quite recent in comparison with the 
history of the Atlantic Rainforest settlement and natural resources exploitation, by the 
time they were enacted, the reality was that in most of the private properties within the 
biome, areas of penn anent preservation and legal reserves were already converted into 
agricultural use.642 In the absence of precise and comprehensive numbers for degraded 
portions ofthose legally protected areas within the Atlantic Rainforest biome, sparse 
studies and not up-to-date data suggest a trend ofnon-compliance.643 Because oftha!, 
many landowners and speculators envision the CDM forestry carbon market as a 
profitable opportunity to bring them into compliance with the areas of pennanent 
preservation and legal reserve requirements.644 
In support of the abovementioned non-compliance trend, a compilation of 
official reports and data is quite useful. First, the data presented by the INPE during the 
90s showed no significant progress in slowing down deforestation rates of the Atlantic 
forest.645 While this data does not specifies different areas, if of penn anent 
preservation, legal reserve or none of them, it constitutes a useful indication of a pattern 
that had those Forest Code provisions been enforced, it could reflect somehow 
late 90s, positive economic incentives are needed as complementary instruments capable of enhancing the 
effectiveness of the current command-and-control regime). 
641 See Heloisa Orlando, Implementat;tio da Reserva Legal- Oportunidade Para Expansiio da Mata 
Atlaneia no Sui da Bahia [Implementation of the Legal Reserve Area - Oportunity to Expand the Atlantic 
Rainforest in the South of Bahia 1 , in ASPECTOS JURiDICOS DAPROTE<;Ao DAMATAATLANTlCA [JUDICIAL 
ASPECTS OF THE ATLANTIC RAINFOREST PRESERVATloNI122, 122 (Andre R. Lima org., 2001) (IVaiiable 
at http://www.socioambiental.org/banco imagens/pdfs/44.pdf(last visited Jul. 22, 2008). 
642 See WARWICK MANFRlNATO ET AL, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, AREAS DE PRESERVA<;Ao 
PERMANENTE E RESERVA LEGAL NO CONTEXTO DA MlTlGA<;AO DE MUDAN<;AS CLIMA TlCAS - MUDAN<;AS 
CLlMATICAS, 0 CODIGO FLORESTAL, 0 PROTOCOLO DE QurOTO E 0 MECANISMO DE DESENVOLVlMENTO 
LrMPO, 17 (2005), (IVaiiable at 
http://www.celuloseonline.com.br/imagembankiDocslDocBanklnt5/Li vro Warwick1v1anfrinato.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2009) (stating that most of the deforestation of the areas of permanent preservation and 
legal reserve took place prior the enactment of protective legislation). 
643 See Carlos Eduardo Frickmann Young, Socioeconomic Causes of Deforestation in the Atlantic Forest 
of Brazil, in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 103, 104 (Carlos Galindo·Leal and Ibsen de 
Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) ("In all, the Atlantic Forest is being pressured by a system that drains its 
natural resources and is motivated almost completely by short-term thinking and an alarming absence of 
any value being put on long-term sustainabiJity ofland or on the interests of the poor."). 
644 See WARWICK MANFRlNATO ET AL, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, AREAS DE PRESERVA<;Ao 
PERMANENTE E RESERVA LEGAL NO CONTEXTO DA MlTlGA<;Ao DE MUDAN<;AS CLlMA TlCAS - MUDAN<;AS 
CLlMATlCAS, 0 CODlGO FLORESTAL, 0 PROTOCOLO DE QurOTO EO MECANISMO DEDESENVOLVIMENTO 
LIMPO, 41 (2005), (IVaiiable at 
http://www.celuloseonline.com.br/imagembankIDocslDocBanklnt5!Livro WarwickManfrinato.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2009) (providing a legal opinion supportive of CDM AIR project-activities in areas of 
permanent preservation and legal reserve in light of the current climate change and Brazilian regulatory 
framework); see 
645 See Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Dossie Mata Atldntica 2001,24-
25 (2001) (IVaiiabie at hnp:llwww.socioambiental.orglbanco imagens/pdfs/54.pdf (last visited Jun. 17, 
2008) (last visisted Jun. 23, 2008) (showing the high rates of deforestation within the period of 1990-
1995). 
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differently in the INPE report. Second, a report issued by the Nature Conservancy in 
2005 reveals a degradation business-as-usual scenario for areas of permanent 
preservation and legal reserves in spite of protective provisions in place.646 Third, 
according to data compiled from the statistical information raised by the National 
Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform ("INCRA"), up until 1998 just a small 
portion of private properties in Brazil were in compliance with the legal reserve 
requirement imposed by the Forest Code. The table below shows the percentage of 
areas within rural private properties in Brazil covered with legal reserves. It reveals that 
those areas are far from the required twenty percent, especially in those states totally or 
in part within the Atlantic Rainforest biome (Alagoas, Bahia, Ceara, Espfrito Santo, 
Goias, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso do Sui, Parafba, Pernambuco, Piauf, Parana, Rio de 
Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sui, Santa Catarina, Sergipe e Silo 
Paulo).647 
646 See WARWICK MANFRJNATO ET AL, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, AREAS DE PRESERVAc;Ao 
PERMANENTE EREsERVA LEGAL NO CONTEXTO DAMlTIGA<;Ao DEMUDAN<;AS CLIMAnCAS - MUDAN<;AS 
CLIMA TlCAS, 0 CODIGO FLORESTAL, 0 PROTOCOLO DEQUIOTO E 0 MECANISMO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO 
LIMPo, 41 (2005), available at 
http://www.celuloseonline.com.br/imagembankiDocs/DocBanklnt5/Livro WanvickManfrinato. pdf (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2009) (concluding that although the Forest Code requires afforestation and reforestation 
of areas of permanent preservation and legal reserves, the law has not been complied nor enforced 
effectively). 
647 See Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Dassie MataAtldntica 200112 
(2001) available at http://www.socioambiental.orglbanco imagens/pdfs/54.pdf(last visited Jun. 17, 
2008) . 
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Tabela 1: percentagem das areas dos imoveis rurais do Brasil cobertos 
com reserva Legal, por Estado. 
Estado 1972 1978 1992 1998 
em rela9ao a area de todos os imoveis rurais 
Rondonia 26,84 41,06 10,89 9,36 
Acre 19,06 31,54 22,35 15,07 
Amazonas 36,30 43,99 9,87 6,37 
Roraima 12,40 49,07 1,72 2,99 
Para 29,47 30,65 31,83 24,36 
Maranhao 33,70 29,70 20,40 15,91 
Amapa 8,31 11,32 8,56 6,79 
Piau! 0,96 1,40 2,16 1,95 
Ceara 1,28 1,02 0,78 0,59 
R.G. do Norte 0,72 0,40 1,91 1,19 
Parafba 1,14 0,93 1,11 0,84 
Pernambuco 1,19 1,51 1,33 0,96 
Alagoas 1,48 1,51 0,76 0,72 
Sergipe 1,19 0,71 1,38 1,79 
Bahia 2,55 3,59 3,11 3,26 
Minas Gerais 2,69 2,87 5,28 4,92 
Espirito Santo 1,51 2,27 1,73 1,20 
Rio de Janeiro 6,79 5,49 2,90 2,13 
Sao Paulo 5,59 3,46 2,64 2,70 
Parana 3,69 2,87 3,59 3,55 
Santa Catarina 2,67 2,41 2,27 2,16 
R.G. do Sui 1,64 0,94 0,57 0,57 
Malo Grosso' 16,88 17,19 20,40 18,05 
Goias" 5,77 5,06 6,17 5,76 
D. Federal 5,48 5,16 5,88 5,29 
Brasil 9,16 12,75 10,31 9,58 
Fonte: Estatisticas Cadastrais do !NCRA. *!nclui Mato Grosso do SuI. Hlnc!ui Tocantins. 
As eelulas em braneo indicam dad os nao disponiveis. 
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Once a non-compliance trend has' been identified within those areas protected by 
the Forest Code, it is important to stress the two different regeneration approaches the 
law prescribes for areas of permanent preservation and legal reserves. For the prior, no 
reforestation/afforestation effort is required from the landowner other than just 
delimitating the area and setting it aside for natural regeneration.648 For those areas 
considered legal reserves, a thirty year human-induced regeneration timetable is 
required by law.649 In practice, the reasons that make these two approaches important 
are manifold and examined below. 
For legal reserves upon which regeneration is mandatory, although the overall 
data suggests a non-compliance trend, in which case a reforestation/afforestation 
project-activity would be additional to the baseline scenario, the available information is 
over generalist and, therefore, inappropriate to serving the entire Atlantic Rainforest 
biome. States and municipalities in Brazil enjoy a great deal of power not only on 
enacting, but also on promoting compliance and enforcement mechanisms with federal 
environmentallaws.65o Therefore, what seems a non-compliance trend for the country 
can very well be different from a State and even a municipality-wise reality. The same 
analogy is valid from a State tendency in comparison to a municipality, for instance. 
Ultimately, only through a case-by-case analysis that takes into consideration the 
peculiarities of a region within the Atlantic Rainforest biome can an accurate non-
compliance trend be assessed. 
The same is applicable to areas of permanent preservation for which no 
regeneration legal requirement is in place. A general non-compliance trend does not 
take into consideration different realities throughout this vast biome. But the inexistence 
of a human-induced regeneration requirement constitutes an important distinctive 
element in comparison with areas of legal reserve. And that is because the mere 
requirement of setting the area aside, contrary to what legislators might have thought, 
648 See Executive Provisory Decree 2,166-67, (2001), available at 
http://www.planalto.goy.br/cciYiI03/MPVI2166-67.htm#art (imposing no reforestation/afforestation 
requirement over area of permanent preservation). 
649 See Law 4,77111965, art. 44, available at http://www.planaito.goy.br/cciyii03/LeisIL477l.htm. 
650 The 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution states in its articles 23, 24 and 30.I that the Federal, State and 
Municipal governments hold the environment in public trust and, consequently, are empowered to 
administer it jointly and legislate on the topic concurrently. See Constitution of the Federative Republic of 
Brazil ("Constitui,ao da Republica Federativa do Brazil") [C.F.], arts. 23,24 and 30.!, (1988). See also 
The Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University, available at 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazillbrazil.html(providing an English version of the 
Brazilian 1988 Constitution). 
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does not guarantee that the area will regenerate naturally. If, for instance, the region 
was taken over by invasive grassland species, it might not be possible for natural 
recovery, or if so, it could take a long time for that to happen. In those circumstances, 
human-induced reforestation/afforestation activities can make regeneration feasible or 
speed up a process that would not occur in the absence ofthe proposed activity. That 
was the case of a successful CDM forestry project-activity that took place within the 
Atlantic Rainforest biome.651 It is also illustrative of how carbon forest markets can 
maximize legal regeneration requirements already in place and, consequently, assist on 
promoting protective environmental laws in the Atlantic forest. 
2. Enforcement and Compliance With Federal 
Environmental Laws and Regulations 
Other than those generically applicable Forest Code provisions, additional laws 
and regulations specific to the Atlantic Rainforest may also influence the legal analysis 
of how efficient carbon forest markets mechanism are and to what extent they can be 
fully employed. That is because this specific legal framework brings about protective 
provisions and compliance and enforcement tools capable of influencing the selection of 
a baseline and additionality test set forth the CDM ru1eS.652 Also, because depending on 
the modality and requirements of alternative carbon forest markets, conservation 
practices, even when not additional, may benefit from the inflow of offsetting carbon 
credits.653 
651 See Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document for Reforestation and Afforestation 
Project-Activities, AES-Tiete Afforestation/Reforestation Project Activity Around the Borders of 
Hydroelectric Plant Reservoirs, ARNM0034. 2007, at 3, U.N. Doc FCCC/SB/2000/XX, Version 3, (Mar. 
5, 2007) (describing that although the project boundary region falls within the area of permanent 
preservation legal requirement, "nearly 100 percent of the areas within the project boundaries were 
covered with aggressive grass species, which prohibit woody species from taking root, and which, for 
more than 30 years, have not naturally regenerated."). 
652 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19, 
2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 19: 
Combined Tool to IdentifY the Baseline Scenario and Demonstrate Additionality in AIR CDA1 Project 
Activities, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007); see Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean 
Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Oct. 15-19,2007, Executive Board of the Clean Development 
Mechanism Thirty Fifth Meeting Report Annex 17: Tool for the Demonstration and Assessment of 
Additionality in AIR CDM Project Activities (Version 2), U.N. DOC CDM-EB-35 (Oct. 19,2007). 
653 The Parana State Environmental Department is stimulating afforestation/reforestation projects in areas 
of legal reserves enabling small rural landowners to participate in the carbon forest market while 
promoting compliance and enforcement with the Forest Code protective provisions See Agencia Estadual 
de Notfcias [State News Agency], Projeto Paranaense de Sequestra de Carbona Recebe 2Q Premia(:fio em 
Menos de Um Ana [State Carbon Sequestration Project Earn 2° Award in Less than One Year], available 
at http://v,'\\'w.aenoticias.pr.gov.br/modules/news/article.php?storvid-36037 (last visited, Feb. 27, 2009). 
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The 1981 Brazilian National Environmental Policy Act (Law 6,938/81) is the 
paramount federal statute below the constitutional environmental framework.654 Its 
main provisions include: enumerating instruments of environmental policy (e.g. 
environmental impact assessment, zoning, permitting, etc), establishing strict liability 
for environmental degradation and promoting a decentralized, yet coordinated 
management system ("SISNAMA") among different environmental agencies and 
organs from the federal, state and municipal governments.655 These provisions form the 
core basis of environmental law instruments of compliance and enforcement in Brazil. 
Whether they constitute an effective command-and-control system may impact on the 
extent carbon forest markets can be useful within the Atlantic forest biome. Reality has 
demonstrated that although environmental legislation in Brazil is well-designed with 
strong protective provisions, lack of compliance and enforcement is widespread 
throughout the country.656 
In addition to the substantive set of compliance and enforcement legal tools, 
Law 7,347 of 1985 empowered the Public Prosecutor's Office and Non-Governmental 
Organizations to bring suits on behalf of environmental protection.657 Similarly, a 
citizen suit provision was inserted into the 1988 Constitution658 improving the strength 
of a citizen suit statute dated from 1965, Law 4.717.659 These are all important 
instrumental enforcement provisions with power to influence the analysis of whether a 
proposed forestry project-activity would be additional to a scenario without the 
project.660 For instance, it is based on the 1985 Civil Action Act that a Public 
Prosecutor in the State of Sao Paulo is successfully raising compliance numbers with 
654 See Law 6,938/1981, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03ILeisIL6938.htm. 
655 See Law 6,93811981, arts. 6, 9 and 14 ~ I, available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/cciviI03/Leis/L6938.htm. 
656 See Colin Crowford & Guilherme Pignataro, The Insistent (And Unrelenting) Challenges Of 
Protecting Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding "The Law That Sticks", 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. I, 6 
(2007) (highlighting the overall Brazilian population feeling that written laws lack enforcement and 
compliance in practice). 
657 See Law 7,34711985, available at http://www.planalto.gov.brlcciviI03ILeis/L73470lig.htm. 
658 See Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil ("Constitui9ao da Republica Federativa do 
Brazil") [C.F.] art. 5, LXXIII (1988). See also The Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown 
University, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/ConstitutionslBrazillbrazil.html (containing an 
English version of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution) (last visited Jun. 2, 2008). 
659 See Law 4,7171I965, available at http://www.planalto.gov.brlccivil03/Leis/L4717.htm. 
660 See generally Lesley K. McAllister, Public Prosecutors and Environmental Protection in Brazil, in 
ENVlRONMENTALIssUES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 208 (Aldemaro Romero & Sarah E. 
West orgs., 2006) ("In Brazil, .... a new type of environmental enforcement - prosecutorial enforcement 
- is reshaping environmental protection. Both at the federal and state levels, the prosecutors of the 
MinisU:rio Publico have become involved in enforcing environmental laws."). 
( 
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areas designated as legal reserves by the 1965 Forest Code.661 In this particular 
instance, when the command-and-control regime is working properly, the chances a 
proposed forestry project-activity is additional to a scenario without it, are quite slim. 
Administrative and civil sanctions to non-compliance are guaranteed by Law 
9,605 of 1998662 and its regulating Decree 6,514/2008.663 Through fines and jail time 
for environmental non-compliance, Law 9,605/1998 is able to improve the degree of 
enforceability of environmental laws and, therefore, also capable of influencing the 
additionality test offorestry project-activities under the CDM. Specifically for the 
Atlantic Rainforest, those who destroy or degrade forested area in its pristine or old 
secondary or climax stages face one to three years of imprisonment and/or fines.664 
Therefore, if causation can be drawn between administrative fines and criminal 
prosecution provisions with improvement of compliance and enforcement, it may very 
well impact on whether the project-activity would be additional to the baseline scenario. 
3. Other Relevant Environmental Protective Laws and 
Regulations 
Starting in 1990, soon after the 1988 Constitution was enacted, a set of rules 
specifically designed to regulate the protection and sustainable use of the Atlantic 
Rainforest were launched. The first one was Decree 99,547 of25 September 1990.665 In 
light of the constitutional special protection conferred upon the Atlantic forest declaring 
it common heritage of the Brazilian inhabitants, Decree 99,547 had the task of 
narrowing down this general provision into more practical and regulatory actions and 
restrictions upon landowners.666 This regulation was the first step towards a specific 
661 See Edward Ferreira Filho, Public Prosecutor, Sao Paulo State Public Prosecutor's Office, Speech at 
the 13a Brazilian Environmental Law Conference: Climate Change, Biodiversity and Sustainable Energy 
Use (Jun. 5, 2008). 
662 See Law 9,60511998, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03ILeis/L9605.htm. 
663 See Decree 6,51412008, available at http://www.pianaito.gov.br/ccivil 03/ Ato2007-
20 I 0/2008IDecretoID65 I 4.htm#art 153. 
664 See Law 9,60511998, art. 38-A, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/cciviI03/Leis/L9605.htm. 
665 See Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Dassie Alata Atlantica 2001, 14 
(2001) available at http://www.socioambiental.orglbanco imagens/pdfs/54.pdf (last visited Jun. 17, 
2008) (last visisted Jun. 23, 2008) (examining the main provisions of Decree 99,547 of 1990). 
666 See Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA}, Mata Atlantica: Avam;os Legais 
e Institucionais Para sua Conservar;:ao Doc. 4 [Atlantic Rainforest: Legal and Institutional Evolution 
Towards Its Protection], 9 (Andre R. Lima & Jollo Paulo R. Capobianco orgs., 1997) (1997) CfIlaiiabie at 
http://www.socioambiental.orglbanco imagens/pdfsllOJ 03.pdf (last visited Jul. 21, 2008) (stressing that 
Decree 99,547 was the first Federal Government regulatory initiative with respect to the Constitutional 
protection conferred upon the Atlantic Rainforest). 
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legal regime for the Atlantic Rainforest biome and its set of rules were construed around 
the imposition of a general prohibition to exploit the remaining dense forested areas.667 
But the 1990 Decree was hea,:ily criticized on the grounds that: 1) it did not define the 
areas comprised by the Atlantic Rainforest biome; 2) in light of its overall ruling 
forbidding any kind of exploitation of dense forest, it was contrary to the constitutional 
provision allowing for sustainable exploitation of the biome; 3) it did not create a 
separate and differentiated regime for local and traditional commuriities; and 4) it lacked 
provisions delineating the role of state environmental authorities.668 
The 1990 Decree was soon replaced by the Decree 750/93669 which addressed 
each and every one of those abovementioned criticisms.67o In 1999, the Brazilian 
Environmental National Council ("CONAMA,,)671, concerned with the lack of a 
specific federal statute dealing with the Atlantic Rainforest biome and with the stage of 
the forest degradation, but also recognizing the social and economical needs of the 
region, agreed upon Resolution 24911999. This resolution established a detailed Plan of 
Action for Sustainable Development emphasizing conservation policies regarding the 
biome and it was a result of a combined effort congregating stakeholders from different 
sectors.672 After long years of congressional debate over a proposed legislative bill 
667 See Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Mata Atlantica: Avam;os Legais 
e Institucionais Para sua ConSerVQ9i1o Doc. 4 [Atlantic Rainforest: Legal and Institutional Evolution 
Towards Its Protection], 10 (Andre R. Lima & Joao Paulo R. Capobianco orgs., 1997) (1997) available at 
http://www.socioambientai.orgibanco imagens/pdfsIlOl03.pdf(last visited Jui. 21, 2008) (noting that 
the Decree 99,547 prohibit any kind of forest degeneration or deforestation within the Atlantic Rainforest 
biome). 
668 See Ubiracy Craveiro Araujo, Mata Atlantica - Do Disciplinamento Juridico Acerca da Competencia 
Legislaliva Para Autorizar a sua Supressiio [Atlantic Rainforest - About the Legal Framework Over 
Legislative Jurisdiction to Authorize its Suppression], in ASPECTOS JURimcos DA PROTE<;AO DA MA TA 
ATLANTICA jJURIDICALAsPECTS OF THE ATLANTIC RAINFOREST PRESERVA TION] 25, 25 (Andre R. Lima 
org., 2001) available at http://www.socioambiental.org/banco imagens/pdfs/44.pdf(1ast visited Jul. 22, 
2008) (listing the main criticisms to Decree 99,547190). 
669 See Decree 75011993, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/cciviI03/decretoIl990-19941D750.htm. 
670 See Marga Barth Tessller, Reflexoes Sobre a Tutela luridica da Mata Atlantica [Reflexions About the 
Atlantic Rainforest Legal Protection], in ASPECTOS JURimcos DAPROTE<;AO DAMATAATLANTICA 
[JURIDICAL ASPECTS OF THE ATLANTIC RAINFOREST PRESERVATION] 25, 26 (Andre R. Lima org., 2001) 
available at http://www.socioambiental.orglbanco imagens/pdfs/44.pdf(1ast visited Jul. 22, 2008) 
(stressing out that in the Decree 750/93 the lack of more precise provisions in the Decree 99,547 was 
better structured allowing for an improvement in the protection of the Atlantic Rainforest biome). 
671 See generally Luiz Fernando Henry Sani' Anna, General Overvlew of Brazilian Environmental Law, 
15-SPG INT'LL. PRACTICUM 22,22 (2002) ("National Environmental Councilor 'CONAMA' [Conselho 
Nacional do Meio Ambiente] - The main objective of CO NAMA, which is the National Council for the 
Environment, is to deliberate, within the scope of its competence, about rules and standards that are 
essential to public health and safety and that are compatible with an ecologically balanced environment, 
and to support, study, and propose to the Ministry of the Environment [ ... J governmental policy relating 
to the environment and natural resources."). 
672 See Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente [Environmental National Council], Resolution 249/1999 
[hereinafter CONAMA Resolution], available at 
http://www.mma.gov.br/portlconamallegiabre.cfm ?codlegj-249. 
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dealing specifically with the Atlantic Rainforest biome,673 in 2006 the long wait had 
come to an end with the passage of Law 11,428/2006674 and, subsequently, its 
regulatory Decree 6,660 of21 November 2008,675 instituting a definite legal framework 
specifically designed for the Atlantic Rainforest biome. 
Based on this framework legislation, the biome is divided according to different 
stages of regeneration. Only those areas classified as being in early secondary, old 
secondary, climax, and pioneer stages of regeneration have their use regulated by the 
2006 Law and the 2008 Decree.676 Areas that are already regularly and legally occupied 
with agriculture, cities, commercial forest plantations or other deforested areas are left 
out from the regulatory framework in place. Depending upon the classification of a 
specific forested area, different degrees of conservation, preservation and sustainable 
management policies apply.677 Interestingly, the Atlantic forest law does not impose 
afforestation/reforestation requirements upon landowners. It simply determines which 
degeneration and deforestation activities may and may not occur in the Atlantic forest 
areas classified by the National Environmental Council ("CONAMA") as being in early 
secondary, old secondary, climax, and pioneer stages ofregeneration.678 
Consequently, ifthe framework regime does not impose upon landowners the 
burden of afforestation/reforestation activities vis-a-vis to what the 1965 Forest Code 
mandates for areas falling under the definition oflegal reserve; carbon forestry markets 
could assist maximizing the efficiency of this legal framework in place by serving as an 
alternative to the degeneration/deforestation business-as-usual scenarios.679 
Furthermore, for the purpose of specifically meeting the CDM forestry project-activities 
673 See generally Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Mata Atldntica: 
Avan90s Legals e lnstitucionais Para sua Conservac;iio Doc. 4 [Atlantic Rainforest: Legal and 
Institutional Evolution Towards Its Protection], Intro. (Andre R. Lima & Joao Paulo R. Capobianco ergs., 
1997) (1997) available at http://www.socioambiental.orglbanco imagens/pdfsIlOl03.pdf(last visited Jul. 
21,2008) (presenting detailed information on the proposed legislative bill number 3,285/92). 
674 See Law 11,428/2006, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ Ato2004-
2006/20061LeilLi1428.htm. 
675 See Decree 6,660/2008, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ At02007-
2010/2008IDecreto/D6660.htm. 
676 See Law 11,428/2006, art. 2" available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 031 Ato2004-
?006/2006/Lei/Li J 428.htm. 
677 The technical parameters for defining the regeneration stages of areas within the Atlantic Rainforest 
biome are set forth by CONAMA resolutions. See Conselho NacionaI do Meio Ambiente [Environmental 
National Council], Resolutions 10 and 11 of 1993,1,2,4,5,6,12,25,26,28,29,30,31,32,33 and 34 of 
1994,7 of 1996,261 of 1999, and 388, 391 and 392 of 2007 available at 
htlp:llwww.mma.gov.brlport/conamallegiabre.cfm?codlegi=249. 
678 See Law J 1,428/2006, arts. 20-32, available at http://www.planallo.gov.br/ccivii 03/ Ato?004-
?00612006/LeilL i J 4? 8.htm. 
679 See above chapler 5.b.III. 
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guidelines, it is worth noticing that this new Atlantic Rainforest legislative framework 
came into force five years after the November 2001 baseline year.680 In other words, 
this set of national policies instituted by law and regulation need not to be taken into 
account for the selection of a baseline from which additionality is measured.681 
Ultimately, that reveals the CDM forestry carbon market did not constitute a perverse 
incentive holding back domestic legislators from enacting protective forestry 
provisions.682 
Additionally, the 2008 Decree 6,660 in its article 46 - regulating articles 33-35 
of Law 11,428/2006683 - states that afforestation projects within the Atlantic Rainforest, 
including those taking place on areas of permanent preservation and legal reserve under 
the 1965 Forest Code are eligible to receive economic incentives.684 These incentives 
can be either domestically stated in national legislation as well as those from 
multilateral environmental agreements related to biodiversity, forests and, more 
importantly, climate change.685 Regeneration projects in areas of permanent 
preservation and legal reserves are expressly stated as eligible to receiving economic 
incentives in spite of the above mentioned command-and-control regime put into place 
by the 1965 Forest Code provisions.686 Assuming a proposed project activity can 
overcome the additionality technicality from the selection of a baseline scenario that 
considers the current Forest Code in place,687 article 46 of Decree 6,660 is a clear 
indication to the Brazilian DNA that CDM forestry project activities aimed at 
regenerating the Atlantic Rainforest meets the country's sustainable development goals 
in light of the current legal framework. 688 Moreover, this economic policy provision 
680 See above chapter 5.b.III. 
681 See above chapter 5.b.III. 
682 See Meeting of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, Bonn, F.R.G., Feb. 22-24, 
2006, Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism Twenty Third Meeting Report Annex 19: 
National and/or Sectoral Policies and Circumstances in the Baseline Scenari%r Afforestation and 
Reforestation Project Activities, ~ 3, U.N. Doc CDM-EB-23 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
683 See Law 11,428/2006, arts. 33-35, available at http://www.planaito.gov.br/ccivil 03/ Ato2004-
2006/2006ILeiIL I 1 428.htm. 
684 See Decree 6,66012008, art. 46, available at http://vvww.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 031 Ato2007-
2010/2008IDecrcto/D6660.htm. 
685 See Decree 6,660/2008, art. 46, available at http://www.planalto.e:ov.br/ccivil 031 Ato2007-
20 I 0/2008/Decreto/D6660.htm. 
686 See Decree 6,66012008, art. 46, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ Ato2007-
2010/2008/Deereto/D6660.htm. 
687 See above chapter S.b.III. 
688 According to Decision 17/CP.7 is the host country Party's prerogative to assess whether a CDM 
project meets its sustainable development goals. See See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Morocco, Oct. 29~Nov. 10,2001, Report afthe Conference 
of the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties (Volume 
( 
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instituted by law is capable of stimulating forestry activities under the voluntary market 
with less stringent set of regulations at least for areas or permanent preservation and 
legal reserves falling within the Atlantic Rainforest biome. 
Finally, with respect to protective provisions imposed upon landowners with 
property undergoing some of the aforementioned stages of regeneration, alternative 
carbon markets that do not have strict additionality requirements may assist on 
maximizing implementation efficiency of the Atlantic Rainforest legal framework. 689 
This could shift investment options from developing a forested region undergoing a 
regeneration process to conservation activities.69o Tradable carbon credits from an 
avoided deforestation project, in that case, could constitute an attractive option for a 
forested area under development pressure. Moreover, developers would study 
alternative development options even ifmore costly in light of the potential revenue loss 
of developing an area that could profit from an avoided deforestation project. 
4. Laws 9,985 of 2000 and 11,284 of 2006 
Two other forest laws of relevance to the Atlantic Rainforest biome are Laws 
9,985 of2000691 and 11,284 of 2006.692 Although not specifically designed to the 
Atlantic forest, both laws reflect somehow the Brazilian approach to market 
mechanisms as instruments of environmental policy. These laws do not forbid project 
forestry-activities. To the contrary, Law 11,284 adds to article 9 of the 1981 National 
Environmental Policy Act economic mechanisms as an additional instrument of 
environmental policy.693 
11), Decision 17/CP.7, pmbl., U.N. DOC FCCCICP/2001113/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter COP-7 
Report - Part Two (Volume II)]. 
689 See Katherine Hamilton et aI., Carving a Niche for Forests in the Voluntmy Carbon Markets, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 292, 294 (Charlotte 
Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Unfortunately, the 
regulated market's regulatory requirements have created high cost and time barriers that exclude many 
project developers from entering the markets."). 
690 See Rosimeiry Portela et aI., The Idea a/Market-Based Mechanisms/or Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
11,14 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("In 
contrast to nonmarket approaches to forest conservation, market-based mechanisms encourage a 
particular behavior by changing the incentives for individual agents."). 
691 See Law 9,985/2000, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/cciviI03/Leis/L9985.htm. 
692 See Law 11,28412006, available at http://www.planalto .• ov.br/ccivil 031 Ato2004-
?006!2006/Lei/LlI284.htm. 
693 See Law 6,93811981, art. 9.Xlll, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/cciviI03/Leis/L6938.htm. 
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Starting with Law 9,985/2000, it institnted in Brazil the National System of 
Conservation Units ("SNUC"). The SNUC divides conservation units into two different 
categories: I) complete protection; and 2) sustainable development.694 Under each of 
these categories, specific units are defined. The differences between them is that on 
those units defined as being of complete protection, only activities that do not involve 
consumption, extractive practices, damage or destruction of natural resources are 
authorized. For sustainable development units, the direct use is authorized, meaning 
those involving sustainable natural resources exploitation for commercial purpose or 
not.695 
Those conservation units defined by law as of complete protection are: I) 
Ecologic Stations; 2) Biologic Reserves; 3) National Parks; 4) Natural Monuments; and 
5) Wildlife Refuges.696 In contrast, those under the sustainable development category 
are: I) Enviromnental Protection Area; 2) Area of Relevant Environmental Interest; 3) 
National Forests; 4) Extractive Reserves; 5) Fauna Reserve; 6) Sustainable 
Development Reserve; and 7) Private Reserve of Natural Patrimony.697 Due to the way 
some of those units are designed and conceptualized, carbon forest markets are 
irrelevant or of no applicability whatsoever. On the other hand, considering the format 
some of these units take, carbon forest markets can constitute important and additional 
regeneration and preservation incentives. 
For forest carbon markets allowing credits for avoided deforestation and that do 
not have strict additionality requirements, in principle all of conservation units of 
complete protection could potentially benefit. Because all of those units value existing 
native natural areas, which often comprises primary forested areas with high ecological 
value associated to it, carbon markets allowing for avoided deforestation could 
stimulate the conception of new units and special maintenance treatment of existing 
ones.
698 This market for forested areas of high ecological value would assist on 
694 See Law 9,985/2000, art. 7.1 and II, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03/LeisIL9985.htm. 
695 See generally Colin Crowford & Guilhenne Pignataro, The Insistent (And Unrelenting) Challenges Of 
Protecting Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding "The Law That Sticks", 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 30-
65 (2007) (examining in details Law 9,985 of2000). 
696 See Law 9,985/2000, art. 8.1-V, available at http://www.planalto.gov.brlccivil03ILeis/L9985.htm. 
697 See Law 9,98512000, art. 14.1-VII, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil03ILeisIL9985.htm. 
698 See Marisa Meizlish and David Brand, Developing Foreslly Carbon Projects/or the Voluntmy 
Carbon Market: A Practical Analysis, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND 
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 311, 313 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby lanson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Conservation, or avoided deforestation, projects prevent forests from being 
converted to nonforest land uses. Carbon credits are created by accounting for the existing volume of 
carbon sequestered in the forest. In order to claim the carbon associated with emission reductions, 
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\ 
( 
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attracting foreign funding for conservation projects. Depending on how successful this 
market turns out for existing forested areas, it would also work as an additional 
incentive to regenerate degraded areas that once were of high ecological value. After 
regenerated, the conservation unit could benefit from carbon credits. In that case, 
credits could also be generated from the afforestation/reforestation project prior to 
becoming an area of complete protection.699 
With respect to conservation units of sustainable development, considering 
natural resources exploitation are allowed in a balance between social and economic 
needs and environmental protection, carbon forest credits can assist on maximizing the 
means to achieving regeneration and preservation objectives set forth the SNUC. Areas 
named extractive and sustainable development reserves are linked to the living and 
subsistence needs of traditional populations. Fauna reserve, area of relevant 
environmental interest and environmental protection area have well defined objectives, 
such as protection of animal habitats, rare locally occurring biota and urban 
environments respectively.70o For all of these five types of special conservation units, 
while carbon credits could be theoretically generated for their forested areas under 
carbon markets, because they are limited in scope and with well defined objectives far 
from climate change mitigation, a realistic analysis suggests little, if any, positive 
carbon market influence on these types of units worthy of further investigation in this 
study. That, however, does not undermine economic market-based incentives for 
different ecosystem services.701 In addition, public subsidies through tax incentives and 
avoided deforestation projects need to establish that an immediate conversion threat exists and 
demonstrate that carbon revenues are essential to conserving fores1."). 
699 See generally Marisa Meizlish and David Brand, Developing Forestly Carbon Projects for the 
Voluntary Carbon Market: A Practical Analysis, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY 
AND MARKET OPPORTUNlTlES 311, 314 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and 
Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Concurrent with the growing interest in the carbon value of forest is a 
recent upsurge of private investment in the forestry sector. The vast amount of capital invested in timber 
production is likely to play an important part in enhancing the role of carbon sequestration in both 
voluntary and regulatory markets, as investors look to maximize returns. It is also likely that forestry 
project focused on conservation or noncommercial uses will incorporate sustainable harvesting in the 
future, because the value of standing forests needs to compete with economic drivers that are rapidly 
converting forests to agribusiness plantations."). 
700 See generally Colin Crawford & Guilherrne Pignataro, The Insistent (And Unrelenting) Challenges Of 
Protecting Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding "The Law That Sticks", 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1,40-
50 (2007) (providing a detailed examination of each of the above listed types of conservation units under 
the SNUC law). 
701 See Marisa Meizlish and David Brand, Developing FOl'estlY Carbon Projects/or the VoluntGlY 
Carbon Market: A Practical Analysis, in CUMA TE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLlCY AND 
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 311, 313 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard 
Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("There are now emerging market values for a range of ecosystem services 
compensation tend to be more effective on promoting these special sustainable 
development units.702 
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On the flip side, that is not the case for private reserves of natural patrimony and 
areas defined as national forests.703 For the prior, a landowner's initiative may impose 
upon herlhis own land a conservation easement registered with the State and that sticks 
to the property in perpetuity. For large forested areas following under private property, 
the possibility of carbon credits from avoided deforestation can serve as an effective 
incentive for landowners to transform their lands into private reserves of natural 
patrimony. Currently, those areas in Brazil are already incentivized by economic 
mechanisms such as tax breaks and subsidies.704 
Within the concept of national forests, Law 11,284/2006's main objective is to 
protect areas covered with native species allowing for sustainable exploitation of forest 
resources. That is done through a governmental grant process through which private 
parties are granted special exploitation licenses to exploit public forests. 705 Contrary to 
the abovementioned modalities of special conservation units from which carbon credit 
opportunities are assumed based on general market conceptual rules, Law 11,284/2006 
expressly regulates potential revenues from carbon forest markets deriving from any 
. 706 given grant. 
Article 16 of Law 11,284/2006 expressly forbids the commercialization of 
carbon credits deriving from avoided deforestation projects on national forests under 
including water purification, nutrient retention, and biodiversity conservation, not just the value of 
timber."). 
702 See Rosimeiry Portela et al., The Idea a/Market-Based Mechanisms/or Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 
11,16·20 (Charlotte Streck, Robett O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008). 
(providing a table listing different economic incentives for different types of forest conservation projects 
and units). 
703 See Colin Crowford & Guilherme Pignataro, The Insistent (And Unrelenting) Challenges Of 
Protecting Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding "The Law That Sticks··, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. I, 43, 
49 (2007) (defining private reserves of natural patrimony as "privately-owned land that is designated for 
perpetual use as a property in which biological diversity will be preserved."; and national forests as an 
attempt to "protect areas with forest cover with a predominance of 'native species', .... ".). 
704 See Rosimeiry Portela et al., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and 
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 
11, 19 (Charlotte Streck, Robett O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
(describing the economic mechanism applicable to the Brazilian private natural patrimony reserves as a 
"system in which landowners can designate private property as conservation areas to protect biodiversity 
in perpetuity, in exchange for rural property tax exemptions, preference in the state concession of rural 
credits, and cooperation with private and public entities in the protection, management, and handling of 
the RPPN."). 
705 See Law 11,284/2006, arts. 7-9, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 031 Ato2004-
2006/2006/LeiIL11284.htm. 
706 See Law 11,284/2006, art. 16.lV 1 2', available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 031 Ato2004-
2006/2006/Lei/L11284.htm. 
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private concession.707 At the same time, the law authorizes grant proposals to include 
commercialization rights over carbon credits from afforestation/reforestation projects.708 
On this topic, domestic legislators sent a clear message to the international community 
that for the post-20 12 commitment period, Brazil is not willing to accept avoided 
deforestation projects on national forests designed for sustainable exploitation.709 While 
such legislative intent is of little applicability to the Atlantic Rainforest, considering its 
high stage of degradation, 710 it is of relevance to the Amazon forest and of importance 
to this study because Law 11,284/2006 is the first statute expressly referring to market-
based forestry incentive. 
However, considering that Brazilian legislators clearly intended that national 
forests were to be multiply and sustainably exploited,711 setting a forested area aside for 
the pursue of avoided deforestation carbon credits does not fulfill the national forests' 
legally established basic objective. In that sense, for forested areas declared national 
forests and under a public concession, no credits from REDD might besought. Ifnot 
for REDD activities, the national forests' Act still is a landmark statute for market-
based forestry economic incentive as it constitutes the first specific legislative action 
expressly embracing afforestation/reforestation projects.712 And because of that, even 
though of limited applicability to the Atlantic forest, it can be seen as an important step 
in broadening legislative receptivity of this type of economic mechanism. 
In addition, official data reports over seven hundred conservation units within 
the Atlantic forest including those of complete protection and of sustainable use.713 
707 See Law 11,284/2006, art. 16.lV, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ At02004-
2006/2006/Lei/LlI284.htm. 
708 See Law 11,284/2006, art. 16. ~ 2", available at http://www.planalto.eov.br/ccivil 03/ At02004-
200612006/Lei/LlI284.htm. 
709 See SummQlY althe Thirteenth Conference afParties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and Third Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, EARTH NEGOTIA nONS BULL., Dec. 18, 2007, 
at 7, available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enbI2354e.pdf(highlighting Brazil's opposition to 
accept reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries). 
710 Both statutes were designed with a conservationist purpose aimed at protecting existing forests. Since 
most of the last remaining forested areas in Brazil are on the Amazon biome and very few left on the 
Atlantic Rainforest region, the prior is likely to benefit to a much greater extent from both laws' positive 
effects. See above chapter 6. 
711 See Law 9,98512000, art. 17, available at http://www.planalto.2:ov.br/cciviI03/Leis/L9985.htm. 
712 See Law 11,28412006, art. 16 ~ 2", available at hltp:llwww.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 031 Ato2004-
2006/2006/Lei/LlI284.htm. 
713 See Instituto Socioambiental (Social-Environmental Institute) [ISA], Dossie Mata Atlantica 2001,31 
(2001) available at http://www.socioambienta1.orglbanco imagens/pdfs/54.pdf(1ast visited Jun. 17, 
2008) (listing conservation units of complete protection and sustainable use withing the Atlantic 
Rainforest biome). 
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Albeit limited in scope,l14 some of these areas are already benefiting from the voluntary 
carbon forest market.715 Yet, "[pJrotected areas cover less than 2 percent of the original 
Brazilian Forest biome, and strictly protected units currently protect only 21 percent of 
remnant forests. ,,716 Because within voluntary markets no limitation to avoided 
deforestation activities exists, they are illustrative of how economic instruments can 
maximize preservation and conservation efforts of the last remaining primary Atlantic 
forested areas.7!7 Whenever voluntary carbon markets are accompanied by 
sustainability standards, in addition to promoting climate change mitigation they can 
assist on raising the region's environmental standards by valuing different ecosystem 
services.718 
Finally, because under the 2000 SNUC Law no mandatory 
afforestation/reforestation is required, it does not influence the selection of a baseline 
scenario from which additionality is measured under the CDM. Thus, it does not carry 
the burden of enjoining forestry project-activities within markets with stricter 
additionality rules.719 With respect to the abovementioned carbon credits provisions set 
forth the 2006 National Forest Act, because no comparative afforestation/reforestation 
advantage competes with the Kyoto's forestry market and due to the fact the law 
714 See Carlos Galindo~Leal and Ibsen de Gusrnao Camara, Atlantic Forest Hotspot Status: An Overview, 
in THE ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 3, 8 (Carlos Galindo·Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara 
eds., 2003) ("[I]t is difficult to assess the actual protection afforded by these protected areas because 
many of them lack the basis apparatus necessary to effectively maintain biodiversity, tools such as 
management plans, land tenure definition, plant and animal inventories, monitoring, and law enforcement. 
Although a few parks do have effective management mechanisms in place, most are only paper parks. In 
addition, many protected areas were created opportunistically, and their size, shape, and zoning may not 
be the most effective for focused conservation pourposes."). 
715 See Projetos SeqUestro de Carbono - Projetos de Ac;ao Contra 0 Aquecimento Global [Carbon 
Sequestration Projects - Action Projects Against Global Warming], available at 
http://vvww.spvs.org.br/orojetos/sdc index.pho (last visited 6 Feb. 2009) (describing ajoint sequestration 
project in the Atlantic Rainforest between SPVS [an Atlantic Rainforest·based NGO] and The Nature 
Conservancy in partnership with American Electric Power, General Motors and Chevron). 
716 Luiz Paulo Pinto and Maria Cecilia Wey de Brito, Dynamics of Biodiversity Loss in the Brazilian 
Atlantic Forest: An Introduction, in 1HEATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 27,28 (Carlos Galindo-
Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 2003) 
717 An example of voluntary initiatives aimed at promoting conservation and regeneration practices is the 
Monte Pascoal carbon forest project on the Atlantic Rainforest in the State of Bahia. See The Climate, 
Community & Biodiversity Alliance ('"CCB"), The Monte Pascoal- Pau Brasil Ecological Corridor: 
Carbon, Community and Biodiversity Initiative - Monte Pascoal Farm - CPA#i, 7, available at 
http://www.climate-standards.orglprojects/files/cpa dd caraiva.pdf(last visited 31 Mar., 2009). 
718 See generally Katherine Hamilton et al., Carving a Niche/or Forests in the VoluntGlY Carbon 
Markets, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 292,297-
304 (Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) 
(listing different standardization initiatives provided by independent organizations and programs 
incorporating concepts of sustainable development). 
719 See above chapter S.b.IIL 
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outdates the 2001 baseline year set forth the CDM forestry guidelines, it does not need 
to be taken into consideration in the selection of a baseline scenario.72o 
7. Overcoming the Obstacles to, and Adverse Impacts of, Carbon Forest 
Markets for the Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest 
In general, if well-managed and implemented, project-based forestry market 
incentives can serve many environmental, social and economic purposes and benefit 
small, rural, and poor communities and individuals. The positive aspects of forestry 
activities can overcome political, legal, and technical challenges; the risks to 
biodiversity, watersheds and of deforestation. This section, then, is dedicated to 
examining trends and proposing concrete policy actions capable of fostering a carbon 
forest market and thus contributing for the regeneration and preservation of the Atlantic 
Rainforest biome. 
a. Overcoming Political Obstacles 
Under the regulatory market set forth the Kyoto Protocol, political obstacles are 
a major barrier for further expansion of the current carbon forest market. The U.S. for 
what it represents in any international environmental negotiation and considering the 
country was among those advocating an ample use of forestry activities during the 
Kyoto negotiations is a key player to foster the regulated carbon forest market.721 By 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, it is likely that the U.S. will enhance the demand for 
carbon forest credits and thus assist on fostering the market for conservation and 
regeneration practices worldwide. In the voluntary market, North-American enterprises 
pioneered and are currently major consumers of voluntary emission reductions credits in 
the forestry sector. 
Furthermore, in the 2006 elections in the United States the Democrats took the 
majority from the Republican Party in Congress. In 2008 the Democrat presidential 
candidate, Barack Hussein Obama, was elected. In view of Democratic sensibilities 
with respect to climate change, and the fact that the Clinton Administration signed the 
720 See above chapter S.b.III. 
721 See above Chapter 4. 
Kyoto Protocol but faced a Republican Congress, one could hope a more active 
American role and involvement in the international climate change regime.722 
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On the flip side, the European Union as another major player in the international 
climate change regime is not demonstrating willingness to expand allowable forestry 
activities under the Kyoto regulated market. Two factors indicate that the EU will not 
easily accept forestry activities in the CDM in future commitment periods. The EU's 
refusal to accept credits from forestry activities in the EU ETS is the first clear . 
indication.723 In addition, should the afforestation and reforestation limitation be 
overcome in the CDM for future commitment periods, the language used in the ETS 
suggests that it is not likely that the EU will accept the expansion of allowable 
activities.724 Instead of using just the terms afforestation and reforestation in the ETS, 
legislators used the phrase LULUCF,725 which could suggest that the EU anticipated 
future attempts to broaden the scope of forestry projects in the CDM and opted to 
exclude all forestry projects in advance. 
Prospects are better off for the CDM's current limitation on forestry activities to 
afforestation and reforestation projects. Decision II/CP. 7 provides that the limitation is 
valid for only the first commitment period and that the Parties should decide upon new 
LULUCF activities for upcoming commitment periods.726 The inclusion ofREDD 
activities in the Bali Roadmap is indicative that forestry activities will be expand 
722 See JOHN R. JUSTUS & SUSAN R. FLETCHER, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR 
CONGRESS: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE II (2004) (implying that, contrary to the Bush administration, the 
Clinton administration demonstrated an affinity towards the international climate change legal regime.). 
723 See KENNETHM. CHOMITZ ET AL., WORLD BANK, OVERVIEW: AT LOGGERHEADS? AGRICULTURAL 
EXPANSION, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE TROPICAL FORESTS 23 (2007), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.ondINITROPICALFORESTlResources/2463822-
1161184206155/3060670-1161608416166/PRR-AL SAOverviewwebnonembargo.pdf("[S]ome 
observers think that tackling climate change requires paying about US$3 a ton for C02 abatement - and 
European Union (EU) members are currently paying up to US$20 a ton (though this price is volatile). In 
other words, deforesters are destroying a carbon storage asset theoretically worth US$I,500-US$10,000 
to create a pasture worth US$200-US$SOO (per hectare). Yet carbon markets, such as those under the 
Kyoto Protocol and EU Emissions Trading Scheme, do not reward forestholders for reduced emissions 
from avoided deforestation."). 
724 See Imke Sagemuller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk/or Biodiversity?, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189,233 
(2006) (noting that EU's decision not to recognize credits for LULUCF activities is premised on the 'fact 
that forestry credits can be obtained at relatively low prices, reducing emissions allowances prices and 
inhibiting domestic action aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions). 
725 See Council Directive No. 200411 OIIEC, art. 1,20040.1. L 338, at 18,21. 
726 See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10,2001, 
Report of the Conference a/the Parties on its Seventh Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties (Volume 1), Decision IIICP.7 Annex, ~ 14-15, U.N. DOC 
FCCCICP/2001113/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter] COP-7 Report - Part Two (Volume 1)]. 
c 
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beyond just afforestation/reforestation practices.727 While the Parties do not reach an 
agreement upon the rules governing the post-2012 period, the voluntary market grows 
in importance. In that sense, addressing the lack of reliable data, the fragmentation of 
the market, developing efficient registry schemes and standardization patterns is crucial 
to boost the voluntary market to the point it can be more readily used within the Atlantic 
Rainforest biome. 
h. A Stronger Link Between the Climate Change Legal Regime and 
Other Major Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
As far as CDM forestry activities are concerned, in light of environmental, 
social, and political implications arising internationally from the climate change debate, 
it is crucial that the legal regime creates links beyond those envisioned between the 
Liaison Group and the Rio Conventions.728 . The design of carbon forest projects can 
improve regional socio-economic standards and foster other ecosystem services beyond 
climate change mitigation.729 Therefore, following the example set by the FAO,73o 
stronger communications channels ought to be opened with the World Bank, and the 
International Labor Organization on the potential implications and benefits of forestry 
activities on employment conditions and opportunities.731 
727 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indonesia, 
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session, Decision lIep.13, U.N. Doc. 
FCCCICPl2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14,2008) [hereinafter COP-l3 Report-Part Two]. 
72S See Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, New Delhi, India, Oct. 23-Nov. 1,2002, Report 
a/the Conference of the Parties on its Eighth Session - Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its Eighth Session, Decision I3/CP.8, ~ 1, U.N. DOC FCCCICP/2002I71Add.1 (Mar. 28, 2003) 
(affiIming the need for enhanced cooperation between the UNFCee, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, and the Convention to Combat Desertification). 
729 See Jan Fehse, Forest Carbon and Other Ecosystem Services: Synergies Between the Rio Conventions, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 59, 59 (Charlotte 
Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Depending on their 
design, most carbon forestry projects provide one or more additional services that benefit the local, 
regional, and in some cases global community. In doing so they can also contribute to the objectives of 
the United National Millennium Declaration and of two United Nations Rio Conventions, the Convention 
to Combat Desertification (CCD) and the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)."). 
730 See KENNETHL. ROSENBAUN ET AL, FOOD & AGRIGULTUREORGANIZATlON OF THE U.N., CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND THE FOREST FACTORS: POSSIBLE NATIONAL AND SUBNA TlONALLEGISLATlON 31 (2004), 
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/faoI007/y5647e/v564 7eOO.pdf (taking into consideration the benefits 
and pitfalls of markets as tools for the encouragement of mitigation activities). 
731 See Seventh Session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Bonn, F.R.G., 
October 20-29, 1997, Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Synthesis Report on 
Activities Implemented Jointly - Note by the Secretariat, ~ 28, U.N. DOC FCCC/SBSTAII 997II2 (Oct. 7, 
1997) [hereinafter 1997 SBSTA Report] (listing improved working environments, increased economic 
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The Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity has also provided a 
paradigm to be followed in the socio-economic area by developing a specific study on 
the relationship between biological diversity and climate change.732 Firmer institutional 
cooperation beyond interconnected environmental areas would help prevent poor social 
conditions, such as the ones threatening the credibility ofCDM biofuels and biomass 
• • •• 733 project actIvItIes. 
Such links and interconnection would be similar to the ecological standards 
under voluntary markets, recognizing that the benefits of forest market incentives go 
beyond climate change mitigation. Considering the Atlantic Rainforest region 
congregates one of the world's highest rates of biodiversity, along with various socio-
economic challenges, a regulated forestry market with standards beyond climate change 
mitigation could provide an additional range of socio-economic and environmental 
benefits.734 In light ofthe above highlighted Atlantic forest's ecological and socio-
economical characteristics, a regulated forestry market with broader standards tends to 
be more promising for the Atlantic Rainforest biome than the current one under the 
Kyoto Protocol.735 
c. Environmental and Socio-Economic Impact Analyses, Assessments 
and Standards 
opportunities, and the development oflaeal production capacity as potential benefits arising from jointly 
implemented activities). 
732 See SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, INTERLINKAGESBETWEEN 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ADVICE ON THE INTEGRATION OF BIODIVERSITY 
CONSIDERA nONS INTO lHE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS KYOTO PROTOCOL 48 (2003), available at 
http://www .biodiv .orgldoc!publications/cbd-ts-l O.pdf. 
733 See Press Release, Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, IDB Targets $3 Billion in Private Sector Biofuel Projects 
(Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.iadb.orglNEWS/articledetai1.cfm?artid~3779&language~En 
(announcing investments in ethanol and biofuels production while closely examining questions regarding 
labor conditions). 
734 See Jan Fehse, Forest Carbon and Other Ecosystem Services: Synergies Between the Rio Conventions, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTIJNITIES 59, 67 (Charlotte 
Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("Forest conservation 
is a holistic approach from the point of view of ecosystem services. Preventing deforestation of an area 
conserves the whole set of ecosystem services the forest offers."). 
735 Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissionsfrom Deforestation in Developing Countries: An Introduction, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS - EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 179, 182 
(Charlotte Streck, Robert O'Sullivan, Toby Janson-Smith, and Richard Tarasofsky eds., 2008) ("The 
treatment of afforestation and reforestation under the CDM and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme is an 
example of the way overcomplex and discriminatory rules have led to a market failure in this sector."). 
( 
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The importance of environmental and socio-economic impact assessments is 
doubltless. Nonetheless, two major factors appear to limit the power of climate change 
negotiators to go beyond merely requiring preliminary analysis instead of an impact 
assessment. The first one is a legal limitation. Article 21 of the 1972 Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment ("UNCHE") clearly states that 
countries have the sovereign right to exploit their own natural resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies.736 In addition, Principle 17 ofUNCED, while 
embracing environmental impact assessments, establishes that they shall be conducted 
only when the proposed activity is likely to adversely impact the environment. 737 
The second factor seems to be of a policy nature. That is, the whole validation, 
verification, and certification process for afforestation and reforestation projects is 
already overly burdensome, bureaucratic, time consuming, and replete with high 
procedural costs. Adding an environmental and social-economic impact assessment for 
those projects that, at first, do not present the risk for any adverse impacts would make 
CDM forestry activities practically unfeasible in light ofthe aforementioned legal, 
political, and technical obstacles already apparent.738 
The same rationale is applicable to voluntary markets. If an environmental and 
socio-economic impact assessment was required regardless whether a preliminary 
analysis demonstrated that little if any probable adverse impact, it would constitute an 
additional unnecessary burden. In that sense, the development of ecological and socio-
economic standards is more effective on ensuring positive effects from a proposed 
forestry-activity than a mandatory impact assessment. 
Under the Brazilian environmental legal framework, article 225.IV of the 1988 
Brazilian Constitution states that an impact assessment is necessary for any activity 
736 See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5R 16, 1972, 
Declaration a/the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc 
AlConf.48114IRev.1 (June 16, 1972) ("States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of intemationallaw, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental policies .... "), 
737 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 17, U.N. DOC AlCONF.151/26 (Vol. 
I) (Aug. 12, 1992) ("Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for 
proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject 
to a decision of a competent national authority."). 
738 See Mark C. Trexler & Laura H. Kosloff, The 1997 Kyoto Protocol: What Does it Mean For Project-
Based Climate Change Mitigation?, 3 MITIGATION ADAPTA nON STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE 1,35 (1998) ("Overly detailed reviews of environmental impacts could require the equivalent of 
an environmental impact statement. Such a process could prove so expansive that it would impede the 
ability to prepare and fund projects. "). 
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capable of causing significant environmental degradation.739 Resolution CONAMA 1 
of 1986 list activities that are required to develop an environmental impact 
assessment.740 Among them, commercial forestry activities are included. This list is 
illustrative and the competent environmental department if convinced by a preliminary 
study that a proposed activity may adversely impact the environment, may require an 
impact assessment. According to article 6.I( c) of the CONAMA Resolution 111986, the 
socio-economic aspects of the proposed project must be included in the impact 
assessment. 741 
The main problem with the current Brazilian environmental legal framework 
with regards to environmental impact assessments is that it does not take into 
consideration the peculiarities of forestry activities under carbon markets. Currently, 
project proponents defer to the competent environmental department the answer over 
whether an impact assessment is or is not required. With the increase of proposed 
forestry activities, such a system has the potential of producing conflicting decisions. 
Therefore, a clear set of domestic regulations in tune with the international carbon forest 
market regime of requiring a preliminary analysis to verifY the potential adverse impacts 
of a proposed project creates a more stable and investment-friendly environment. 
Consequently, an increased number of high quality forestry projects are likely to take 
place within the Atlantic Rainforest biome. 
d. Promoting Good Governance and Overcoming Legal Constraints 
(Education, Capacity-Building, Public Awareness, Land Tenure, 
Transparency and Domestic Accountability) 
Article 4.1(i) of the UNFCCC called all Parties to "[pjromote and cooperate in 
education, training and public awareness related to climate change ... .',742 along with 
739 See Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil ("Constituiyao da Republica Federativa do 
Brazil") [C.F.] art. 225, IV (1988). See also The Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown 
University, available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/ConstitutionslBraziVbrazil.html (containing an 
English version of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution) (last visited Jun. 2, 2008). 
740 See Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente [Environmental National Council], Resolution 111986 
[hereinafter CONAMA Resolution], available at 
http://www.mma.goY.br/port/conamaJlegiabre.cfm ?codlegi=23. 
741 See Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente [Environmental National Council], Resolution 111986, art. 
6.1(c) [hereinafter CONAMA Resolution], available at 
http://www.mma.gov.br/portlconama/legiabre.cfm?codlegi=23. 
742 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4(1)(i), May 9, 1992, 1771 
V.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
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the promotion of education, training and public awareness.743 Under this section, each 
of the above listed socio-economic elements included in what this study refers to good 
governance are worthy of a thorough and complementary examination for a specific set 
of policies capable of addressing each one of them in the context of promoting market-
based economic incentives.744 But this would fall outside the scope set forth this thesis. 
Moreover, all of these elements are already analyzed in specific sections of this study as 
they relate to the set of policies proposed for an ampler use of forestry market-based 
incentives for the Atlantic Rainforest biome. For the purpose of this section, these 
socio-economic elements are gathered with the sole objective of reading them in light of 
a proposed climate change legislative bill numbered 3,535 of2008 currently before the 
Brazilian Congress.745 
Governmental policies are one major contributor to forest loss. With the 
Atlantic forest is no different. Public policy privileging the granting of property rights 
to settlers over those traditional and more sustainable forms ofland ownership rights is 
one such example.746 In that sense, good governance in the carbon forest market sector 
can be achieved by supporting domestic legislation that enhances the role of sinks in the 
climate change legal regime.747 Legislation could be aimed at, inter alia, combating 
corruption, regulating ownership and management of public forested areas, reconciling 
the interests of private owners (land tenure), promoting education, providing training 
743 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art.6, May 9,1992, 1771 D.N.T.S. 
107 [hereinafter VNFCCC]. 
744 See KENNETHM. CHOMITZ ET AL., WORLD BANK, OVERVIEW: AT LOGGERHEADS? AGRICULTURAL 
EXPANSION, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE TROPICAL FORESTS 22 (2007), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/1NTTROP1CALFOREST/Resources/2463822-
lI6ll84206l55/3060670-l1616084l6l66/PRR'AL SAOverviewwebnnnembar"o.pdf ("While forests 
have many environmental benefits, only two command a global constituency with potentially large 
willingness to pay for those benefits: carbon storage and conservation of globally significant biodiversity. 
Mobilizing global fmance for these environmental services is a crucial1ong-tenn challenge."). 
745 See Proposed Bill 3,535 (2008), available at 
http://www.planalto."ov.br/ccciviI03/Projetos/Ouadros/guadroPLl2008.htm 
746 See Carlos Galindo-Leal et aI., State a/the Hotspots: The Dynamics a/Biodiversity Loss, in THE 
ATLANTIC FOREST OF SOUTH AMERICA 12, 17 (Carlos Galindo-Leal and Ibsen de Gusmao Camara eds., 
2003) ("Another indirect cause of biodiversity loss is the design of many government policies. In many 
countries, government policies are more likely to grant property rights to settlers who clear and settle 
forests and other biodiversity-rich areas than to those who operate under traditional land ownership rights 
or who practice'more sustainable methods of resource use. Although traditional resource use patterns can 
be sustainable, the dynamics between poverty and inequality, higher population densities, increased 
reliance on the market economy, perverse subsidies, government policies, and new technologies have 
dramatically altered the human-nature relationship. "). 
747 See KENNETH L. ROSENBAUN ET AL., FOOD & AGRIGULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THEU.N., CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND THE FOREST FACTORS: POSSIBLE NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONALLEGISLATION 31 (2004), 
available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/faoI007/y5647e/v5647eOO.pdf ("Having a legal foundationfor forest 
[greenhouse gas] mitigation projects will enable forests to playa positive role in UNFCCC compliance."). 
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and public awareness, and ensuring transparency.748 In addition, a clear regulatory 
regime laying down the legal nature of carbon credits generated under project activities 
for the purpose of taxation is an additional element to attract investments aimed at 
fostering the market.749 
In 2008, after a long process of public consultation, a bill was proposed to the 
Brazilian Congress aimed at creating the country's National Policy on Climate 
Change.75o Although it constituted an important step towards a unified system capable 
of coordinating federal, state and municipal mitigation and adaptation strategies, it left 
unresolved the abovementioned socio-economic constraints currently facing forestry 
market-based incentives. Actually, in this regard, the bill innovates in its article 5 by 
expressly mentioning that economic policies as instruments of mitigation and adaptation 
policies are among the bill's directives.75L Furthermore, in establishing the instruments 
of the Climate Change National Policy, the bill includes those economic incentives 
currently available under the Kyoto Protocol and any other that might exist of national 
applicability. 
If not well suitable for addressing the socio-economic constraints facing project-
based forestry activities in Brazil, for the first time since the 1992 UNFCCC the country 
takes concrete action on recognizing its role on mitigation and adaptation strategies to 
combat global climate change. In addition, if the bill is successful in becoming a law it 
can trigger related legislative action capable of resolving the above listed good 
governance constraints in the forestry market sector. Ultimately, along with 
international cooperation, stronger link with other major multilateral environmental 
agreements and the proper utilization of environmental and socio-economical impact 
analysis, assessments and standards, a well planned and comprehensive domestic legal 
framework specifically designed for national strategies on climate change will create a 
748 See KENNETHM. CHOMITZ ET AL, WORLD BANK, OVERVIEW: AT LOGGERHEADS? AGRICULTURAL 
EXPANSION, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE TROPICAL FORESTS 23 (2007), available at 
http://siteresourees.worldbank.org/INTTROPICALFOREST/Resources/2463822-
1161184206155/3060670-1l6l6084l6l66IPRR-AL SAOverviewwebnonembargo.pdf (providing policy 
recommendations for maximizing forest management and conservation 'while reducing poverty), 
749 See generally GABRIEL SISTER, MERCADO DECARBONO EPROTOCOLO DEQUIOTO-AsPECTOS 
NEGOCIAIS E TRIBUTA~AO, ["CARBON MARKET AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL - TAXATION AND BUSINESS 
ASPECTS"], 33-38 (Elsevier 2007) (laying down the importance of determining the legal status of carbon 
credits (i.e. whether services or goods for the purpose of taxation in Brazil aimed at creating a more 
investor friendly environment). 
750 See Proposed Bill 3,535 (2008), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/cccivil03IProietos/Ouadros/quadroPLl2008.htm 
751 See Proposed Bill 3,535 (2008), art. 5, available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/cccivil03/Projetos/Ouadros/quadroPLl2008.htm 
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stable environment capable of promoting forestry market initiatives throughout the 
country. By addressing the above listed good governance constraints, this legal 
framework will stimulate forestry restoration and preservation projects on the Atlantic 
Rainforest biome and thus assist with compliance and enforcement efforts currently 
restricted to what has proven to be an ineffective command-and-control regime. 
8. Conclusion 
The world's tropical forests are at great risk. Among them lies the Brazilian 
Atlantic Rainforest, one of the world's richest biodiverse ecosystems. After over five 
hundred years of intense and unsustainable exploitation, the Atlantic forest is one of the 
most threatened tropical forests on Earth. Only in the past two decades, legislators 
started to agree upon a command-and-control regime aimed at curbing deforestation 
rates in this important biome. The results are still incipient. Concomitantly, international 
action towards forest conservation and regeneration strengthened during the 90s and is 
reflected in different multilateral environmental agreements (i.e. forest principles of the 
UNCED, CBD, UNFCCC and Chapter II of Agenda 21). 
Of importance to this study, a parallel forest market-based economic incentive 
inspired by philanthropic and/or corporate environmental and social responsibility 
reasons started to foster forest regeneration and conservation practices. Under the 
climate change regime set forth the UNFCCC and implemented by the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol, an international regulatory market-based economic incentive was put into 
place also aimed at inter alia at fostering forestry practices. Although limited in scope 
to human induced-afforestation and reforestation activities, the Kyoto market served to 
boost different markets worldwide while also calling for the Party's attention to expand 
the scope of allowable forestry practices for the post-2012 commitment period. Under a 
new regime, avoided deforestation practices would be accountable for in what the 
Parties named "reduce emissions from forest deforestation and degradation". The terms 
of how this new agreement will operate remains open, but fact is voluntary forest 
market initiatives have long been accepting forest conservation and preservation 
practices. 
In light of these available different forest market-based initiatives and historical 
deforestation rates and patterns of the Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest, this study proposed 
to address the following problems: 1) whether the current command-and-control regime 
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for the Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest is being successful in and sufficient to promote 
conservation and regeneration practices; 2) whether this legal framework is receptive of 
auxiliary market-based economic incentives; 3) whether existing forest market-based 
economic incentives can assist on maximizing the legal framework currently in place 
and applicable to the Atlantic Rainforest; and 4) how the Atlantic forest's legal 
framework should be construed differently to benefit from the rules ofthe available 
regulatory and voluntary carbon markets. 
In response to the first and second queries, official dated reported by satellite 
imaging revealed by the INPE demonstrates that deforestation rates for the Atlantic 
Rainforest increased over the past two decades. As of today, only 7.26% ofthe entire 
biome remains preserved. During this same period, important protective forest laws and 
regulations were enacted building upon the provisions of the 1965 Forest Code. They 
include the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, Decrees 99,547 of 1990 and 750 of 1993, 
CONAMA Resolution 249 of 1999, Laws 9,985 of2000, 11,284 and 11,428 of2006 
and the regulatory Decree 6,660 of2008. Enforcement laws were also passed during 
that time and include Laws 6,938 of 1981 (the National Environmental Policy Act), 
7,347 of 1985 (Civil Public Action) and law 9,605 of 1998 and its regulatory Decree 
6,514 of2008. While part of this legal framework is relatively recent, increased 
deforestation rates indicate that the command-and-control regime is not being effective. 
Moreover, the incorporation and reception of economic incentives as instruments of 
forest policies in some of the most recent laws (i.e. 9,985/2000, 11,284/2006 and 
11,42812006) and a proposed bill currently being debated in Congress over a national 
climate change strategy indicates an implicit recognition that additional enforcement 
and compliance efforts are necessary to curb deforestation within the Atlantic 
Rainforest biome. 
Even though broadly incorporated and not well defined by this above stated 
legal framework, market-based incentives as instruments of forestry policy is permitted 
under the Brazilian environmental legal framework. In addition to being expressly 
stated by the abovementioned laws, Brazil is a signatory and ratified the UNCED 
embracing Principle 16, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, no legal 
restriction exists to enjoin a private corporation's will to invest in forest conservation 
and regeneration projects as long as subject, evidently, to the procedural and 
instrumental environmental rules set forth the environmental legal regime. Therefore, 
( 
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no prohibition whatsoever exists on the Brazilian environmental legal framework that 
could enjoin voluntary or regulatory carbon forest markets. 
Once official deforestation data implies the failure of a regime strictly construed 
upon a command-and-control system and considering there is no limitation to the use of 
market -based incentives, this study concludes that existing carbon forest markets are 
viable, valuable and concrete initiatives to maximize the efficacy of the current Atlantic 
forest protective legal framework. For that to happen, in the regulatory market at the 
international level, political and legal obstacles including overcoming U.S. resistance to 
ratifY the Kyoto Protocol, the E.U. refusal to accept carbon forest credits in its E.T.S. 
and the expansion of current permitted activities (afforestation/reforestation) under the 
CDM to accepting avoided deforestation practices must be overcome. Stronger links 
with other multilateral environmental agreements, such as the biodiversity convention, 
the convention to combat desertification and international organizations, such as the 
International Labor Organization and the World Bank, for instance, must be sought. 
Strengthening these kinds of links is crucial for the development of project standards 
beyond just climate change mitigation and the requirement of preliminary socio-
economic analyzes. 
In addition, still under the regulatory and international level, simpler technical 
methodological rules without undermining the problems of non-
pennanence/reversibility and leakage shall be designed and planned. That reflects 
positively at the national level. According to the current baseline and additionality rules 
under the CDM, the only Brazilian law capable of enjoining a project activity is the 
1965 Forest Code when it establishes mandatory regeneration provision upon 
landowners. But if because no legally-binding regeneration action is required besides 
just setting a portion of the land aside (area of permanent preservation), or because the 
legally-binding regeneration timetable is overestimated (30 years for areas of legal 
reserves), or even because ecological hurdles (invasive species impeding natural 
regeneration) or due to a general non-compliance trend, these methodological technical 
challenges on a case-by-case basis can be overcome. 
Considering strong and effective international regulatory set of rules for a carbon 
forest market initiative has the potential to foster voluntary markets and taking into 
account their quantitative and qualitative growth over the past decade, they constitute 
additional economic incentives to boost conservation and regeneration practices on the 
Atlantic Rainforest biome. Voluntary forest markets are still far from being able to 
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impact positively on the overall problem of global warming, but they have come long 
ways. At the local level, with the engagement of not-for-profit organizations, the 
development of additional ecosystem services and socio-economic standards, voluntary 
markets started to promote sustainable forestry practices and benefit traditional 
communities. Problems like the lack of transparency due to the variety of existing 
initiatives, flexible and not always reliable set of rules and data and the inexistence of 
uniform registration, certification and verification processes are among the obstacles 
that must be overcome to incentivize further voluntary initiatives. 
Finally, for the Atlantic Rainforest to take maximum advantage of the promising 
benefits from market-based incentives, the legal framework currently in place must be 
construed differently. Economic incentives as instruments of forestry policy as stated 
by the above mentioned forest laws are broad in nature and therefore leave unresolved 
critical aspects of good governance and political constraints that constitute important 
elements to foster carbon forest markets. These elements include promoting 
environmental education and capacity-building, public awareness, a more efficient 
system of property rights and land-tenure, transparency and, above all, domestic 
accountability. Ideally, they should be addressed as part of the proposed national 
climate change plan of action currently being debated in Congress. But because that can 
take a long time to be effectively implemented, combined federal, state and municipal 
efforts in addressing those issues through legislation and regulation, community 
involvement, integrated and coordinated environmental and socio-economic 
enforcement and compliance actions must be developed to minimize the adverse 
impacts of poor governance and political constraints upon carbon forest markets within 
the Atlantic Rainforest biome. 
The Brazilian Atlantic Rainforest is just a small part of the problem, but at the 
same time an extremely useful case-study. An area that was once over twice the size of 
France and is left to less than ten percent of its original size and still holds one of the 
world's highest rates of biodiversity, if can be saved by the current climate change 
regime, it can offer not only a remarkable sign to policy-makers around the world in 
charge ofthreatened tropical forests, but can also improve the quality of millions of 
Brazilian inhabitants. Additionally, if carbon forest markets are successful in promoting 
conservation and regeneration policies on the Atlantic Rainforest biome, along with the 
benefits to the global climate, many other ecosystem services will be restored, 
something that the Convention on Biological Diversity has long ascribed to .be of 
( 
common concern of humankind. In the end, everything seems to come down to a 
general proverb recalled by James Gustave Speth that states: "conservation without 
money is conversation.,,752 
752 JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNlNG42 (2004). 
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